

## Office of the Comptroller of the Currency December 2001

Comptroller
John D. Hawke Jr.

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## Background

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) was established in 1863 as a bureau of the Department of the Treasury. The OCC is headed by the Comptroller, who is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a five-year term.

The OCC regulates national banks by its power to:

- Examine the banks;
- Approve or deny applications for new charters, branches, capital, or other changes in corporate or banking structure;
- Take supervisory actions against banks that do not conform to laws and regulations or that otherwise engage in unsound banking practices, including removal of officers, negotiation of agreements to change existing banking practices, and issuance of cease and desist orders; and
- Issue rules and regulations concerning banking practices and governing bank lending and investment practices and corporate structure.

The OCC divides the United States into six geographical districts, with each headed by a deputy comptroller.

The OCC is funded through assessments on the assets of national banks, and federal branches and agencies. Under the International Banking Act of 1978, the OCC regulates federal branches and agencies of foreign banks in the United States.

## The Comptroller

Comptroller John D. Hawke Jr. has held office as the 28th Comptroller of the Currency since December 8, 1998, after being appointed by President Clinton during a congressional
recess. He was confirmed subsequently by the U.S. Senate for a five-year term starting on October 13, 1999. Prior to his appointment Mr. Hawke served for $31 / 2$ years as Under Secretary of the Treasury for Domestic Finance. He oversaw development of policy and legislation on financial institutions, debt management, and capital markets; served as chairman of the Advanced Counterfeit Deterrence Steering Committee; and was a member of the board of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation. Before joining Treasury, he was a senior partner at the Washington, D.C., law firm of Arnold \& Porter, which he joined as an associate in 1962. In 1975 he left to serve as general counsel to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, returning in 1978. At Arnold \& Porter he headed the financial institutions practice. From 1987 to 1995 he was chairman of the firm.

Mr. Hawke has written extensively on the regulation of financial institutions, including Commentaries on Banking Regulation, published in 1985. From 1970 to 1987 he taught courses on federal regulation of banking at Georgetown University Law Center. He has also taught courses on bank acquisitions and serves as chairman of the Board of Advisors of the Morin Center for Banking Law Studies. In 1987 Mr. Hawke served on a committee of inquiry appointed by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange to study the role of futures markets in the October 1987 stock market crash. He was a founding member of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, and served on it until joining Treasury.

Mr. Hawke was graduated from Yale University in 1954 with a B.A. in English. From 1955 to 1957 he served on active duty with the U.S. Air Force. After graduating in 1960 from Columbia University School of Law, where he was editor-inchief of the Columbia Law Review, Mr. Hawke clerked for Judge E. Barrett Prettyman on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. From 1961 to 1962 he was counsel to the Select Subcommittee on Education, U.S. House of Representatives.

The Quarterly Journal is the journal of record for the most significant actions and policies of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. It is published four times a year. The Quarterly Journal includes policy statements, decisions on banking structure, selected speeches and congressional testimony, material released in the interpretive letters series, statistical data, and other information of interest to the administration of national banks. Send suggestions or questions to Rebecca Miller, Senior Writer-Editor, Communications Division, Comptroller of the Currency, Washington, DC 20219. Subscriptions are available for $\$ 100$ a year by writing to Publications-QJ, Comptroller of the Currency, P.O. Box 73150, Chicago, IL 60673-7150. The Quarterly Journal is on the Web at http://www.occ.treas.gov/qj/qj.htm.

# Quarterly J ournal 



# Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 

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Comptroller of the Currency

The Administrator of National Banks

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## Condition and Performance of Commercial Banks

## Summary

Bank earnings fell during the third quarter, as the recession cut into noninterest income, and banks adjusted to weakness in their loan books by boosting provisions. With both earnings and capital strong by standards of recent history, however, the industry is well positioned to absorb the costs imposed by a recession.

Figure 1-ROE slips in third quarter
Commercial and National Bank ROE
Percent


* 2001 data as of September 30, 2001. All other data as of year-end. Shaded areas represent periods of recession.
Source: Integrated Banking Information Sytem

The early months of the economic slowdown saw the greatest impact on the manufacturing sector, with output declining for all major market and industry groups except mining. Not surprisingly, commercial and industrial (C\&I) loan volume slowed as a result. During the second and third quarters, signs of recession spread from the manufacturing sector to the consumer sector. The economy lost 1.2 million jobs between March and November; this compares with 1.8 million jobs lost in the recession of 199091.

As the economy has weakened, credit quality has suffered. Noncurrent loan ratios rose for all major classes of loans-particularly for C\&I and construction loans at large banks and for credit card loans at small banks. Although provisions continue to exceed charge-offs, rapid growth in the noncurrent ratio has led to a decline in the reserve coverage ratio. Higher provisioning requirements will likely continue for at least several more quarters, as nonperforming and charge-off ratios remain high.

Figure 2-Noncurrent loans are increasing
National Banks Percent


Noncurrent loans as a percent of loans in respective category. Source: Integrated Banking Information System

Large banks have been hit disproportionately hard by credit quality deterioration. Moreover, market-sensitive income, on which many large banks depend, has fallen sharply from the record highs of recent years. International income, another important element on the income statements of many large banks, is unlikely to provide much of a boost, given the synchronized global slowdown now taking place. On the positive side, large banks have seen substantial increases in net interest income, and in potential gains from available-for-sale securities. For both small and large banks, loan growth will remain slow until the economy picks up.

## Key Trends

In the third quarter, return on equity for national banks fell to 12.3 percent, down from 15.4 percent a year ago, and record-high 16-plus-percent levels recorded in the midand late-1990s. Increased provisioning accounted for most of the decline. Third-quarter income fell $\$ 1.2$ billion ( 12 percent), compared with the third quarter of 2000 , as increased provisioning more than offset an increase in net interest income.

Driving the decline was a large increase in provisioningnearly double the figure for third-quarter 2000-as banks adjusted to a fall in credit quality. In addition, the weaker economy pushed down banks' noninterest income. On the positive side, banks in the aggregate, and large

Table 1-Increased provisioning costs and slippage in noninterest income main factors in weaker earnings

|  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | National Banks |  |  |
|  | Sep-00 | Sep-01 | Change |
| Positives |  |  |  |
| Net interest income | 29,132 | 31,415 | 2,283 |
| Real gains/losses sec | -399 | 585 | 984 |
| Negatives |  |  |  |
| Provisioning | 4,490 | 8,219 | 3,729 |
| Noninterest income | 25,516 | 24,425 | $-1,091$ |
| Noninterest expense | 32,358 | 33,004 | 646 |
| Net income | 11,097 | 9,803 | $-1,294$ |

Source: Integrated Banking Information System
banks in particular, saw a surge in net interest income as the Federal Reserve continued to push down interest rates.

Noncurrent loan ratios and charge offs are likely to remain high for several quarters after the end of the recession. In the 1990-91 recession, for example, the noncurrent ratio rose by an average of 57 basis points for the three quarters of the recession, and for three quarters afterwards. The charge-off ratio rose by an average of 25 basis points over those six quarters. If that pattern were to occur again, and banks were to maintain the same ratio of reserves to noncurrent loans, provisions would have to rise by about $\$ 40$ billion-about 40 percent of pre-recession earnings-over 6 quarters. Thus, earnings may not return soon to the exalted levels of the last several years. More-

Figure 3-Based on past experience, credit quality problems will continue after recovery starts


Quarterly data. Shaded area represent period of recession. Source: Integrated Banking Information System
over, some banks will have to look elsewhere for a way to pay for provisioning requirements. Some will sell appreciated securities; others may reduce dividends.

Generally high capital levels give banks a better cushion against this recession than they had in 1990. The improvement is particularly noticeable at the low end of the capital range. For example, only 1 percent of national banks had a risk-based capital ratio of less than 9.5 percent in 2001, as against about 15 percent in 1990. Today, almost all banks have at least adequate levels of capital, providing a valuable buffer against the risks posed by a recession.

Figure 4-Percent of national banks with given levels of risk-based capital


In addition, banks hold substantial quantities of available-for-sale securities, mostly bonds, which have risen in value as interest rates have fallen. The potential gains from the sale of these securities affords banks additional protection in covering their extra provisioning costs over the next several quarters, particularly while the economy remains weak and interest rates low. A rise in interest rates, however, would reduce the value of bonds, so this appreciation cannot be counted on as a consistent source of protection.

The manufacturing sector continues to suffer the greatest impact from the recession. Manufacturing output is now 8 percent below the peak reached 18 months ago; this is close to the post-war record decline of 10.8 percent set in the recession of 1981-82. The purchasing managers' index fell to an 11-year low in October. Even after a modest rise in November, the index has remained below the critical level of 50 for 16 consecutive months. The recession has hit corporate profits particularly hard, coming as it does after a three-year squeeze on corporate profit margins; profits as a share of corporate gross domestic product (GDP) have now matched the postwar lows reached in 1982.

Figure 5-Banks also have sizable potential gains on sales of securities if interest rates remain low


* 2001 data through September. All other data as of year-end.

Source: Integrated Banking Information System

For banks, the result has been a decline in C\&I loan volume. Through the third quarter, commercial banks' C\&I portfolios are down 5 percent for the year. This will be the first year in a decade in which C\&l loan volumes actually drop. The decline is concentrated in large banks, many of whose large corporate clients can now go directly to the bond market and replace short-term debt (commercial paper and bank loans) with longer-term debt, mostly bonds. Not surprisingly, bond issuance has risen sharply in 2001. In contrast, smaller banks have expanded their C\&I portfolios; nearly half of smaller banks reported C\&I loan growth of over 10 percent from a year earlier.

The recession has now spread beyond the manufacturing sector to the service and consumer sectors. By October, unemployment rates were up 1 percent or more over a year earlier in 19 states, with many of the new additions to the list, including Florida, Virginia, and Arizona, and Hawaii concentrated in the service sector. Consumer confidence, which had been falling since the beginning of the year, continued to fall in the third quarter, and is now about 25 percent below its peak. The consumer debt burden (debt service payments as a percent of disposable personal income) remains near the historical peak. Although consumer spending has continued to grow, the fall in consumer income that accompanies the recession will make this difficult to sustain.

Large banks have suffered from the sharp drop in marketsensitive income, which is heavily concentrated in a few
banks: just 10 banks earn 75 percent of market-sensitive income. The synchronized global slowdown has also restrained large banks' international income. In contrast, during the last recession, both Japan and Europe were growing, boosting earnings for U.S. banks with an active international presence. For banks with over $\$ 10$ billion in assets reporting international income, international income represented over 60 percent of total net income from 1990 to 1992. Over the last three years, however, the ratio has remained below 40 percent.

Figure 6-Large banks have seen gains on net interest income
Median NIM for Non-specialty National Banks Percent


Source: Integrated Banking Information System. Excludes specialty banks that have credit card loans (or securitized credit card credits) in excess of $25 \%$ of assets or loans less than $10 \%$ of assets.

Falling interest rates have helped large banks, which are net borrowers in the interbank market. They have gained particularly because the sharpest drop in rates has occurred in the shorter maturities, which dominate the interbank market. At the same time, falling rates have hurt those small banks that are net lenders. This is what happens in spot markets: buyers (borrowers) benefit, at the expense of sellers, when spot prices are falling. For both net borrowers and net lenders, net interest margins can be expected to return to more normal levels over time as banks reprice their loans.

Small banks face their own set of pressures. Net interest margins have fallen for small banks that lend heavily into the interbank market. Although credit quality in the aggregate has held up better at small banks than large banks, the consumer credit portfolio has deteriorated. Small banks have been increasing provisions to offset this deterioration. This provisioning will have to continue for several more quarters at least.

## Key indicators, FDIC-insured national banks

 Annual 1997-2000, year-to-date through September 30, 2001, third quarter 2000, and third quarter 2001 (Dollar figures in millions)|  |  |  |  |  | Preliminary | Preliminary |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## Loan performance, FDIC-insured national banks

 Annual 1997-2000, year-to-date through September 30, 2001, third quarter 2000, and third quarter 2001 (Dollar figures in millions)|  | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | Preliminary 2001YTD | 2000Q3 | Preliminary 2001Q3 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Percent of loans past due 30-89 days |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total loans and leases. | 1.32 | 1.27 | 1.16 | 1.26 | 1.37 | 1.14 | 1.37 |
| Loans secured by real estate (RE) | 1.39 | 1.33 | 1.22 | 1.42 | 1.28 | 1.21 | 1.28 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages | 1.65 | 1.50 | 1.61 | 1.95 | 1.56 | 1.60 | 1.56 |
| Home equity loans | 0.93 | 0.97 | 0.77 | 1.07 | 0.93 | 0.93 | 0.93 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 1.33 | 0.94 | 0.69 | 0.59 | 0.72 | 0.58 | 0.72 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 0.95 | 1.02 | 0.70 | 0.72 | 0.81 | 0.64 | 0.81 |
| Construction RE loans | 1.63 | 1.82 | 1.07 | 1.12 | 1.36 | 1.08 | 1.36 |
| Commercial and industrial loans* | 0.76 | 0.81 | 0.71 | 0.71 | 0.95 | 0.70 | 0.95 |
| Loans to individuals | 2.52 | 2.44 | 2.36 | 2.40 | 2.33 | 2.28 | 2.33 |
| Credit cards. | 2.75 | 2.52 | 2.53 | 2.50 | 2.65 | 2.49 | 2.65 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 2.34 | 2.37 | 2.24 | 2.31 | 2.32 | 2.11 | 2.32 |
| All other loans and leases. | 0.46 | 0.46 | 0.50 | 0.58 | 1.35 | 0.58 | 1.35 |
| Percent of loans noncurrent |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total loans and leases. | 0.97 | 0.97 | 0.98 | 1.22 | 1.46 | 1.09 | 1.46 |
| Loans secured by real estate (RE) | 1.07 | 0.98 | 0.87 | 0.93 | 1.01 | 0.86 | 1.01 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages | 1.01 | 0.95 | 0.91 | 1.06 | 0.99 | 0.92 | 0.99 |
| Home equity loans | 0.43 | 0.41 | 0.32 | 0.41 | 0.43 | 0.39 | 0.43 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 1.01 | 0.88 | 0.43 | 0.55 | 0.41 | 0.40 | 0.41 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 1.27 | 1.01 | 0.84 | 0.77 | 1.02 | 0.81 | 1.02 |
| Construction RE loans | 1.00 | 0.80 | 0.63 | 0.82 | 1.20 | 0.74 | 1.20 |
| Commercial and industrial loans | 0.78 | 0.86 | 1.11 | 1.66 | 2.23 | 1.50 | 2.23 |
| Loans to individuals | 1.49 | 1.59 | 1.52 | 1.46 | 1.48 | 1.44 | 1.48 |
| Credit cards. | 2.03 | 2.06 | 2.00 | 1.89 | 2.09 | 1.89 | 2.09 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 1.04 | 1.19 | 1.16 | 1.06 | 1.14 | 1.05 | 1.14 |
| All other loans and leases. | 0.27 | 0.31 | 0.40 | 0.85 | 1.25 | 0.53 | 1.25 |
| Percent of loans charged-off, net |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total loans and leases. | 0.71 | 0.75 | 0.70 | 0.80 | 0.99 | 0.69 | 1.17 |
| Loans secured by real estate (RE) | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 0.12 | 0.26 | 0.13 | 0.47 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.37 | 0.13 | 0.76 |
| Home equity loans. | 0.18 | 0.16 | 0.19 | 0.23 | 0.29 | 0.27 | 0.35 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 0.01 | 0.07 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.06 |
| Commercial RE loans. | -0.01 | -0.02 | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.12 | 0.08 | 0.16 |
| Construction RE loans | -0.10 | -0.01 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.14 |
| Commercial and industrial loans* | 0.27 | 0.38 | 0.54 | 0.87 | 1.21 | 0.70 | 1.36 |
| Loans to individuals | 2.86 | 2.92 | 2.65 | 2.84 | 2.88 | 2.54 | 3.13 |
| Credit cards. | 4.95 | 5.03 | 4.51 | 4.43 | 4.69 | 4.23 | 5.16 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 1.20 | 1.23 | 1.27 | 1.54 | 1.48 | 1.14 | 1.63 |
| All other loans and leases. | 0.10 | 0.53 | 0.31 | 0.32 | 0.44 | 0.21 | 0.55 |
| Loans outstanding (\$) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total loans and leases. | \$1,840,485 | \$2,015,585 | \$2,127,933 | \$2,227,071 | \$2,235,513 | \$2,226,940 | \$2,235,513 |
| Loans secured by real estate (RE) | 725,305 | 764,944 | 853,141 | 892,152 | 938,893 | 900,899 | 938,893 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages | 363,329 | 381,597 | 433,807 | 443,088 | 450,840 | 456,723 | 450,840 |
| Home equity loans. | 67,669 | 66,091 | 67,267 | 82,672 | 95,639 | 80,373 | 95,639 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 23,346 | 23,201 | 26,561 | 28,021 | 30,263 | 28,149 | 30,263 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 190,067 | 200,469 | 214,145 | 221,218 | 231,741 | 219,914 | 231,741 |
| Construction RE loans | 47,410 | 56,261 | 71,578 | 76,884 | 89,998 | 75,879 | 89,998 |
| Farmland loans. | 10,178 | 10,930 | 11,957 | 12,346 | 12,670 | 12,341 | 12,670 |
| RE loans from foreign offices | 23,306 | 26,396 | 27,825 | 27,923 | 27,741 | 27,519 | 27,741 |
| Commercial and industrial loans | 508,589 | 583,903 | 622,006 | 646,995 | 618,076 | 649,897 | 618,076 |
| Loans to individuals. | 371,477 | 386,410 | 348,634 | 370,363 | 372,891 | 353,795 | 372,891 |
| Credit cards*. | 168,236 | 176,408 | 147,179 | 176,372 | 156,182 | 162,139 | 156,182 |
| Other revolving credit plans | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 21,049 | 0 | 21,049 |
| Installment loans. . . . . . | 203,241 | 210,003 | 201,455 | 193,991 | 195,660 | 191,655 | 195,660 |
| All other loans and leases. | 237,326 | 282,367 | 306,042 | 319,145 | 307,094 | 323,866 | 307,094 |
| Less: Unearned income | 2,212 | 2,039 | 1,890 | 1,584 | 1,441 | 1,516 | 1,441 |

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## Key indicators, FDIC-insured national banks by asset size Third quarter 2000 and third quarter 2001

(Dollar figures in millions)

|  | Less than \$100M |  | \$100M to \$1B |  | \$1B to \$10B |  | Greater than \$10B |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2000Q3 | 2001Q3 | 2000Q3 | 2001Q3 | 2000Q3 | 2001Q3 | 2000Q3 | 2001Q3 |
| Number of institutions reporting. | 1,126 | 1,027 | 940 | 974 | 132 | 131 | 44 | 41 |
| Total employees (FTEs). | 27,835 | 24,318 | 95,432 | 96,152 | 116,502 | 110,579 | 705,614 | 716,666 |
| Selected income data (\$) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Net income | \$147 | \$133 | \$766 | \$795 | \$1,724 | \$1,528 | \$8,459 | \$7,347 |
| Net interest income | 600 | 519 | 2,483 | 2,544 | 3,823 | 4,199 | 22,225 | 24,153 |
| Provision for loan losses | 37 | 40 | 278 | 243 | 573 | 821 | 3,602 | 7,114 |
| Noninterest income | 278 | 228 | 1,325 | 1,413 | 3,594 | 2,790 | 20,319 | 19,994 |
| Noninterest expense | 635 | 529 | 2,388 | 2,569 | 4,031 | 3,916 | 25,305 | 25,990 |
| Net operating income | 148 | 133 | 782 | 777 | 1,776 | 1,476 | 8,884 | 7,036 |
| Cash dividends declared | 76 | 83 | 357 | 423 | 794 | 1,040 | 5,912 | 5,558 |
| Net charge-offs to loan and lease reserve. | 23 | 32 | 180 | 174 | 439 | 699 | 3,163 | 5,677 |
| Selected condition data (\$) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total assets | 57,170 | 53,299 | 245,058 | 256,641 | 401,927 | 411,484 | 2,659,339 | 2,823,087 |
| Total loans and leases | 34,277 | 31,929 | 156,675 | 161,030 | 253,165 | 261,168 | 1,782,824 | 1,781,386 |
| Reserve for losses | 456 | 431 | 2,148 | 2,270 | 4,514 | 5,439 | 32,126 | 35,027 |
| Securities. | 15,198 | 12,727 | 61,814 | 60,801 | 91,362 | 84,949 | 340,954 | 368,038 |
| Other real estate owned | 67 | 70 | 189 | 254 | 160 | 175 | 1,113 | 1,307 |
| Noncurrent loans and leases | 323 | 345 | 1,301 | 1,593 | 2,186 | 2,821 | 20,487 | 27,875 |
| Total deposits | 47,989 | 44,747 | 197,872 | 206,789 | 264,628 | 264,478 | 1,684,464 | 1,780,575 |
| Domestic deposits | 47,978 | 44,747 | 197,416 | 206,427 | 261,312 | 261,757 | 1,261,790 | 1,395,891 |
| Equity capital. | 6,360 | 6,175 | 23,961 | 26,276 | 37,254 | 40,300 | 225,186 | 256,440 |
| Off-balance-sheet derivatives. | 22 | 56 | 1,434 | 2,929 | 32,030 | 38,821 | 14,659,322 | 19,768,726 |
| Performance ratios (annualized \%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Return on equity . | 9.41 | 8.72 | 13.06 | 12.32 | 19.00 | 15.47 | 15.23 | 11.86 |
| Return on assets. | 1.05 | 1.01 | 1.26 | 1.25 | 1.73 | 1.50 | 1.28 | 1.06 |
| Net interest income to assets. | 4.25 | 3.94 | 4.09 | 4.01 | 3.83 | 4.13 | 3.35 | 3.47 |
| Loss provision to assets | 0.26 | 0.31 | 0.46 | 0.38 | 0.57 | 0.81 | 0.54 | 1.02 |
| Net operating income to assets | 1.05 | 1.01 | 1.29 | 1.22 | 1.78 | 1.45 | 1.34 | 1.01 |
| Noninterest income to assets. | 1.97 | 1.74 | 2.18 | 2.23 | 3.60 | 2.75 | 3.06 | 2.87 |
| Noninterest expense to assets. | 4.50 | 4.02 | 3.93 | 4.05 | 4.04 | 3.85 | 3.82 | 3.73 |
| Loss provision to loans and leases | 0.44 | 0.51 | 0.72 | 0.61 | 0.92 | 1.27 | 0.81 | 1.58 |
| Net charge-offs to loans and leases | 0.27 | 0.41 | 0.46 | 0.44 | 0.70 | 1.08 | 0.72 | 1.26 |
| Loss provision to net charge-offs. | 159.56 | 125.06 | 154.62 | 139.35 | 130.43 | 117.56 | 113.87 | 125.33 |
| Performance ratios (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Percent of institutions unprofitable. | 10.04 | 11.98 | 2.45 | 4.11 | 6.82 | 4.58 | 9.09 | 4.88 |
| Percent of institutions with earnings gains. | 58.61 | 47.52 | 62.02 | 59.96 | 54.55 | 61.83 | 47.73 | 60.98 |
| Nonint. income to net operating revenue. | 31.66 | 30.57 | 34.79 | 35.70 | 48.45 | 39.92 | 47.76 | 45.29 |
| Nonint. expense to net operating revenue. | 72.31 | 70.80 | 62.71 | 64.94 | 54.34 | 56.02 | 59.48 | 58.87 |
| Condition ratios (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Nonperforming assets to assets | 0.68 | 0.78 | 0.61 | 0.72 | 0.60 | 0.74 | 0.83 | 1.05 |
| Noncurrent loans to loans. | 0.94 | 1.08 | 0.83 | 0.99 | 0.86 | 1.08 | 1.15 | 1.56 |
| Loss reserve to noncurrent loans. | 140.92 | 124.99 | 165.11 | 142.47 | 206.45 | 192.81 | 156.81 | 125.66 |
| Loss reserve to loans. | 1.33 | 1.35 | 1.37 | 1.41 | 1.78 | 2.08 | 1.80 | 1.97 |
| Equity capital to assets | 11.12 | 11.59 | 9.78 | 10.24 | 9.27 | 9.79 | 8.47 | 9.08 |
| Leverage ratio | 11.22 | 11.21 | 9.66 | 9.54 | 8.41 | 8.45 | 7.20 | 7.40 |
| Risk-based capital ratio. | 17.94 | 18.16 | 14.78 | 14.68 | 13.36 | 13.85 | 11.50 | 11.88 |
| Net loans and leases to assets | 59.16 | 59.10 | 63.06 | 61.86 | 61.86 | 62.15 | 65.83 | 61.86 |
| Securities to assets | 26.58 | 23.88 | 25.22 | 23.69 | 22.73 | 20.64 | 12.82 | 13.04 |
| Appreciation in securities (\% of par). | -1.39 | 2.27 | -1.51 | 2.37 | -1.45 | 2.16 | -1.55 | 1.67 |
| Residential mortgage assets to assets. | 21.39 | 21.77 | 24.61 | 24.68 | 26.95 | 26.95 | 18.80 | 20.32 |
| Total deposits to assets. | 83.94 | 83.95 | 80.75 | 80.58 | 65.84 | 64.27 | 63.34 | 63.07 |
| Core deposits to assets. | 71.33 | 70.48 | 67.75 | 67.08 | 55.14 | 54.09 | 40.56 | 43.00 |
| Volatile liabilities to assets. . . . . . . . . . . | 15.31 | 15.25 | 18.83 | 17.93 | 28.00 | 25.78 | 39.20 | 34.99 |

## Loan performance, FDIC-insured national banks by asset size Third quarter 2000 and third quarter 2001

(Dollar figures in millions)

|  | Less than \$100M |  | \$100M to \$1B |  | \$1B to \$10B |  | Greater than \$10B |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2000Q3 | 2001Q3 | 2000Q3 | 2001Q3 | 2000Q3 | 2001Q3 | 2000Q3 | 2001Q3 |
| Percent of loans past due 30-89 days |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total loans and leases. | 1.23 | 1.42 | 1.11 | 1.29 | 1.25 | 1.36 | 1.13 | 1.38 |
| Loans secured by real estate (RE) | 1.05 | 1.21 | 0.87 | 1.07 | 0.91 | 0.97 | 1.33 | 1.37 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages. | 1.40 | 1.51 | 1.08 | 1.28 | 0.97 | 0.94 | 1.79 | 1.71 |
| Home equity loans. | 0.76 | 0.81 | 0.70 | 0.77 | 0.86 | 0.89 | 0.96 | 0.94 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 0.54 | 0.97 | 0.42 | 0.44 | 1.01 | 0.94 | 0.49 | 0.71 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 0.72 | 0.96 | 0.65 | 0.87 | 0.80 | 0.81 | 0.58 | 0.79 |
| Construction RE loans | 1.16 | 1.28 | 1.04 | 1.37 | 0.94 | 1.48 | 1.12 | 1.33 |
| Commercial and industrial loans* | 2.03 | 1.84 | 1.53 | 1.39 | 1.14 | 1.54 | 0.61 | 0.87 |
| Loans to individuals. | 1.97 | 2.35 | 1.91 | 2.46 | 2.37 | 2.31 | 2.30 | 2.32 |
| Credit cards. | 2.04 | 2.72 | 2.84 | 5.48 | 2.71 | 2.77 | 2.44 | 2.56 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 1.96 | 2.38 | 1.69 | 1.97 | 2.15 | 2.09 | 2.16 | 2.40 |
| All other loans and leases. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.94 | 1.07 | 0.58 | 1.40 |
| Percent of loans noncurrent |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total loans and leases. | 0.94 | 1.08 | 0.83 | 0.99 | 0.86 | 1.08 | 1.15 | 1.56 |
| Loans secured by real estate (RE) | 0.74 | 0.93 | 0.66 | 0.81 | 0.63 | 0.81 | 0.94 | 1.08 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages. | 0.63 | 0.81 | 0.60 | 0.71 | 0.56 | 0.69 | 1.03 | 1.09 |
| Home equity loans. | 0.21 | 0.39 | 0.40 | 0.37 | 0.33 | 0.45 | 0.40 | 0.43 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 0.43 | 0.64 | 0.27 | 0.51 | 0.40 | 0.37 | 0.42 | 0.41 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 0.77 | 1.03 | 0.77 | 0.91 | 0.75 | 0.93 | 0.84 | 1.08 |
| Construction RE loans | 0.68 | 0.71 | 0.54 | 0.94 | 0.69 | 1.22 | 0.79 | 1.26 |
| Commercial and industrial loans* | 2.48 | 1.81 | 1.60 | 1.48 | 1.25 | 1.67 | 1.51 | 2.33 |
| Loans to individuals | 0.65 | 0.78 | 0.80 | 1.14 | 1.29 | 1.43 | 1.53 | 1.52 |
| Credit cards. | 1.09 | 1.74 | 2.23 | 4.40 | 2.23 | 2.41 | 1.83 | 1.98 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 0.63 | 0.76 | 0.48 | 0.56 | 0.67 | 0.76 | 1.23 | 1.30 |
| All other loans and leases. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.33 | 0.52 | 0.55 | 1.32 |
| Percent of loans charged-off, net |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total loans and leases. | 0.27 | 0.41 | 0.46 | 0.44 | 0.70 | 1.08 | 0.72 | 1.26 |
| Loans secured by real estate (RE) | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.13 | 0.16 | 0.14 | 0.60 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages.. | 0.02 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.15 | 0.22 | 0.14 | 0.95 |
| Home equity loans. | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.02 | -0.06 | 0.17 | 0.21 | 0.29 | 0.39 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | -0.01 | 0.64 | 0.07 | 0.02 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.08 | 0.06 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.20 |
| Construction RE loans | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.15 |
| Commercial and industrial loans* | 0.89 | 0.83 | 0.61 | 0.72 | 0.72 | 0.96 | 0.70 | 1.44 |
| Loans to individuals. | 0.69 | 0.98 | 2.13 | 1.86 | 2.35 | 3.65 | 2.64 | 3.16 |
| Credit cards. . | -1.52 | 3.22 | 8.43 | 6.87 | 5.16 | 6.89 | 3.96 | 4.82 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 0.80 | 0.92 | 0.61 | 0.91 | 0.47 | 1.23 | 1.37 | 1.80 |
| All other loans and leases. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.26 | 0.68 | 0.21 | 0.54 |
| Loans outstanding (\$) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total loans and leases. | \$34,277 | \$31,929 | \$156,675 | \$161,030 | \$253,165 | \$261,168 | \$1,782,824 | \$1,781,386 |
| Loans secured by real estate (RE). | 19,875 | 18,567 | 96,685 | 101,992 | 136,593 | 138,161 | 647,746 | 680,173 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages.. | 9,264 | 8,282 | 42,541 | 41,464 | 64,412 | 63,563 | 340,505 | 337,531 |
| Home equity loans | 452 | 475 | 4,023 | 4,374 | 9,767 | 9,280 | 66,131 | 81,511 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 440 | 404 | 3,337 | 3,693 | 4,936 | 4,933 | 19,437 | 21,233 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 5,745 | 5,436 | 34,011 | 37,406 | 41,600 | 41,873 | 138,558 | 147,026 |
| Construction RE loans | 1,670 | 1,830 | 8,790 | 10,730 | 13,898 | 16,566 | 51,521 | 60,871 |
| Farmland loans. | 2,304 | 2,141 | 3,977 | 4,322 | 1,809 | 1,799 | 4,252 | 4,408 |
| RE loans from foreign offices | 0 | 0 | 6 | 3 | 172 | 146 | 27,342 | 27,592 |
| Commercial and industrial loans | 5,757 | 5,420 | 27,893 | 28,889 | 49,921 | 49,347 | 566,326 | 534,421 |
| Loans to individuals | 4,749 | 4,274 | 22,575 | 20,406 | 50,481 | 53,750 | 275,990 | 294,460 |
| Credit cards** | 179 | 127 | 4,217 | 3,107 | 20,075 | 22,754 | 137,669 | 130,193 |
| Other revolving credit plans | 0 | 69 | 0 | 450 | 0 | 1,779 | 0 | 18,752 |
| Installment loans. | 4,570 | 4,078 | 18,357 | 16,849 | 30,406 | 29,217 | 138,322 | 145,516 |
| All other loans and leases. | 3,972 | 3,725 | 9,790 | 9,948 | 16,263 | 20,005 | 293,841 | 273,416 |
| Less: Unearned income | 76 | 57 | 268 | 205 | 92 | 95 | 1,080 | 1,084 |

*Includes "All other loans" for institutions under $\$ 1$ billion in asset size.
**Previously banks reported "Credit card \& related plans." Starting with 2001 this item will be split into separate categories, "Credit cards" and "Other revolving credit plans."

## Key indicators, FDIC-insured national banks by region

Third quarter 2001
(Dollar figures in millions)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  |  |  |  |  | All |  |
|  | Northeast | Southeast | Central | Midwest | Southwest | West | institutions

## Loan performance, FDIC-insured national banks by region

Third quarter 2001
(Dollar figures in millions)

|  | Northeast | Southeast | Central | Midwest | Southwest | West | institution |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Percent of loans past due 30-89 days |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total loans and leases. | 1.27 | 1.18 | 1.70 | 1.22 | 1.27 | 1.53 | 1.37 |
| Loans secured by real estate (RE) ... | 1.42 | 1.09 | 1.64 | 0.69 | 1.21 | 1.15 | 1.28 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages.. | 1.66 | 1.44 | 2.19 | 0.55 | 1.18 | 1.36 | 1.56 |
| Home equity loans. | 0.83 | 0.89 | 1.26 | 0.39 | 0.53 | 0.50 | 0.93 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 0.55 | 0.33 | 0.83 | 0.73 | 1.23 | 1.45 | 0.72 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 0.65 | 0.59 | 1.09 | 0.87 | 1.25 | 0.71 | 0.81 |
| Construction RE loans | 1.03 | 0.90 | 1.61 | 1.52 | 1.29 | 1.89 | 1.36 |
| Commercial and industrial loans* | 0.57 | 0.54 | 1.57 | 1.93 | 1.12 | 1.43 | 0.95 |
| Loans to individuals. | 2.58 | 1.91 | 2.42 | 2.00 | 1.80 | 2.41 | 2.33 |
| Credit cards. | 2.90 | 2.11 | 2.39 | 2.07 | 1.13 | 2.62 | 2.65 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 2.58 | 1.96 | 2.62 | 2.07 | 1.91 | 2.21 | 2.32 |
| All other loans and leases | 0.56 | 2.29 | 1.46 | 0.84 | 1.18 | 1.73 | 1.35 |
| Percent of loans noncurrent |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total loans and leases. | 1.76 | 1.42 | 1.46 | 0.89 | 1.12 | 1.27 | 1.46 |
| Loans secured by real estate (RE) | 1.33 | 0.79 | 1.34 | 0.52 | 0.82 | 0.81 | 1.01 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages... | 1.29 | 0.73 | 1.65 | 0.30 | 0.72 | 0.63 | 0.99 |
| Home equity loans. | 0.30 | 0.32 | 0.71 | 0.25 | 0.32 | 0.26 | 0.43 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 0.25 | 0.47 | 0.44 | 0.35 | 0.25 | 0.44 | 0.41 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 0.91 | 0.97 | 1.30 | 0.85 | 0.91 | 0.86 | 1.02 |
| Construction RE loans | 0.95 | 1.22 | 1.17 | 1.06 | 0.83 | 1.62 | 1.20 |
| Commercial and industrial loans* | 2.23 | 2.51 | 2.16 | 1.20 | 2.01 | 2.10 | 2.23 |
| Loans to individuals | 2.34 | 0.57 | 0.84 | 1.22 | 0.58 | 1.66 | 1.48 |
| Credit cards. | 2.43 | 1.03 | 1.65 | 1.57 | 0.69 | 2.13 | 2.09 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 2.71 | 0.47 | 0.75 | 0.97 | 0.61 | 0.64 | 1.14 |
| All other loans and leases. | 0.80 | 2.16 | 1.04 | 1.21 | 1.20 | 0.86 | 1.25 |
| Percent of loans charged-off, net |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total loans and leases. | 1.28 | 1.24 | 1.06 | 0.92 | 0.48 | 1.35 | 1.17 |
| Loans secured by real estate (RE) | 0.19 | 1.03 | 0.29 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.11 | 0.47 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages... | 0.18 | 1.70 | 0.33 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.12 | 0.76 |
| Home equity loans........ | 0.14 | 0.45 | 0.42 | 0.19 | 0.18 | 0.30 | 0.35 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 0.00 | 0.13 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.06 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 0.18 | 0.17 | 0.30 | 0.07 | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.16 |
| Construction RE loans | 0.19 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.25 | 0.14 |
| Commercial and industrial loans* | 0.75 | 1.81 | 1.74 | 0.88 | 1.11 | 1.21 | 1.36 |
| Loans to individuals. | 4.02 | 1.81 | 2.07 | 2.79 | 1.09 | 4.80 | 3.13 |
| Credit cards. . | 5.24 | 3.19 | 4.97 | 5.10 | 2.16 | 6.04 | 5.16 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 2.25 | 1.39 | 1.57 | 0.64 | 1.06 | 1.97 | 1.63 |
| All other loans and leases. | 0.33 | 0.28 | 1.17 | 0.80 | 0.25 | 0.33 | 0.55 |
| Loans outstanding (\$) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total loans and leases. | \$597,435 | \$639,423 | \$537,157 | \$129,959 | \$88,336 | \$243,203 | \$2,235,513 |
| Loans secured by real estate (RE) | 164,513 | 307,328 | 239,598 | 60,504 | 47,496 | 119,453 | 938,893 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages... | 76,294 | 162,444 | 104,110 | 35,124 | 18,721 | 54,147 | 450,840 |
| Home equity loans | 17,435 | 29,971 | 31,185 | 3,753 | 1,187 | 12,107 | 95,639 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 3,562 | 10,168 | 9,775 | 1,494 | 1,559 | 3,706 | 30,263 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 33,105 | 72,824 | 62,758 | 12,835 | 16,723 | 33,496 | 231,741 |
| Construction RE loans | 8,745 | 26,277 | 28,221 | 4,310 | 7,695 | 14,750 | 89,998 |
| Farmland loans. | 495 | 2,799 | 3,539 | 2,988 | 1,611 | 1,239 | 12,670 |
| RE loans from foreign offices | 24,877 | 2,845 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 27,741 |
| Commercial and industrial loans | 189,933 | 178,572 | 151,006 | 23,778 | 22,985 | 51,802 | 618,076 |
| Loans to individuals. | 138,021 | 72,256 | 70,697 | 28,466 | 12,657 | 50,795 | 372,891 |
| Credit cards** | 80,915 | 15,252 | 10,708 | 13,377 | 302 | 35,629 | 156,182 |
| Other revolving credit plans | 10,199 | 2,947 | 4,309 | 959 | 591 | 2,044 | 21,049 |
| Installment loans. | 46,907 | 54,057 | 55,680 | 14,130 | 11,764 | 13,122 | 195,660 |
| All other loans and leases. | 105,728 | 81,612 | 75,956 | 17,225 | 5,313 | 21,262 | 307,094 |
| Less: Unearned income | 760 | 345 | 98 | 14 | 115 | 109 | 1,441 |

*Includes "All other loans" for institutions under $\$ 1$ billion in asset size.
**Previously banks reported "Credit card \& related plans." Starting with 2001 this item will be split into separate categories, "Credit cards" and "Other revolving credit plans."

## Key indicators, FDIC-insured commercial banks

Annual 1997-2000, year-to-date through September 30, 2001, third quarter 2000, and third quarter 2001
(Dollar figures in millions)

|  | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | Preliminary | 2000Q3 | Preliminary 2001Q3 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of institutions reporting. | 9,142 | 8,773 | 8,579 | 8,315 | 8,149 | 8,375 | 8,149 |
| Total employees (FTEs) | 1,538,408 | 1,626,978 | 1,657,602 | 1,670,857 | 1,671,162 | 1,655,790 | 1,671,162 |
| Selected income data (\$) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Net income | \$59,156 | \$61,782 | \$71,547 | \$71,007 | \$55,836 | \$19,257 | \$17,353 |
| Net interest income | 174,502 | 182,752 | 192,142 | 203,962 | 157,514 | 51,327 | 54,261 |
| Provision for loan losses | 19,851 | 22,215 | 21,816 | 30,005 | 28,001 | 6,742 | 11,578 |
| Noninterest income | 104,499 | 123,688 | 144,454 | 153,452 | 117,059 | 39,257 | 38,798 |
| Noninterest expense | 169,983 | 194,133 | 204,209 | 216,104 | 164,768 | 53,684 | 56,168 |
| Net operating income | 57,928 | 59,225 | 71,312 | 72,595 | 54,086 | 19,981 | 16,657 |
| Cash dividends declared | 42,541 | 41,004 | 51,936 | 53,842 | 39,184 | 12,475 | 13,556 |
| Net charge-offs to loan and lease reserve | 18,318 | 20,740 | 20,364 | 24,787 | 23,829 | 5,663 | 9,248 |
| Selected condition data (\$) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total assets | 5,014,942 | 5,442,530 | 5,735,162 | 6,244,622 | 6,555,668 | 6,067,230 | 6,555,668 |
| Total loans and leases | 2,970,747 | 3,238,287 | 3,491,666 | 3,819,547 | 3,860,819 | 3,779,167 | 3,860,819 |
| Reserve for losses | 54,685 | 57,262 | 58,770 | 64,139 | 68,211 | 62,558 | 68,211 |
| Securities. | 871,868 | 979,852 | 1,046,526 | 1,078,981 | 1,106,816 | 1,062,196 | 1,106,816 |
| Other real estate owned | 3,795 | 3,150 | 2,796 | 2,912 | 3,457 | 2,825 | 3,457 |
| Noncurrent loans and leases | 28,542 | 31,253 | 32,997 | 42,940 | 51,800 | 38,869 | 51,800 |
| Total deposits | 3,421,726 | 3,681,428 | 3,831,104 | 4,179,634 | 4,294,677 | 4,021,592 | 4,294,677 |
| Domestic deposits | 2,895,531 | 3,109,395 | 3,175,515 | 3,472,968 | 3,613,777 | 3,327,385 | 3,613,777 |
| Equity capital. | 417,774 | 462,141 | 479,737 | 530,732 | 586,004 | 521,313 | 586,004 |
| Off-balance-sheet derivatives. | 25,065,499 | 33,007,227 | 34,819,179 | 40,571,148 | 51,275,576 | 38,314,316 | 51,275,576 |
| Performance ratios (annualized \%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Return on equity . | 14.68 | 13.93 | 15.31 | 14.02 | 13.42 | 15.03 | 12.16 |
| Return on assets. | 1.23 | 1.19 | 1.31 | 1.19 | 1.17 | 1.28 | 1.08 |
| Net interest income to assets. | 3.64 | 3.51 | 3.51 | 3.41 | 3.30 | 3.41 | 3.37 |
| Loss provision to assets | 0.41 | 0.43 | 0.40 | 0.50 | 0.59 | 0.45 | 0.72 |
| Net operating income to assets. | 1.21 | 1.14 | 1.30 | 1.21 | 1.13 | 1.33 | 1.03 |
| Noninterest income to assets. | 2.18 | 2.37 | 2.64 | 2.57 | 2.46 | 2.61 | 2.41 |
| Noninterest expense to assets. | 3.54 | 3.73 | 3.73 | 3.61 | 3.46 | 3.56 | 3.48 |
| Loss provision to loans and leases | 0.69 | 0.72 | 0.66 | 0.82 | 0.97 | 0.72 | 1.20 |
| Net charge-offs to loans and leases | 0.64 | 0.67 | 0.61 | 0.67 | 0.83 | 0.61 | 0.96 |
| Loss provision to net charge-offs. | 108.37 | 104.81 | 107.12 | 121.04 | 117.51 | 119.07 | 125.19 |
| Performance ratios (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Percent of institutions unprofitable. . | 4.85 | 6.11 | 7.50 | 7.34 | 7.53 | 6.83 | 8.09 |
| Percent of institutions with earnings gains | 68.35 | 61.22 | 62.83 | 67.38 | 53.27 | 58.89 | 55.12 |
| Nonint. income to net operating revenue. | 37.45 | 40.36 | 42.92 | 42.93 | 42.63 | 43.34 | 41.69 |
| Nonint. expense to net operating revenue | 60.93 | 63.35 | 60.67 | 60.46 | 60.01 | 59.26 | 60.36 |
| Condition ratios (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Nonperforming assets to assets | 0.66 | 0.65 | 0.63 | 0.74 | 0.85 | 0.70 | 0.85 |
| Noncurrent loans to loans. | 0.96 | 0.97 | 0.95 | 1.12 | 1.34 | 1.03 | 1.34 |
| Loss reserve to noncurrent loans. | 191.59 | 183.22 | 178.11 | 149.37 | 131.68 | 160.95 | 131.68 |
| Loss reserve to loans. | 1.84 | 1.77 | 1.68 | 1.68 | 1.77 | 1.66 | 1.77 |
| Equity capital to assets | 8.33 | 8.49 | 8.36 | 8.50 | 8.94 | 8.59 | 8.94 |
| Leverage ratio. | 7.56 | 7.54 | 7.79 | 7.70 | 7.81 | 7.84 | 7.81 |
| Risk-based capital ratio. | 12.23 | 12.23 | 12.16 | 12.12 | 12.45 | 12.26 | 12.45 |
| Net loans and leases to assets | 58.15 | 58.45 | 59.86 | 60.14 | 57.85 | 61.26 | 57.85 |
| Securities to assets | 17.39 | 18.00 | 18.25 | 17.28 | 16.88 | 17.51 | 16.88 |
| Appreciation in securities (\% of par). | 1.10 | 1.07 | -2.31 | 0.20 | 2.07 | -1.37 | 2.07 |
| Residential mortgage assets to assets. | 20.03 | 20.93 | 20.78 | 20.20 | 20.53 | 20.57 | 20.53 |
| Total deposits to assets. | 68.23 | 67.64 | 66.80 | 66.93 | 65.51 | 66.28 | 65.51 |
| Core deposits to assets. | 50.06 | 49.39 | 46.96 | 46.39 | 46.31 | 45.75 | 46.31 |
| Volatile liabilities to assets. . | 31.92 | 31.68 | 34.94 | 34.98 | 33.26 | 35.72 | 33.26 |

## Loan performance, FDIC-insured commercial banks

Annual 1997-2000, year-to-date through September 30, 2001, third quarter 2000, and third quarter 2001
(Dollar figures in millions)

|  |  |  |  |  | Preliminary | Preliminary |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

[^1] "Other revolving credit plans."

## Key indicators, FDIC-insured commercial banks by asset size Third quarter 2000 and third quarter 2001

(Dollar figures in millions)

|  | Less than \$100M |  | \$100M to \$1B |  | \$1B to \$10B |  | Greater than \$10B |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2000Q3 | 2001Q3 | 2000Q3 | 2001Q3 | 2000Q3 | 2001Q3 | 2000Q3 | 2001Q3 |
| Number of institutions reporting | 4,922 | 4,598 | 3,069 | 3,150 | 302 | 321 | 82 | 80 |
| Total employees (FTEs) | 101,865 | 93,154 | 293,647 | 294,054 | 249,607 | 245,573 | 1,010,671 | 1,038,381 |
| Selected income data (\$) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Net income | \$615 | \$530 | \$2,444 | \$2,436 | \$3,222 | \$2,916 | \$12,975 | \$11,470 |
| Net interest income | 2,401 | 2,175 | 7,957 | 7,986 | 8,334 | 8,770 | 32,636 | 35,330 |
| Provision for loan losses | 149 | 171 | 744 | 756 | 1,139 | 1,643 | 4,710 | 9,007 |
| Noninterest income | 617 | 567 | 3,096 | 3,135 | 5,745 | 5,154 | 29,799 | 29,942 |
| Noninterest expense | 2,040 | 1,891 | 6,750 | 6,961 | 7,779 | 7,975 | 37,115 | 39,341 |
| Net operating income | 620 | 520 | 2,482 | 2,375 | 3,336 | 2,806 | 13,543 | 10,955 |
| Cash dividends declared | 931 | 269 | 1,125 | 1,140 | 1,624 | 4,161 | 8,796 | 7,985 |
| Net charge-offs to loan and lease reserve | 85 | 115 | 458 | 525 | 919 | 1,350 | 4,201 | 7,257 |
| Selected condition data (\$) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total assets | 233,229 | 225,793 | 770,810 | 803,188 | 870,961 | 898,151 | 4,192,229 | 4,628,537 |
| Total loans and leases | 144,412 | 139,618 | 505,205 | 524,240 | 556,481 | 566,495 | 2,573,070 | 2,630,466 |
| Reserve for losses | 2,010 | 1,957 | 7,141 | 7,439 | 9,485 | 10,843 | 43,922 | 47,972 |
| Securities | 60,345 | 52,263 | 184,839 | 177,783 | 200,659 | 201,265 | 616,353 | 675,505 |
| Other real estate owned | 269 | 293 | 659 | 853 | 403 | 475 | 1,494 | 1,837 |
| Noncurrent loans and leases | 1,350 | 1,564 | 4,056 | 5,041 | 4,879 | 6,341 | 28,584 | 38,853 |
| Total deposits | 195,848 | 190,363 | 626,664 | 655,292 | 603,933 | 611,041 | 2,595,147 | 2,837,981 |
| Domestic deposits | 195,821 | 190,362 | 624,419 | 653,512 | 589,615 | 598,097 | 1,917,529 | 2,171,806 |
| Equity capital. | 25,819 | 25,396 | 72,754 | 79,229 | 78,206 | 87,963 | 344,534 | 393,416 |
| Off-balance-sheet derivatives. | 193 | 84 | 6,528 | 5,970 | 76,011 | 89,459 | 38,669,343 | 51,575,648 |
| Performance ratios (annualized \%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Return on equity | 9.67 | 8.48 | 13.73 | 12.54 | 16.85 | 13.63 | 15.30 | 11.99 |
| Return on assets. | 1.07 | 0.95 | 1.28 | 1.23 | 1.49 | 1.32 | 1.24 | 1.01 |
| Net interest income to assets. | 4.17 | 3.91 | 4.18 | 4.03 | 3.86 | 3.96 | 3.13 | 3.11 |
| Loss provision to assets | 0.26 | 0.31 | 0.39 | 0.38 | 0.53 | 0.74 | 0.45 | 0.79 |
| Net operating income to assets. | 1.08 | 0.93 | 1.30 | 1.20 | 1.54 | 1.27 | 1.30 | 0.96 |
| Noninterest income to assets. | 1.07 | 1.02 | 1.63 | 1.58 | 2.66 | 2.33 | 2.86 | 2.63 |
| Noninterest expense to assets. | 3.55 | 3.40 | 3.55 | 3.51 | 3.60 | 3.60 | 3.56 | 3.46 |
| Loss provision to loans and leases | 0.42 | 0.50 | 0.60 | 0.58 | 0.83 | 1.17 | 0.74 | 1.37 |
| Net charge-offs to loans and leases | 0.24 | 0.34 | 0.37 | 0.40 | 0.67 | 0.96 | 0.66 | 1.10 |
| Loss provision to net charge-offs. | 175.34 | 147.89 | 162.73 | 144.04 | 123.93 | 121.73 | 112.12 | 124.11 |
| Performance ratios (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Percent of institutions unprofitable. | 9.67 | 11.31 | 2.44 | 3.65 | 5.30 | 5.61 | 6.10 | 7.50 |
| Percent of institutions with earnings gains. | 56.32 | 49.80 | 62.92 | 61.37 | 60.60 | 67.91 | 56.10 | 63.75 |
| Nonint. income to net operating revenue... | 20.46 | 20.68 | 28.01 | 28.19 | 40.81 | 37.02 | 47.73 | 45.87 |
| Nonint. expense to net operating revenue. | 67.58 | 68.95 | 61.07 | 62.60 | 55.25 | 57.28 | 59.45 | 60.27 |
| Condition ratios (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Nonperforming assets to assets | 0.70 | 0.82 | 0.61 | 0.74 | 0.61 | 0.77 | 0.73 | 0.89 |
| Noncurrent loans to loans . | 0.93 | 1.12 | 0.80 | 0.96 | 0.88 | 1.12 | 1.11 | 1.48 |
| Loss reserve to noncurrent loans. | 148.91 | 125.11 | 176.04 | 147.57 | 194.40 | 171.00 | 153.66 | 123.47 |
| Loss reserve to loans. | 1.39 | 1.40 | 1.41 | 1.42 | 1.70 | 1.91 | 1.71 | 1.82 |
| Equity capital to assets . | 11.07 | 11.25 | 9.44 | 9.86 | 8.98 | 9.79 | 8.22 | 8.50 |
| Leverage ratio. | 11.16 | 10.85 | 9.34 | 9.26 | 8.43 | 8.66 | 7.25 | 7.22 |
| Risk-based capital ratio. | 17.59 | 17.10 | 14.16 | 14.09 | 12.98 | 13.59 | 11.60 | 11.82 |
| Net loans and leases to assets | 61.06 | 60.97 | 64.62 | 64.34 | 62.80 | 61.87 | 60.33 | 55.80 |
| Securities to assets | 25.87 | 23.15 | 23.98 | 22.13 | 23.04 | 22.41 | 14.70 | 14.59 |
| Appreciation in securities (\% of par). | -1.42 | 2.30 | -1.46 | 2.34 | -1.49 | 2.07 | -1.30 | 1.97 |
| Residential mortgage assets to assets. | 20.95 | 21.44 | 23.51 | 23.77 | 25.74 | 26.25 | 18.93 | 18.82 |
| Total deposits to assets. | 83.97 | 84.31 | 81.30 | 81.59 | 69.34 | 68.03 | 61.90 | 61.31 |
| Core deposits to assets. | 71.24 | 70.93 | 67.90 | 67.78 | 55.46 | 54.31 | 38.25 | 39.83 |
| Volatile liabilities to assets. | 15.32 | 15.02 | 18.94 | 17.78 | 28.45 | 26.74 | 41.45 | 38.10 |

## Loan performance, FDIC-insured commercial banks by asset size Third quarter 2000 and third quarter 2001

(Dollar figures in millions)

|  | Less than \$100M |  | \$100M to \$1B |  | \$1B to \$10B |  | Greater than \$10B |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2000Q3 | 2001Q3 | 2000Q3 | 2001Q3 | 2000Q3 | 2001Q3 | 2000Q3 | 2001Q3 |
| Percent of loans past due 30-89 days |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total loans and leases. | 1.40 | 1.56 | 1.16 | 1.32 | 1.22 | 1.35 | 1.11 | 1.36 |
| Loans secured by real estate (RE) | 1.22 | 1.40 | 0.92 | 1.11 | 0.89 | 0.99 | 1.19 | 1.33 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages . | 1.59 | 1.77 | 1.17 | 1.39 | 1.05 | 1.08 | 1.57 | 1.57 |
| Home equity loans. | 0.78 | 0.83 | 0.69 | 0.78 | 0.84 | 0.88 | 0.87 | 0.90 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 0.57 | 0.77 | 0.65 | 0.51 | 0.69 | 0.65 | 0.46 | 0.83 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 0.96 | 1.19 | 0.67 | 0.88 | 0.74 | 0.85 | 0.58 | 0.91 |
| Construction RE loans | 1.17 | 1.39 | 1.06 | 1.34 | 0.89 | 1.21 | 1.09 | 1.25 |
| Commercial and industrial loans* | 1.34 | 1.44 | 1.28 | 1.35 | 1.23 | 1.54 | 0.64 | 0.96 |
| Loans to individuals. | 2.27 | 2.59 | 2.12 | 2.40 | 2.32 | 2.43 | 2.31 | 2.35 |
| Credit cards. | 1.95 | 2.33 | 3.81 | 5.45 | 2.80 | 3.01 | 2.51 | 2.60 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 2.28 | 2.65 | 1.82 | 2.06 | 2.07 | 2.18 | 2.13 | 2.37 |
| All other loans and leases. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.01 | 0.96 | 0.65 | 1.19 |
| Percent of loans noncurrent |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total loans and leases. | 0.93 | 1.12 | 0.80 | 0.96 | 0.88 | 1.12 | 1.11 | 1.48 |
| Loans secured by real estate (RE) | 0.76 | 0.98 | 0.64 | 0.82 | 0.70 | 0.87 | 0.84 | 0.99 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages... | 0.70 | 0.87 | 0.60 | 0.73 | 0.70 | 0.83 | 0.90 | 1.00 |
| Home equity loans. | 0.28 | 0.40 | 0.32 | 0.37 | 0.33 | 0.45 | 0.36 | 0.41 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 0.48 | 0.53 | 0.38 | 0.52 | 0.38 | 0.39 | 0.31 | 0.35 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 0.80 | 1.13 | 0.64 | 0.89 | 0.76 | 0.89 | 0.80 | 1.00 |
| Construction RE loans | 0.56 | 0.94 | 0.72 | 0.95 | 0.77 | 1.18 | 0.76 | 1.08 |
| Commercial and industrial loans* | 1.32 | 1.45 | 1.25 | 1.34 | 1.28 | 1.76 | 1.54 | 2.34 |
| Loans to individuals. | 0.81 | 0.98 | 0.82 | 1.00 | 1.04 | 1.31 | 1.53 | 1.52 |
| Credit cards. | 1.07 | 1.72 | 2.36 | 3.80 | 1.88 | 2.42 | 1.98 | 2.07 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 0.80 | 0.97 | 0.54 | 0.65 | 0.60 | 0.68 | 1.16 | 1.26 |
| All other loans and leases. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.53 | 0.67 | 0.48 | 1.01 |
| Percent of loans charged-off, net |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total loans and leases. | 0.24 | 0.34 | 0.37 | 0.40 | 0.67 | 0.96 | 0.66 | 1.10 |
| Loans secured by real estate (RE) | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.14 | 0.11 | 0.43 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.08 | 0.14 | 0.15 | 0.11 | 0.68 |
| Home equity loans . . . . . . . . | 0.06 | -0.05 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.13 | 0.17 | 0.24 | 0.32 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 0.01 | 0.19 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.03 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.17 |
| Construction RE loans | 0.18 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.29 | 0.06 | 0.11 |
| Commercial and industrial loans* | 0.39 | 0.61 | 0.53 | 0.75 | 0.90 | 1.15 | 0.67 | 1.40 |
| Loans to individuals. | 0.67 | 0.95 | 1.69 | 1.60 | 2.33 | 3.38 | 2.37 | 2.78 |
| Credit cards. . | 1.02 | 2.99 | 7.19 | 6.82 | 5.16 | 7.12 | 3.96 | 4.73 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 0.65 | 0.89 | 0.67 | 0.89 | 0.84 | 1.10 | 1.06 | 1.42 |
| All other loans and leases. . | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.29 | 0.75 | 0.22 | 0.41 |
| Loans outstanding (\$) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total loans and leases. | \$144,412 | \$139,618 | \$505,205 | \$524,240 | \$556,481 | \$566,495 | \$2,573,070 | \$2,630,466 |
| Loans secured by real estate (RE) | 82,643 | 81,012 | 323,879 | 343,471 | 305,796 | 313,570 | 948,761 | 1,011,118 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages. | 38,194 | 35,788 | 132,113 | 130,164 | 130,563 | 127,254 | 497,621 | 492,506 |
| Home equity loans | 1,993 | 2,185 | 13,711 | 14,812 | 19,799 | 19,219 | 87,408 | 109,532 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 1,788 | 1,804 | 10,946 | 11,420 | 12,482 | 13,379 | 34,965 | 36,896 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 23,108 | 23,214 | 118,522 | 130,601 | 103,393 | 108,141 | 211,601 | 231,711 |
| Construction RE loans | 6,938 | 7,780 | 35,182 | 42,097 | 35,205 | 41,368 | 80,117 | 99,250 |
| Farmland loans. | 10,623 | 10,240 | 13,363 | 14,339 | 4,003 | 3,865 | 5,976 | 7,025 |
| RE loans from foreign offices | 0 | 0 | 42 | 38 | 350 | 344 | 31,073 | 34,198 |
| Commercial and industrial loans | 24,601 | 24,111 | 90,989 | 93,369 | 122,417 | 117,541 | 803,617 | 775,420 |
| Loans to individuals. | 19,695 | 17,869 | 64,045 | 59,922 | 96,024 | 99,377 | 404,577 | 430,387 |
| Credit cards** | 730 | 483 | 9,888 | 7,031 | 33,146 | 37,288 | 184,891 | 173,604 |
| Other revolving credit plans | 0 | 305 | 0 | 1,719 | 0 | 2,880 | 0 | 20,873 |
| Installment loans. | 18,966 | 17,081 | 54,157 | 51,172 | 62,878 | 59,209 | 219,686 | 235,910 |
| All other loans and leases. | 17,701 | 16,792 | 27,083 | 28,096 | 32,863 | 36,597 | 417,528 | 414,830 |
| Less: Unearned income | 229 | 167 | 791 | 618 | 620 | 589 | 1,413 | 1,290 |

*Includes "All other loans" for institutions under $\$ 1$ billion in asset size.
**Previously banks reported "Credit card \& related plans." Starting with 2001 this item will be split into separate categories, "Credit cards" and "Other revolving credit plans."

## Key indicators, FDIC-insured commercial banks by region

## Third quarter 2001

(Dollar figures in millions)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  |  |  |  |  | All |  |
| Number of institutions reporting $\ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots$ | Sortheast | Southeast | Central | Midwest | Southwest | West | institutions

# Loan performance, FDIC-insured commercial banks by region 

Third quarter 2001
(Dollar figures in millions)

|  | Northeast | Southeast | Central | Midwest | Southwest | West | institutions |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Percent of loans past due 30-89 days |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total loans and leases.............. | 1.33 | 1.21 | 1.62 | 1.31 | 1.31 | 1.37 | 1.36 |
| Loans secured by real estate (RE) | 1.41 | 1.08 | 1.48 | 0.88 | 1.22 | 1.02 | 1.23 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages.. | 1.45 | 1.42 | 1.88 | 0.86 | 1.38 | 1.26 | 1.47 |
| Home equity loans. | 0.80 | 0.83 | 1.13 | 0.61 | 0.56 | 0.64 | 0.88 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 0.95 | 0.46 | 0.78 | 0.58 | 1.03 | 0.77 | 0.73 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 1.07 | 0.75 | 1.13 | 0.90 | 1.11 | 0.64 | 0.91 |
| Construction RE loans | 1.12 | 0.92 | 1.60 | 1.38 | 1.23 | 1.59 | 1.27 |
| Commercial and industrial loans* | 0.80 | 0.69 | 1.67 | 1.87 | 1.21 | 1.47 | 1.10 |
| Loans to individuals | 2.62 | 2.15 | 2.34 | 2.38 | 1.91 | 2.18 | 2.37 |
| Credit cards. | 3.06 | 2.53 | 2.37 | 2.93 | 1.59 | 2.35 | 2.76 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 2.49 | 2.13 | 2.48 | 2.10 | 1.98 | 2.10 | 2.31 |
| All other loans and leases. | 0.63 | 1.91 | 1.38 | 0.80 | 1.02 | 1.41 | 1.13 |
| Percent of loans noncurrent |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total loans and leases. | 1.60 | 1.23 | 1.35 | 0.96 | 1.08 | 1.21 | 1.34 |
| Loans secured by real estate (RE) | 1.05 | 0.78 | 1.20 | 0.66 | 0.87 | 0.80 | 0.93 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages.. | 1.02 | 0.75 | 1.38 | 0.43 | 0.79 | 0.64 | 0.92 |
| Home equity loans. | 0.32 | 0.32 | 0.64 | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.29 | 0.41 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 0.25 | 0.46 | 0.51 | 0.32 | 0.47 | 0.32 | 0.39 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 0.86 | 0.88 | 1.22 | 0.94 | 0.92 | 0.82 | 0.95 |
| Construction RE loans | 1.06 | 0.97 | 1.16 | 0.97 | 0.88 | 1.25 | 1.07 |
| Commercial and industrial loans* | 2.45 | 2.17 | 2.05 | 1.31 | 1.79 | 2.00 | 2.17 |
| Loans to individuals. | 2.10 | 0.83 | 0.81 | 1.32 | 0.64 | 1.43 | 1.42 |
| Credit cards. | 2.57 | 1.51 | 1.62 | 2.02 | 1.01 | 1.98 | 2.18 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 1.88 | 0.67 | 0.73 | 0.89 | 0.66 | 0.50 | 1.06 |
| All other loans and leases. | 0.60 | 1.77 | 0.90 | 1.16 | 1.22 | 1.13 | 0.99 |
| Percent of loans charged-off, net |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total loans and leases. | 1.04 | 0.97 | 0.86 | 0.79 | 0.43 | 1.18 | 0.96 |
| Loans secured by real estate (RE) | 0.12 | 0.62 | 0.23 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.09 | 0.29 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages. | 0.11 | 1.13 | 0.24 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.10 | 0.47 |
| Home equity loans...... | 0.10 | 0.33 | 0.33 | 0.19 | 0.17 | 0.22 | 0.26 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | -0.01 | 0.10 | 0.03 | -0.12 | 0.03 | -0.01 | 0.02 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.24 | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.12 |
| Construction RE loans | 0.18 | 0.14 | 0.16 | 0.04 | 0.08 | 0.16 | 0.14 |
| Commercial and industrial loans* | 0.95 | 1.60 | 1.53 | 0.82 | 0.97 | 1.49 | 1.30 |
| Loans to individuals | 3.31 | 1.74 | 1.77 | 2.77 | 1.03 | 4.07 | 2.71 |
| Credit cards. | 5.51 | 3.45 | 4.74 | 5.84 | 2.89 | 5.52 | 5.20 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 1.40 | 1.20 | 1.35 | 0.61 | 0.98 | 1.50 | 1.27 |
| All other loans and leases. | 0.24 | 0.32 | 0.92 | 0.89 | 0.33 | 0.30 | 0.45 |
| Loans outstanding (\$) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total loans and leases. | \$1,147,287 | \$1,043,442 | \$838,839 | \$227,749 | \$158,368 | \$445,134 | \$3,860,819 |
| Loans secured by real estate (RE) | 363,177 | 551,907 | 401,805 | 115,527 | 88,426 | 228,328 | 1,749,170 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages. | 184,759 | 256,471 | 170,306 | 55,914 | 33,860 | 84,402 | 785,713 |
| Home equity loans. | 29,149 | 47,897 | 44,686 | 5,379 | 1,508 | 17,131 | 145,749 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 15,090 | 17,211 | 15,922 | 3,063 | 2,555 | 9,658 | 63,499 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 82,436 | 151,999 | 115,862 | 30,050 | 32,563 | 80,757 | 493,667 |
| Construction RE loans | 19,394 | 68,410 | 46,028 | 10,365 | 14,063 | 32,234 | 190,495 |
| Farmland loans. | 1,336 | 7,074 | 8,968 | 10,756 | 3,877 | 3,457 | 35,468 |
| RE loans from foreign offices . | 31,013 | 2,845 | 33 | 0 | 0 | 689 | 34,580 |
| Commercial and industrial loans | 342,735 | 255,477 | 232,324 | 41,626 | 37,209 | 101,071 | 1,010,441 |
| Loans to individuals. | 231,921 | 132,464 | 96,157 | 39,662 | 22,849 | 84,501 | 607,555 |
| Credit cards** | 105,886 | 29,482 | 12,142 | 16,058 | 651 | 54,187 | 218,406 |
| Other revolving credit plans | 11,662 | 4,305 | 4,810 | 1,106 | 713 | 3,180 | 25,777 |
| Installment loans. | 114,373 | 98,677 | 79,205 | 22,498 | 21,485 | 27,134 | 363,372 |
| All other loans and leases. | 210,582 | 104,233 | 108,781 | 30,976 | 10,090 | 31,654 | 496,316 |
| Less: Unearned income | 1,129 | 638 | 228 | 42 | 207 | 421 | 2,664 |

*Includes "All other loans" for institutions under $\$ 1$ billion in asset size.
**Previously banks reported "Credit card \& related plans." Starting with 2001 this item will be split into separate categories, "Credit cards" and "Other revolving credit plans."

## Glossary

## Data Sources

Data are from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) Reports of Condition and Income (call reports) submitted by all FDIC-insured, nationalchartered and state-chartered commercial banks and trust companies in the United States and its territories. Uninsured banks, savings banks, savings associations, and U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks are excluded from these tables. All data are collected and presented based on the location of each reporting institution's main office. Reported data may include assets and liabilities located outside of the reporting institution's home state.

The data are stored on and retrieved from the OCC's Integrated Banking Information System (IBIS), which is obtained from the FDIC's Research Information System (RIS) database.

## Computation Methodology

For performance ratios constructed by dividing an income statement (flow) item by a balance sheet (stock) item, the income item for the period was annualized (multiplied by the number of periods in a year) and divided by the average balance sheet item for the period (beginning-ofperiod amount plus end-of-period amount plus any interim periods, divided by the total number of periods). For "pooling-of-interest" mergers, prior period(s) balance sheet items of "acquired" institution(s) are included in balance sheet averages because the year-to-date income reported by the "acquirer" includes the year-to-date results of "acquired" institutions. No adjustments are made for "purchase accounting" mergers because the year-todate income reported by the "acquirer" does not include the prior-to-merger results of "acquired" institutions.

## Definitions

Commercial real estate loans-loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential properties.

Construction real estate loans-includes loans for all property types under construction, as well as loans for land acquisition and development.

Core deposits-the sum of transaction deposits plus savings deposits plus small time deposits (under $\$ 100,000$ ).

IBIS—OCC's Integrated Banking Information System.

Leverage ratio-Tier 1 capital divided by adjusted tangible total assets.

Loans to individuals-includes outstanding credit card balances and other secured and unsecured installment loans.

Net charge-offs to loan and lease reserve-total loans and leases charged off (removed from balance sheet because of uncollectibility), less amounts recovered on loans and leases previously charged off.

Net loans and leases to assets-total loans and leases net of the reserve for losses.

Net operating income-income excluding discretionary transactions such as gains (or losses) on the sale of investment securities and extraordinary items. Income taxes subtracted from operating income have been adjusted to exclude the portion applicable to securities gains (or losses).

Net operating revenue-the sum of net interest income plus noninterest income.

Noncurrent loans and leases-the sum of loans and leases 90 days or more past due plus loans and leases in nonaccrual status.

Nonperforming assets-the sum of noncurrent loans and leases plus noncurrent debt securities and other assets plus other real estate owned.

Number of institutions reporting-the number of institutions that actually filed a financial report.

Off-balance-sheet derivatives-the notional value of futures and forwards, swaps, and options contracts; beginning March 31, 1995, new reporting detail permits the exclusion of spot foreign exchange contracts. For March 31, 1984 through December 31, 1985, only foreign exchange futures and forwards contracts were reported; beginning March 31, 1986, interest rate swaps contracts were reported; beginning March 31, 1990, banks began to report interest rate and other futures and forwards contracts, foreign exchange and other swaps contracts, and all types of option contracts.

Other real estate owned-primarily foreclosed property. Direct and indirect investments in real estate ventures are excluded. The amount is reflected net of valuation allowances.

Percent of institutions unprofitable-the percent of institutions with negative net income for the respective period.

Percent of institutions with earnings gains-the percent of institutions that increased their net income (or decreased their losses) compared to the same period a year earlier.

Reserve for losses-the sum of the allowance for loan and lease losses plus the allocated transfer risk reserve.

Residential mortgage assets-the sum of 1-4 family residential mortgages plus mortgage-backed securities.

Return on assets (ROA)—net income (including gains or losses on securities and extraordinary items) as a percentage of average total assets.

Return on equity (ROE)—net income (including gains or losses on securities and extraordinary items) as a percentage of average total equity capital.

Risk-based capital ratio-total capital divided by risk weighted assets.

Risk-weighted assets-assets adjusted for risk-based capital definitions which include on-balance-sheet as well as off-balance-sheet items multiplied by risk weights that range from zero to 100 percent.

Securities-excludes securities held in trading accounts. Effective March 31, 1994 with the full implementation of

Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 115, securities classified by banks as "held-to-maturity" are reported at their amortized cost, and securities classified a "available-forsale" are reported at their current fair (market) values.

Securities gains (losses)—net pre-tax realized gains (losses) on held-to-maturity and available-for-sale securities.

Total capital-the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. Tier 1 capital consists of common equity capital plus noncumulative perpetual preferred stock plus minority interest in consolidated subsidiaries less goodwill and other ineligible intangible assets. Tier 2 capital consists of subordinated debt plus intermediate-term preferred stock plus cumulative long-term preferred stock plus a portion of a bank's allowance for loan and lease losses. The amount of eligible intangibles (including mortgage servicing rights) included in Tier 1 capital and the amount of the allowance included in Tier 2 capital are limited in accordance with supervisory capital regulations.

Volatile liabilities-the sum of large-denomination time deposits plus foreign-office deposits plus federal funds purchased plus securities sold under agreements to repurchase plus other borrowings. Beginning March 31, 1994, new reporting detail permits the exclusion of other borrowed money with original maturity of more than one year; previously, all other borrowed money was included. Also beginning March 31, 1994, the newly reported "trading liabilities less revaluation losses on assets held in trading accounts" is included.

## Recent Corporate Decisions

The OCC publishes monthly, in its publication Interpretations and Actions, corporate decisions that represent a new or changed policy, or present issues of general interest to the public or the banking industry. In addition, summaries of selected corporate decisions appear in each issue of the Quarterly Journal. In the third quarter of 2001, the following corporate decisions were of particular importance because they were precedent setting or otherwise represented issues of importance. The OCC's decision documents for these decisions may be found in Interpretations and Actions using the decision number at the end of each summary.

## Mergers

On July 26, 2001, the OCC granted approval for Bank of Powhatan, N.A., Powhatan, Virginia, to undertake a reorganization pursuant to 12 USC 215a-2 and 12 CFR 7.2000(a). This is the first such approval by the OCC under this recently enacted amendment to 12 USC 215. This new section provides a streamlined process for national bank's to effect holding company reorganizations through an exchange of the bank's stock for cash or securities of a bank holding company. [Corporate Decision Letter No. 2001-21]

On July 26, 2001, the OCC granted approval to Bank One, N.A., Columbus, Ohio, to merge two nonbank mortgage company subsidiaries into the bank under the authority of 12 USC 215a-3. This represents the first such approval by the OCC under this recently enacted amendment to 12 USC 215. This new section expressly authorizes the merger of a national bank with its nonbank subsidiaries or affiliates. The section was adopted to facilitate the ability of banking organizations to effect corporate restructuring between national banks and their subsidiaries and affiliates in the most efficient way possible, while preserving regulatory oversight by requiring OCC approval. [Corporate Decision No. 2001-22]

On September 18, 2001, the OCC granted conditional approval for National Bank of Daingerfield, Daingerfield, Texas, to purchase and assume certain assets and liabilities of the Daingerfield branch of Jefferson Heritage Bank, FSB, Denton, Texas. The approval requires National Bank of Daingerfield to comply with the agreement it signed with the Department of Justice. [Conditional Approval Letter No. 491]

On September 29, 2001, the OCC granted conditional approval for Blackfeet National Bank, Browning, Montana, to consolidate with Native American Interim Bank, N.A., Browning, Montana, with the resulting title of Native American National Bank, in order to facilitate the acquisition of Blackfeet National Bank by Native American Bancorporation, Denver, Colorado. In addition to the conditions imposed on any newly chartered national bank, the conditions of approval address issues concerning tribal sovereignty and the condition of the target bank. [Conditional Approval Letter No. 493].

## O perating Subsidiary

On July 3, 2001, the OCC granted approval for Business First National Bank, Santa Barbara, California, to acquire E-Commerce Financial Services and establish it as an operating subsidiary. E-Commerce enables small business merchants to obtain a package of electronic services that allows the merchant to create Web stores and process electronic payments for purchases made over the Internet. [Corporate Decision No. 2001-18]

On July 27, 2001, the OCC granted approval for Zions First National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah, to establish an operating subsidiary that will provide integrated, online information service for secure web-based document storage, retrieval and collaboration of documents and/or files containing personal information or valuable confidential trade or business information. [Conditional Approval Letter No. 479]

On August 17, 2001, the OCC acknowledged receipt of the after-the-fact notice by Metropolitan National Bank, New York, New York, regarding the bank's acquisition of Cashzone, LLC. Cashzone engages in general check cashing services and other activities permissible under 12 CFR 5.34(e)(5)(v). The OCC's letter authorizes only the specific activities described in the bank's notice and acknowledged by the OCC in its letter. The OCC's letter further advises the bank that neither it nor Cashzone is authorized to engage in "payday lending" activities or to enter into arrangements with third parties to provide "payday" type loans through offices or facilities operated by a third party. [Corporate Decision No. 2001-24]

On September 13, 2001, the OCC granted approval for Bank One, N.A., Chicago, Illinois, to establish a wholly owned operating subsidiary to furnish administrative,
management and consulting services to unaffiliated real estate construction lenders and investors. The services will include: project feasibility, cost, contract, environmental and seismic reviews; appraisals; loan document preparation; collateral and construction phase completion monitoring; syndicated loan lead agent tasks; and, lender training on construction loan administration. This operating subsidiary will not perform credit analysis, make underwriting decisions or provide legal services relative to a given real estate project. [Corporate Decision No. 2001-27]

## CRA Decisions

On July 2, 2001, the OCC granted conditional approval for European American Bank, Uniondale, New York, to merge into and under the charter of Citibank, N.A., New York, New York. The OCC received comments from 16 individuals and community organizations expressing concerns with the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) perfor-
mance of Citibank, N.A. and of an affiliate, Associates National Bank. The OCC's investigation into those concerns disclosed no information that was inconsistent with approval under the CRA. However, the approval was conditioned upon Citibank providing the OCC with progress reports on the implementation of various consumer finance initiatives. [Conditional Approval Letter No. 476]

On July 18, 2001, the OCC granted approval to merger applications of Firstar Bank, N.A., Cincinnati, Ohio; U.S. Bank N.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; U.S. Bank N.A., Canby, Oregon; and, U.S. Bank N.A., MT, Billings, Montana. While the OCC did not receive any comments in connection with these applications, the OCC considered the comments received by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in connection with the related bank holding company merger and considered the Board's analysis. The OCC found that approval of the transaction was consistent with the Community Reinvestment Act. [CRA Decision Letter No. 109]

## Appeals Process

## Appeal 1-Appeal of the Treatment of Credit Cards by a Liquidating Entity

## Background

A credit card bank, in liquidation, appealed the OCC's decision regarding the continued existence and treatment of its private-label credit cards. With a few exceptions, the credit card portfolio had been sold to an independent third party (buyer). The credit card bank was in liquidation and concluding its activities. In addition to the previously issued disclosures, the OCC specifically requested that the credit card bank send out stickers to be affixed to the outstanding cards with current information as to customer service and ownership of the account.

The bank appealed that decision based on the following:

- The substantial expense (\$2-3 million) and time to comply with the decision to issue stickers,
- No precedential support for the decision,
- The decision is impractical, and
- The decision violates the principle of equal treatment with other similar national credit card banks.

The liquidation of the credit card bank had been structured so that the buyer became the owner of the account and the issuer of credit to the account holder. However, the ownership of the actual plastic credit card remained with the original credit card bank. Upon expiration and renewal the buyer would then issue the account holder a new credit card. A notice conveying the sale of the ownership of the credit card accounts was sent to all cardholders at the time the portfolio was sold. The notice did not disclose the ownership of the plastic credit card.

## Discussion

A key area of concern in this appeal involved the liquidation of the credit card bank. In reviewing the facts surrounding this appeal, the retention of ownership of the plastic credit cards by the credit card bank became the overriding regulatory concern because a liquidated entity cannot own assets. Options were explored on how the bank could resolve this issue without having an adverse impact on the involved parties.

## Conclusion

In order to arrive at a feasible option to address all the issues involved, the ombudsman decided on the following course of action:

- The credit card bank should sell the plastic credit card ownership to a third party (either another affiliated entity or to the buyer) for a nominal fee.
- The credit card bank should notify all account holders of the new plastic credit card ownership. This notification would also contain information about future reissuance of expired cards by the buyer.

These actions facilitated the liquidation of the credit card bank since the bank would no longer have ownership of the plastic credit cards. The disclosure provided customers with information regarding the card ownership and when new cards would be issued, therefore alleviating the need for issuing stickers.

## Appeal 2-Appeal of Sensitivity to Market Risk, Earnings, and Management Component Ratings

The ombudsman received a formal appeal of examination conclusions involving the sensitivity to market risk, earnings, and management component ratings. The bank's appeal stated that in the Report of Examination the OCC assigned the bank a 3 rating for sensitivity to market risk, a 5 rating for earnings, and a 5 for management. Bank management and the board of directors' contention was that these CAMELS component ratings did not accurately reflect the bank's condition at the time of the examination.

## Sensitivity to Market Risk— RORRating 3

## B ackground

Management and the bank's board believed that:

Neither the condition of the bank's sensitivity to market risk as of the examination date, as compared to the last examination, nor the quality of the bank's Asset/Liability Management Policy warranted the OCC downgrading
the bank's Sensitivity to Market Risk rating from a " 2 " to a "3." Furthermore, by commissioning reports with outside consulting firms, which also reflects the positive state of the bank's interest rate risk management, the bank has illustrated sound risk management policies and procedures.

The supervisory office concluded in the ROE that the bank's interest rate risk was slightly elevated because of an imbalance resulting from assets repricing faster than liabilities. The ROE also commented that the board and management's planning and risk management processes were deficient. Additionally, the supervisory office believed the Asset/Liability Management Committee had not taken an active role in managing the balance sheet or interest rate risk.

## Discussion and Conclusion

In accordance with OCC Bulletin 97-1 ("Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System") the sensitivity to market risk rating is intended to reflect the degree to which changes in interest rates can adversely affect the earnings and capital of a financial institution. Considerations in determining the sensitivity rating are management's ability to identify, measure, monitor, and control market risk, and the adequacy of the capital and earnings in relation to the bank's level of interest rate risk exposure.

The ombudsman's review did not find adequate support that the board and management was actively managing the bank's interest rate risk (IRR) position. Review of the information provided to the ombudsman's office revealed:

- The input and assumptions used in the modeling were not well supported and hindered an accurate assessment of the risk, making it difficult to quantify the bank's risk exposure.
- While the bank had purchased a complete bank simulator model, allowing for greater accuracy and more assumptions, the bank had never used this model.
- The modeling reports reflected gap positions outside of those limits established in the Asset/Liability management policy of the bank.
- The Asset/Liability Committee (ALCO) minutes provided no insight on management's and the board's efforts to manage IRR. The only discussion reflected in the ALCO minutes was pricing of depository products, which lacked detail. Furthermore, the minutes did not reflect the board's desired balance sheet composition or strategy to manage IRR.

Based on the risk management weaknesses described above, the ombudsman concluded that the 3 rating assigned during the examination was appropriate.

## Earnings-ROE Rating 5

## Background

The bank's submission commented that:


#### Abstract

Although at the time of the last ROE, the bank was experiencing losses, it was taking steps to increase earnings. During the past year, the bank commenced its SBA and Credit Card program, both of which introduced a significant revenue stream to the bank. The bank's earnings trend is not negative and does not represent a distinct threat to the bank's capital. During this time the bank also raised additional capital to compensate for funding the increased provision for loan losses. The increase in revenue from the last examination and the nature of the bank's expenses in no way can justify the downgrading of the bank's earnings rating. The OCC's assignment was wholly improper.


Comments in the ROE concluded that earnings remain poor and were eroding the bank's capital. The supervisory office also stated that management and the board needed to take immediate and ongoing action to alleviate large continuing losses and address the other weaknesses. Examiners' primary concern was that continuing losses of the magnitude experienced in the last years would threaten the bank's viability.

## Discussion and Conclusion

Pursuant to OCC Bulletin 97-1 ("Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System") earnings are intended to reflect not only the quality and trend, but also factors that may affect the sustainability or quality of earnings. Considerations in determining the earnings rating are the following:

- The level of earnings, including trends and stability,
- The ability to provide for adequate capital through retained earnings,
- The quality and sources of earnings,
- The level of expenses in relation to operations,
- The adequacy of provisions to maintain the allowance for loan and lease losses, and
- The adequacy of the budgeting systems and forecasting processes.

The ombudsman review revealed that over the last two years, the bank had no traditional core earnings. The bank experienced net-operating losses in the last two years of approximately $\$ 600,000$ and $\$ 900,000$, respectively. These losses included provisions to the allowance for loan and lease losses of $\$ 600,000$ and $\$ 700,000$, re-
spectively. Furthermore, the net interest margin declined from 4.60 percent to 3.80 percent in the same time period due to increasing funding costs and declining loan yields. Net losses had eroded capital, necessitating an injection of capital.

Additionally, the earnings posture of the bank could be further affected by the bank's risk profile and risk management practices. These include:

- The bank's high credit risk profile as evidenced by the level of classified assets centered in the unguaranteed portion of SBA loans, past dues, and non-accruals.
- Measuring and monitoring risk management systems. For instance, credit risk identification, underwriting standards, loan grading, allowance methodology, and collection efforts remain deficient.
- A weak budgeting process with overly optimistic assumptions based on past performance.

The bank's earnings posture, the high risk profile of the bank, and the questionable future prospects cause a significant supervisory concern and represent a distinct threat to the bank's viability through the erosion of capital. Therefore, the ombudsman concluded that the 5 rating assigned during the examination was appropriate.

## Management-ROE Rating 5

## Background

The bank's appeal letter stated management and the board have made a concerted and significant effort to improve the depth and stability of bank management by making position-specific improvements. They believed that through the creation of new officer positions and the hiring of new officers, the bank management team was significantly stronger at the time of this examination than at the time of the last examination. For these reasons, bank management believed a downgrade in the bank's management rating was inconsistent with the actual condition of the bank.

The ROE stated management and the board's supervision was ineffective. The ROE comments also asserted management actions were not substantive nor were they taken in a timely manner to strengthen the bank's loans and risk management systems. The bank continued to experience turnover in management and the board. Additional examination findings revealed the bank did not have a legal number of directors, the president/chief-lending officer was terminated, and the chief financial officer resigned.

## Discussion and Conclusion

Pursuant to OCC Bulletin 97-1 ("Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System") the management rating is intended to reflect the capability and performance of the board and management. Some considerations in determining the management rating are:

- The level and quality of oversight and support of all activities in the bank,
- The overall performance of the bank and its risk profile,
- Management depth and succession,
- The adequacy and reliability of financial and regulatory reporting,
- The accuracy, timeliness, and effectiveness of management information and the risk monitoring systems appropriate for the institution's size, complexity, and risk profile,
- The adequacy of, and conformance with, appropriate internal policies and controls addressing the operations and risk of significant activities, and
- The ability of the board of directors and management in their respective roles, to plan for, and respond to, risks that may arise from changing business conditions or the initiation of new activities or products.

The ombudsman's review revealed that the positionspecific appointments did not improve the depth, stability, and expertise needed in the board and management. This finding was based on the following:

- The board and management did not demonstrate the ability to reverse the deteriorating trends and improve the poor financial condition of the bank.
- The board and senior management had not developed and maintained appropriate risk management systems given the risk profile of the bank.
- Both the board and management were unstable with no strategic direction given the continual turnover in executive management.
- The bank had operated without the legal number of directors for the last two years.

Strong leadership is essential in a financially troubled institution. The board's effort to provide leadership had not been effective. Therefore, the ombudsman concluded the 5 rating assigned during the examination was appropriate.

## Speeches and Congressional Testimony

## Of the Comptroller of the Currency

Statement of John D. Hawke Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, Committee on Financial Services, on reform of the federal deposit insurance
system, Washington D.C., July 26, 2001

## Of the Director, Securities and Corporate Practices Division

Statement of Ellen Broadman, Director, Securities and Corporate Practices Division, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, before the U.S. House Subcommittees on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government-Sponsored Enterprises and on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, Committee on Financial Services, on broker-dealer exemptions under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Washington, D.C., August 2, 2001

# Statement of J ohn D. Hawke J r., Comptroller of the Currency, before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, Committee on Financial Services, on reform of the federal deposit insurance system, Washington, D.C., J uly 26, 2001 

Statement required by 12 USC 250. The views expressed herein are those of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and do not necessarily represent the views of the President.

## Introduction

Chairman Bachus, Congresswoman Waters, and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate this opportunity to discuss reform of our federal deposit insurance system. Too often reform occurs against the backdrop of a crisis. Fortunately, we are not in that position today. The deposit insurance funds and the banking industry are strong. Nonetheless, the flaws in the current deposit insurance system pose an unnecessary risk to the stability of the banking system and so merit a careful and timely review by the Congress.

For the past year-and-a-half, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) staff has engaged in an inclusive and thoughtful process to identify and analyze deficiencies in the deposit insurance system and to recommend solutions to those problems. A staff paper released by the FDIC in April, and recent testimony by former FDIC Chairman Tanoue, identified what they believe to be four significant flaws in the existing deposit insurance system [http:// www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/initiative/index.html]:

- First, even though the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) and the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) provide an identical product-deposit insurance-for virtually identical institutions, the law requires the FDIC to administer the two as separate insurance funds, sacrificing both operating efficiencies and opportunities for risk diversification.
- Second, the current system of deposit insurance premiums does not adequately reflect the risk that individual depository institutions pose to the deposit insurance system. Currently, 92 percent of all FDIC-insured institutions pay no deposit insurance premiums at all. More than 900 banks chartered within the last five years have never paid any deposit insurance premiums. The FDIC's inability to price deposit insurance according to risk results in a "free ride" for riskier banks, distorts management incentives to limit risks, and increases the moral hazard to the funds. It results in less risky banks effectively subsidizing the activities
of riskier banks-the exact opposite of what was intended by the legislation that mandated a federal riskbased deposit insurance system.
- Third, deposit insurance may be "procyclical." Under the present system, when a deposit insurance fund falls below its designated reserve ratio (DRR) of 1.25 percent of insured deposits, the FDIC must raise premiums sufficiently to bring the reserve ratio back to 1.25 percent within a year. If that cannot be done, it must charge every bank a premium of at least 23 basis points of its total domestic deposits until the reserve ratio reaches 1.25 percent. Thus, if an economic downturn leads to a decline in insurance fund reserves, banks could face dramatically higher deposit insurance premiums at the very time that bank earnings and capital are under pressure.
- Fourth, the FDIC staff paper observes that the real value of the level of deposit insurance coverage, set in 1980 at $\$ 100,000$ per account, has not kept pace with changes in the price level over the past 20 years. Those who seek a safe repository for their savings can offset this reduced coverage in a number of ways. They can, for example, open multiple accounts at a single institution or accounts at multiple institutions. Nonetheless, some banks have argued for an increase in the current coverage limit and the adoption of a framework for periodically adjusting the level of deposit insurance coverage.

There are also several other issues that should be considered in the context of deposit insurance reform. These include the appropriate size of the insurance fund, the desirability of having a fixed designated reserve ratio, and the prospect of issuing rebates when the size of the funds exceeds a specified limit.

The OCC strongly believes that one further set of issues should be considered in this connection. That is the use of the insurance fund to support the cost of bank supervision, and the inequitable treatment of national banks in the way the BIF is currently used to pay the costs of supervision of state nonmember banks.

In my testimony, I review a series of recommendations that I believe will strengthen the insurance fund while reducing the inherent cross subsidization and distortions that arise among institutions under the current deposit insurance system.

## Merger of the Insurance Funds

Currently, the FDIC administers the BIF and the SAIF separately. The OCC recommends that the BIF and SAIF be merged. A merged fund would enable the FDIC to operate more efficiently and to realize the benefits of diversification.

The maintenance of separate deposit insurance funds is a historical anomaly that traces its roots back to the 1930s, when the FDIC and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) were created in separate acts of Congress. When the FSLIC was abolished in 1989, and its functions were taken over by the FDIC, there were significant differences in the powers of commercial banks and thrifts. The thrift industry was just emerging from a period of extraordinary problems, and the risk profiles of banks and thrifts differed significantly. Over time, however, those differences have diminished. Significant commingling of the insurance funds, in the form of SAIF-insured deposits held by BIF members and BIF-insured deposits held by SAIF members, has further blurred the distinctions between BIF and SAIF. As of March 31, 2001, 874 banks and thrifts were members of one fund, yet held deposits insured by the other fund. BIF-member institutions held 41 percent of SAIF-insured deposits.

Industry consolidation has led to an increased concentration of insured deposits in relatively few institutions, which increases the risks to the deposit insurance funds. According to the FDIC staff, the share of SAIF-insured deposits held by the three largest institutions increased from 8.7 percent to 15.5 percent between June 1990 and March 2001, while the corresponding share for BIFinsured deposits increased from 5 percent to 13.7 percent. Merging the funds would reduce these concentration risks; for a merged fund, the share of deposits held by the three largest institutions would have been 12.4 percent.

A combined fund would also have better geographic and product diversification.

Although the portfolios of banks and thrifts have become more similar in recent years, thrifts are still more highly concentrated in single family mortgages, while banks hold much higher percentages of commercial loans.

## Pricing Deposit Insurance

In 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) mandated a risk-based premium
system and maintenance of required reserve levels, while providing the FDIC broad discretion to implement these goals. Five years later, the Deposit Insurance Funds Act of 1996 (DIFA) eliminated the FDIC's discretion. DIFA mandated zero premiums for banks in the lowest risk category when the fund equals or exceeds 1.25 percent of insured deposits. Further, it required the FDIC to charge a premium of at least 23 basis points on total domestic deposits when the fund falls below 1.25 percent for more than one year. The result is a pay-as-you-go system in which losses are determined after the fact and survivors are required to pay for the losses incurred in resolving insolvent institutions. Thus, while the size of the fund remains relatively stable, insurance premiums faced by individual banks can be extremely variable, regardless of the risk these banks present. Currently, the vast majority of banks and thrifts pay nothing for deposit insurance.

The OCC concurs with the FDIC staff's recommendation to eliminate the constraints introduced by DIFA on the FDIC's ability to set premiums, particularly the mandated zero premiums for banks in the lowest risk category whenever the insurance fund reserve ratio equals or exceeds 1.25 percent of insured deposits. The OCC further supports the FDIC exploring revisions to the deposit premium structure to improve the actuarial accuracy of the differential premiums paid by banks with different risk profiles. This does not necessarily mean that there is a need for a dramatically new and more complex approach to setting premiums. Even within the context of the FDIC's current matrix of premiums, we believe there are opportunities to make premiums more risk sensitive.

Under the current deposit insurance premium structure, 92 percent of banks (those that are well-capitalized with CAMELS 1 or 2 ratings) pay the same deposit insurance premiums. The risks those banks pose to the insurance funds, however, can vary greatly. The FDIC staff noted in its Deposit Insurance Reform Options paper that "the 5 -year failure rate for CAMELS 2-rated institutions since 1984 was more than two-and-a-half times the failure rate for 1 -rated institutions." That these banks currently pay nothing for deposit insurance is even more troubling. The net result is a pricing system that has severed almost completely any connection between risk and the price of deposit insurance. To maintain a proper incentive structure and to compensate the government for the benefits conferred by deposit insurance on all banks, even the least risky banks should pay some reasonable minimum insurance premium, regardless of the level of the fund.

Any effort to reform the pricing of deposit insurance should consider the appropriate range of insurance premiums. The premium structure initially adopted by the

FDIC under FDICIA, which charged banks in the highest risk category 31 basis points on domestic deposits, seems to have taken into account factors other than risk, including the likelihood that weaker banks would be unable to afford higher premiums. During the banking crisis of the early 1990s, however, the spread between the yields on the debt of the most- and least-risky banks was at times as much as 700 basis points. While we would not suggest that deposit insurance premiums should exhibit as broad a range as market prices for bank debt, we note that in the current environment spreads on subordinated debt can be as much as 150 basis points among banks that today pay no insurance premiums.

There are, of course, challenges to improving the risk sensitivity of deposit insurance premiums. Nonetheless, I believe it would be desirable to move incrementally, recognizing that perfection is not the relevant standard. Although measuring risk is an inexact science, I believe that, with the removal of some of the statutory constraints on pricing, the FDIC could implement in a reasonable time a risk-based system that improves significantly upon the existing system.

## The S ize of the Fund, Rebates, and Surcharges

Determining the appropriate size of the insurance funds and deciding when and how to pay rebates or impose surcharges if the funds get too large or too small, are two of the most important issues in deposit insurance reform. The current system is flawed in that the current designated reserve ratio of 1.25 percent of insured deposits has no clear actuarial basis-that is, it has no particular relationship to the risks borne by the funds. Rather, it is based on the actual range of the reserve ratio in the 1960s and 1970s. Recent experience would support consideration of a higher level, although we would prefer that there be no statutorily fixed ratios.

The OCC strongly supports eliminating the current DRR of 1.25 percent. We favor empowering the FDIC to establish a size range for the fund, based on the FDIC's evaluation of the risks borne by the funds and its assessment of potential losses. The FDIC should have the flexibility to adjust that range as the health of the banking system and the risks to the fund change through time. In this context we would support authority for the FDIC to pay rebates when the upper end of the range is exceeded and to impose surcharges when the ratio falls below the lower end of the range. We also believe that the FDIC should have the discretion in addressing the need for surcharges, to take into account the effect such surcharges might have on the performance or health of the banking
system. As a corollary, in order to mitigate the procyclical effects of increasing premiums in times of stress, the appropriateness of maintaining a strongly capitalized fund in good times should be recognized.

With the introduction of minimum deposit insurance premiums, it is likely that reserve balances in the funds will periodically exceed the upper end of the target range for the reserve ratios. As a result, it may be appropriate for the funds to pay rebates to insured institutions. To ensure that rebates paid to insured institutions are equitable, it is first necessary to consider the nature of insured institutions' claims on the funds. For instance, institutions that have paid little, if anything, into the funds may have a lesser claim on any rebates compared with institutions that have contributed to building up the funds.

To preserve the integrity of risk-based premiums, rebates to individual banks should be based on a factor that is unrelated to their current premiums. In other words, highrisk banks that pay large premiums should not receive higher rebates per dollar of insured deposits than banks that pose a low risk to the fund. One approach to the calculation of rebates would be to base the rebates on past levels of domestic deposits on which a bank paid premiums.

Any program of rebates should also reflect the benefits that are presently received by FDIC-supervised state nonmember banks in the form of cost-free supervision and examination. Under the current system of bank supervision, the FDIC covers its costs of operations out of the BIF and SAIF. The FDIC spends approximately $\$ 600$ million dollars a year to supervise state nonmember banks-that is, to perform for state banks exactly those functions the OCC performs for national banks. None of these costs is passed on to state banks in the form of direct assessments. By contrast, the OCC charges national banks for the full cost of their supervision.

This disparity is compounded by the fact that more than half of the funds spent by the FDIC for federal supervision of state nonmember banks are attributable directly to the accumulated contributions of national banks to the BIF. The earnings of the insurance funds-provided by all banks-finance the supervisory costs of only a portion of the banking industry. In other words, for every dollar the FDIC spends on the supervision of state banks, national banks, by our estimates, effectively contribute about 55 cents.

A key principle at the heart of deposit insurance reform is that the premiums paid by individual institutions should be closely related to the expected costs they impose on the funds. The objective is to identify and eliminate subsidies in the current system that can distort decision making. As
the FDIC staff notes in its arguments for a risk-based pricing system, healthy, well-managed banks should not be required to bear the costs and risks presented by less well managed, riskier banks. Similarly, banking supervision should not be based on a system of subsidies-such as those embedded in the current deposit insurance system-that results in national banks paying a substantial portion of the FDIC's cost of supervising state banks. As a matter of equity among banks, regardless of charter, the OCC believes that reform of our system of deposit insurance should recognize that the current system requires that national banks cover a significant portion of the cost of supervising state nonmember banks. Because one of the main purposes of bank supervision is to protect the insurance fund, ensuring that supervision is funded in a fair and equitable manner is inextricably related to the subject of deposit insurance reform.

Attached to my testimony is a paper that discusses the disparity in funding supervision in greater detail and proposes a legislative remedy. Our proposal recognizes that effective supervision is a critical component of a sound deposit insurance system. Because the FDIC insurance fund currently funds federal supervision of state nonmember banks, we believe that it would make sense to extend the existing arrangement to cover the costs of both state and national bank supervision from the FDIC fund. In other words, instead of funding supervision through direct assessments on banks, we propose that it be funded by payments to supervisors-the OCC and state supervisors-from the insurance fund, to which all banks contribute. This approach would strengthen both federal and state supervision by ensuring that all supervisors have adequate, predictable resources available to carry out effective supervisory programs.

## Coverage Limits

The erosion of the real value of the nominal deposit insurance coverage limit by inflation since 1980 has generated proposals to increase the coverage limit from its current level of $\$ 100,000$ per account. Opponents of such an increase argue that it is not needed and that it would increase the exposure of the funds and would reduce market discipline.

While this is clearly an issue that deserves consideration by the Congress, the OCC is concerned that an increase in coverage might have unintended effects that most would judge to be undesirable, including an increase in moral hazard. We are fortunate today to have a very strong banking industry, but conditions may not always be so positive. Increasing deposit insurance coverage effec-
tively allows weaker institutions to expand their risk-taking at a time when they should be retrenching-a lesson that we learned painfully during the savings and loan crisis. Increasing deposit insurance coverage also raises the cost to the insurance funds in the event of a bank failure. Reducing the risk of loss for large depositors may undermine market discipline and result in a haphazard reshuffling of existing deposits. We are not persuaded that an increase in coverage is necessary for deposit insurance to fulfill its purposes of preventing depositor runs on banks and providing a basic level of risk-free protection for depositors. Nor have we seen compelling evidence that depositors are demanding increased coverage.

The simple fact is that anyone who wants to use insured bank deposits as a means of holding their wealth can do so today virtually without limits-subject only to the inconvenience of having to open accounts at multiple banks. Of course, one may argue that, because of the relative ineffectiveness of the existing coverage limit, an increase may not have any substantial adverse consequences. But, it is precisely because of the dangers that attend legislating in the presence of uncertainty that the OCC would favor a cautious approach in this area.

The lack of consumer demand for increased deposit insurance coverage is evidenced by the fact that, despite the ability of depositors to achieve virtually unlimited coverage, there is over $\$ 1$ trillion of uninsured deposits in the banking system, compared with over $\$ 3$ trillion in insured deposits. This does not suggest, however, that large numbers of Americans are adversely affected by the existing coverage limit; the Federal Reserve's 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances reported that 98 percent of all households that held any deposits were fully insured. Moreover, money market mutual funds, which have some of the same features as bank transactions accounts and generally offer higher returns than bank deposits, today hold over $\$ 2$ trillion, which suggests that many Americans do not see the additional risk involved in holding money-market fund shares as particularly significant. Against this background a relevant question for the Congress is whether deposit insurance should be converted into a governmentally protected all-purpose investment vehicle.

Another argument put forth in favor of an increase in the coverage limit is that it would significantly assist community banks in meeting their liquidity and funding needs, and would counteract the competitive disadvantage that community banks believe they face vis-à-vis large banks. Those who hold this view attribute the continuing increase in the average size of deposits at large banks, in both nominal and real terms, to the widespread belief that a
"Too-Big-To-Fail" doctrine protects large banks. While it is exceedingly difficult to know whether or to what extent the perception of such potential support for large banks actually affects depositor behavior, the vast holdings of liquid assets in money market mutual funds suggest that yield, rather than safety, may be a more significant motivating factor.

Whether an increase in the coverage limit would in fact enhance community bank funding is speculative at best. It is not at all clear that increasing the limit would result in a net increase in the deposits of the banking system. Depositors who multiply insurance coverage today by using multiple banks might simply consolidate their deposits in a single bank if coverage were raised, and there is no way of determining who would ultimately, when the switching process ended, benefit. Similarly, if a coverage increase did attract new funds into the system, it is not at all clear that the benefits would flow to smaller banks. Large, aggressive institutions might simply use the expanded coverage to offer an even more extensive governmentally protected investment vehicle to wealthy customers, with the consequence of increasing the liquidity pressures felt by smaller banks.

If there is a compelling case to be made for increasing the insurance limit and indexing it to inflation, it remains to be made. Consequently, we believe that Congress should move very cautiously in this area, and while it is certainly true that a coverage increase would be less problematic in the context of properly priced deposit insurance coverage, we think this proposal raises some fundamental questions that need to be addressed. One such question is whether insuring virtually a limitless amount of funds is part of the intent of deposit insurance. Clearly, it would be much easier to decide what to do with the existing $\$ 100,000$ insurance limit if it were a hard and fast upper bound on coverage that was strictly enforced. There have been efforts to devise ways, which generally have been rejected on grounds of administrative complexity, to limit the total coverage or lifetime payouts that could be obtained by a person. In light of the advances that have been made in information technology, those proposals may deserve a second look.

## Conclusion

Today, we have the opportunity to undertake comprehensive federal deposit insurance reform when both the banking industry and the deposit insurance funds are strong. A primary goal of reform should be to reduce the current cross subsidization embedded in the current system, including the inequitable treatment of national banks in the current use of the fund to pay the costs of state nonmember bank supervision.

The OCC supports the FDIC staff recommendations to merge the BIF and SAIF and to eliminate the current constraints on premiums, particularly the mandated zero premiums for well-managed, well-capitalized banks. We favor elimination of the fixed DRR of 1.25 percent of insured deposits and the empowerment of the FDIC to establish a size range for the fund, based on an assessment of the risks the fund faces. Regarding proposals to increase the insurance coverage limit of $\$ 100,000$, we have not seen compelling evidence to date that increasing the insurance coverage would either further the purpose of federal deposit insurance or help to alleviate the liquidity and funding pressures of community banks.

## Attachment: Reforming the Funding of Bank Supervision (J uly 2001)

## Introduction

This paper addresses a fundamental flaw in our system of bank supervision-the way supervision is funded. It also offers a proposal for fixing this flaw. The proposal not only would enhance the resources available to assure quality supervision of our nation's banking system, but would reduce the assessments now imposed on both national and state banks to pay for their own supervision-with no additional cost to taxpayers.

## Background

Under the present system, national banks pay the full costs of their supervision, through assessments levied on them by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the federal agency that charters and supervises national banks.

State-chartered banks, by contrast, pay only for that small fraction of their supervision that is provided by state supervisory agencies. The predominant part of state bank supervision actually comes from two federal agencies, the Federal Reserve System (FRS) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). ${ }^{1}$ These federal agencies perform exactly the same supervisory functions for state banks as the OCC performs for national banks. The main difference is that the FRS and the FDIC do not assess state banks for the costs of their supervisory services.

[^2]In 2000, these two federal agencies spent almost $\$ 1$ billion on state bank supervision, none of which was recovered from the banks they supervise.

## The current situation is a problem that Congress needs to fix because:

It's unfair. The present system is doubly unfair to national banks: they not only are fully charged for the costs of their supervision, but they also have contributed a substantial portion of the deposit insurance premiums that the FDIC relies on to fund its supervision of state nonmember banks. The present system also unfairly imposes on taxpayers and on the FDIC insurance fund the costs of federal supervision of state banks.

It distorts the dual banking system. Healthy competition in the quality of supervision and innovation in meeting the needs of banks and their customers should lie at the heart of our dual banking system. Unfortunately, today a primary focus of this competition is on price. Because state banks receive a federal subsidy for the predominant part of their supervision, there is a cost incentive for banks to avoid or depart from the national charter in favor of the heavily subsidized state charter. This inevitably tends to undermine a vigorous and healthy dual banking system.

It compromises safety and soundness. The present system of funding bank supervision works pro-cyclically. It threatens national banks with additional cost burdens in times of economic stress, and it imposes constraints on supervisory resources at the very time they are most likely to be needed. When there is widespread stress in the banking system, as there was in the late 1980s and early 1990s, significantly increased supervisory attention is demanded and supervisory costs rise. As this occurs, healthy national banks, which already pay more than their state counterparts, face the prospect of substantial increases in assessments to pay the costs of more intensive supervision of problem banks. This creates a strong incentive to convert to a state charter. Such conversions, in turn, reduce the resources available to OCC to fund increased supervisory needs.

It's inconsistent with deposit insurance reform. A fundamental principle at the heart of deposit insurance reform is that subsidies should be eliminated. Healthy, wellmanaged banks should not be required to bear the costs and risks presented by less well-managed, riskier banks. By the same token, national banks should not be forced to bear the costs of supervising and insuring state banks. Any proposals to reform the deposit insurance system must inevitably come to grips with this inequity in the system, just as they must focus on such fundamental issues
as the appropriate size of the insurance fund and how rebates, if any, should be distributed. Since the principal purpose of bank supervision is to protect the insurance fund, the manner in which supervision is funded is inextricably bound up with the subject of reform of the deposit insurance system.

## The following discussion elaborates on each of these points:

## The Present System is Unfair to National Banks and to Taxpayers

The three federal bank supervisory agencies-the OCC, the FRS, and the FDIC-perform virtual identical functions with respect to the banks they supervise, as is demonstrated by Table 1. Indeed, for more than 30 years, whenever Congress has enacted new bank regulatory laws, it has almost always parceled out identical supervisory and enforcement responsibilities to the three federal agencies. As a result, the FRS and the FDIC today perform the predominant part of state bank supervision.

## Table 1-The federal regulatory agencies have similar supervisory responsibilities.

| Responsibilities | OCC | FDIC | FED |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Safety and soundness exams | X | X | X |
| CRA Exams | X | X | X |
| Fair Lending Exams | X | X | X |
| Enforce Bank Secrecy Act | X | X | X |
| Regulation | X | X | X |
| Entry | X | X | X |
| FFIEC | X | X | X |
| Enforce the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 | X | X | X |
| Branch Applications | X | X | X |
| Merger \& Consolidation Applications | X | X | X |
| Enforce Capital Requirements and PCA | X | X | X |
| Truth in Lending Act Examinations | X | X | X |
| Right to Approve Directors and Senior Execs | X | X | X |
| Authority to Prescribe Oper and Mgrl Stds | X | X | X |
| Supervisory Enforcement Actions | X | X | X |
| Supervise Foreign Activities | X | X | X |

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Yet the burden of funding supervision falls with vastly disproportionate weight on national banks. As shown in Table 2, virtually the entire amount of the cost of national bank supervision in 2000 was borne by national banks. By contrast, only 15 percent of the total cost of state bank supervision-that is, the costs of both state and federal supervisors-was paid by state banks, in the form of assessments by their state supervisors. The lion's share of these costs-85 percent-reflecting the costs of the FRS and the FDIC, were absorbed by those federal agencies.

## Table 2-S upervisory fees paid by national banks cover $\mathbf{1 0 0 \%}$ of their cost of supervision. Supervisory fees paid by state banks cover $\mathbf{1 5 \%}$ of their cost of supervision.



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To understand how this federal subsidy unfairly impacts taxpayers and national banks, it is important to understand how the FRS and the FDIC are funded and how those funds are spent.

The FRS derives most of its revenues from open market operations-that is, from the earnings on its portfolio of government securities. Any portion of those earnings remaining after the FRS subtracts its costs of operation are paid over to the U.S. Treasury for the benefit of taxpayers. In 2000, the FRS spent about $\$ 300$ million (out of $\$ 31$ billion in total revenue) on its supervision of state banks. Thus, the costs of supervision of state banks by the FRS are, in practical effect, borne by all American taxpayers.

The FDIC's operating revenues are taken out of the deposit insurance funds, which have been built up over the years through the payment of premiums by all insured banks. In 2000, the FDIC tapped into the funds for a total of $\$ 1.2$ billion, of which $\$ 638$ million was spent on the supervision of state banks. Of this amount, $\$ 568$ million was attributable to the FDIC's supervision of statechartered commercial banks, and $\$ 70$ million to its supervision of state-chartered thrift institutions.

As the holders of the largest share of the nation's bank deposits, national banks have always been the largest contributors to the bank insurance fund, and therefore to FDIC revenues. As shown in Table 3, national bank contributions today account for almost 55 percent of the funds in the FDIC's Bank Insurance Fund-and, by extension, 55 percent of the earnings that are used by the FDIC to supervise state nonmember commercial banks. In other words, 55 cents of every dollar expended by the FDIC on
state nonmember commercial bank supervision is attributable to payments by national banks.

Table 3-O ver one-half of the premiums paid into the bank insurance fund since 1990 came from national banks.


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To be sure, state banks have contributed to the insurance funds just as have national banks. But the fact remains that state banks receive their federal supervision free of cost, while national banks bear the full cost of their supervision.

There is no justification for a federal policy that subsidizes state banks, yet leaves national banks to bear the full cost of their supervision. Such a policy is especially unwarranted when the majority share of that subsidy is involuntarily funded by national banks through their contributions to the FDIC insurance fund.

## The Present System Undermines the Dual Banking System

Historically, the choice between a national or state charter centered on such things as supervisory philosophy and responsiveness, examination quality, and the scope of permissible activities. The cost of supervision was generally a minor factor. But that's no longer the case.

Today the costs of supervision have increased by orders of magnitude, largely because of laws that Congress has put in place over the past three or four decades to strengthen supervision and to increase protections for consumers-laws that Congress has charged the federal supervisors with the responsibility for enforcement. Since the FRS and the FDIC absorb those costs for state banks, while the OCC must pass them on to national banks, the disparity in supervisory costs paid by state and national banks has increased commensurately.

Thus, as shown in Table 4, state banks today pay supervisory costs on average less than half of what comparably sized national banks pay.

Table 4-Because state banks pay only for supervision costs incurred by states, their supervisory fees average less than half those of national banks.

Average Assessment for a $\$ 500$ million bank ${ }^{\star}$


Average fees paid in California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas, 2000.
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To compound the unfairness, many state bank supervisors today actively proselytize for charter conversions on the basis of the fee differential, in effect exploiting the value of the subsidy provided to state banks by the taxpayers and the FDIC. Thus, the fee disparity creates a significant incentive for a banker to choose a state over a national charter-to opt, in effect, to be the recipient, rather than the donor, of a subsidy.

If large numbers of banks were to make that choice-and the current pressures for cost reduction gives them a strong incentive to do so-the national bank charter could be seriously undermined. The result, perversely, would ultimately be to increase the cost to taxpayers and the insurance fund, since banks that convert from national to state charters would no longer pay the full costs of their federal supervision, and it would fall to the FRS and the FDIC to pick up all of the additional supervisory costs.

## The Present S ystem Compromises Safety and Soundness

The current funding system works pro-cyclically to reduce supervisory resources precisely when they are most likely to be needed and to increase the cost burdens on national banks at the very time they are grappling with an economy under stress. Of all the perversities in our system, none is more serious.

We saw this process at work during the wave of large bank failures in the late 1980s and early 1990s-a period
of stress in the banking system not seen since the Great Depression. Supervisors were under mounting pressure to monitor and manage the crisis. Yet each bank failure translated into a reduction in the base on which assessments could be levied to support the agencies' increased costs. At the OCC this meant significant increases in assessment rates-14 percent in 1989, another 11 percent in 1991, and a whopping 30 percent in 1992.

Assessment rates were subsequently lowered when the crisis subsided and the industry returned to health. But it is unfair that our system requires well-managed banks to provide the additional supervisory resources needed to deal with problem institutions. This is a flaw in the system that must be addressed.

Moreover, even in times of relative economic calm, the present system can adversely affect the supervision of national banks. Given the concentration of assets in the banking system today, the loss of even a single large national bank-whether due to merger, conversion, or failure-could have a huge impact on the OCC's operating budget. Faced with the loss of a substantial part of its assessment base, the OCC would have only two choices: either to reduce its supervisory resources or to increase assessments on the remaining institutions.

State bank supervisors face a similar problem. In almost half the states, a single bank accounts for 25 percent or more of the asset base on which state supervisors base the assessments they need to fund their offices. Thus, the loss of such a large bank could have a crippling effect on a state supervisor's ability to provide quality supervision.

## Deposit Insurance Reform Offers an Opportunity to Mend the Present System

A fundamental principle on which all of the current proposals for deposit insurance reform are based is that cross-subsidies in the system should be eliminated. Banks should contribute to the insurance funds based on the risks they present, and healthy banks should not be required to bear the costs and risks of providing deposit insurance to poorly managed, troubled banks.

Eliminating the fee disparity between national and state banks is an inextricable component of deposit insurance reform. National banks have, in effect, been forced to contribute more to the deposit insurance fund than they rightfully should, because more than half of their contributions to the fund go not for insurance coverage, but to defray the FDIC's costs of supervising state banks. Any proposal to reform deposit insurance must deal with this crosssubsidy as much as it must deal with the risk subsidy provided by less risky banks.

The FDIC's initiative to review and revise the deposit insurance system has focused on a number of fundamental issues relating to such questions as how deposit insurance premiums should be set, what the appropriate size of the deposit insurance funds should be, and how rebates, if any, should be distributed once the size of the fund exceeds some specified limit. Although some aspects of the FDIC's proposal are controversial, the debate over deposit insurance reform has been characterized by broad agreement that any reform program should advance the goals of efficient and equitable distribution of the costs and benefits of deposit insurance.

In that context, it's particularly important that we address the supervisory funding issue. As long as premium income or the revenue it generates is used to fund the federal supervision of only one part of the industry, the FDIC's deposit insurance premium structure-even a revised one-cannot equitably price insurance coverage. Remedying this inequity and separating the actual costs of the FDIC's supervisory functions from the costs of providing deposit insurance is an essential step toward efficient and rational pricing of both.

## How to Fix the Problem

Any proposal for reform of our system of supervisory funding must pass several basic tests. It should-

- Strengthen both the federal and state supervisory processes, and protect them from the impact of random structural changes in the banking system;
- Enhance the qualitative aspects of competition within the dual banking system;
- Promote a fair and efficient deposit insurance system, and
- Ensure that all supervisors, state and national, have adequate, predictable resources available to carry out effective supervisory programs.

While there have been many different proposals to those ends, we believe that the most straightforward solution would be to develop a common approach to funding supervision. Since effective supervision is a critical component of a sound deposit insurance system-and since state nonmember supervision is already funded from the FDIC insurance fund-it makes sense to extend the existing arrangement to cover the costs of both state and national bank supervision from the FDIC fund. In other words, instead of funding supervision through direct assessments on banks, it should be funded by payments to supervisors-the OCC and state supervisors-from the insurance fund, to which all banks contribute.

## How Would It Work?

Under a proposal the OCC has developed, the costs of both national bank supervision by the OCC and state bank supervision by the states would be paid from the FDIC insurance funds, as follows:

- Working with the FDIC, the OCC and state supervisors would jointly develop a formula for allocating funding based initially on current levels of funding.
- The formula would take into account both the number of institutions and total assets under supervision, as well as the financial condition and growth of the institutions.
- In subsequent years, the baseline allocation would be no less than the supervisors' costs for the preceding year, unless the baseline were adjusted to take account of changes in relevant factors.
- In no event would allocations exceed the investment earnings of the insurance funds for the preceding year. If earnings were insufficient to cover the baseline allocations, payments would be reduced pro rata. No payments could be made from the funds' principal.
- The agencies would retain the authority to impose supplemental assessments on their banks to meet unusual demands.

In short, this proposal would transfer the direct costs of supervision from the assessment process to the insurance funds-which, of course, have been built up by the very same banks that have paid national and state assessments.

The proposal would not involve any new costs for state banks. Indeed, the proposal envisages that assessments on state banks would be eliminated or reduced significantly.

## Can the Funds Afford It?

It is clear that the FDIC funds could easily carry the costs of these allocations. In fact, the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) alone could support the additional OCC and state supervisory costs. Today BIF holds over $\$ 31$ billion in assets. Over the past five years, BIF's investment incomethat is, excluding any premium income-has averaged more than $\$ 1.6$ billion a year, or nearly 140 percent of the combined 2000 supervisory expenses of the OCC, FDIC, and the 50 state supervisors. Thus, even in the absence of premium payments, BIF is currently generating more than enough investment income to defray the supervisory expenses of the OCC and the states, and the FDIC as well.

## What Benefits Would It Bring?

There would be enormous benefits to such a new approach to the funding of supervision, with no perceptible downside. Specifically:

- It would place supervision on a sounder and fairer footing, relieving national banks of the burden of subsidizing their state bank competitors, without threatening FDIC resources.
- It would be a step toward allocating the costs and benefits of deposit insurance in an equitable and
efficient manner, thus facilitating deposit insurance reform.
- It would ensure that all supervisors have the resources necessary to provide effective bank supervision, regardless of changes in the economy or the structure of the banking system.
- It would revitalize the dual banking system to move beyond the current charter price competition and recapture the elements of the dual banking system that have made it vital to the fabric of our nation's banking system: creativity, efficiency, and healthy competition.


# Statement of Ellen Broadman, Director, S ecurities and Corporate Practices Division, before the U.S. House S ubcommittees on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government-S ponsored Enterprises and on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, Committee on Financial Services, on broker-dealer exemptions under Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Washington, D.C., August 2, 2001 

Statement required by 12 USC 250: The views expressed herein are those of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and do not necessarily represent those of the President.

Chairman Baker, Chairman Bachus, Ranking Members Kanjorski and Waters, and members of the subcommittees, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Securities and Exchange Commission's recent Interim Final Rules implementing the bank broker-dealer exemptions under Title II of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLB Act). The OCC appreciates the subcommittees' efforts to review the significant issues that the commission's rules raise.

To begin, I commend the commission for its recent actions on the rules. The commission's decision on July 18, 2001, to extend the time for banks to comply with the rules was a constructive first step. We also welcome and view as essential the commission's commitment to further extend the compliance date once final rules are adopted to give banks sufficient time to comply with changes. We are especially pleased that the commission anticipates amending the rules after considering public comments.

The OCC, Federal Reserve Board, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (banking agencies) provided the commission with comments on the rules. As you requested, our testimony below briefly describes the reasons we decided to file joint comments and highlights a few of the areas of concern. Those comments provide a more comprehensive discussion of significant substantive concerns the banking agencies had with the rules, and are attached to this testimony [attachment omitted]. We offer this summary with the understanding that the commission has recognized the need to make changes to the rules. The banking agencies are currently working together to provide additional specific recommendations to the commission. We look forward to working with the commission in developing rules that are workable for banks and consistent with the GLBA and congressional intent. We appreciate the subcommittees' support for such a collaborative approach.

## Banking Agencies' Concerns

The banking agencies provided comments to the commission because of the significant issues the rules raise.


#### Abstract

We are concerned that the rules create unworkable requirements that would force banks to discontinue traditional banking activities that Congress intended to preserve under the GLB Act. We also are concerned that the rules would significantly disrupt longstanding relationships between banks and their customers, restrict customer services, and increase customers' costs. We believe this result is unnecessary and inconsistent with the intent expressed by Congress in enacting these provisions. We strongly encourage the commission to address our concerns in revising the rules.


## Trust and Fiduciary Activities

One area of particular concern is how the rules would implement the trust and fiduciary exemption. Congress adopted this exemption to permit banks to continue providing the types of trust and fiduciary services banks have traditionally offered to customers, subject to existing regulatory protections. ${ }^{1}$ In response to concerns that banks might use the exemption to operate full scale retail brokerage operations, Congress required banks to be "chiefly compensated" for trustee- and fiduciary-related transactions on the basis of nonbrokerage-related fees and to not publicly solicit brokerage business.

To qualify for this exemption, the Interim Final Rules require banks to conduct an account-by-account review for each trust or fiduciary account and establish for each account that the bank is "chiefly compensated" by specified fees. ${ }^{2}$ We believe this approach is enormously burdensome for banks and creates serious practical difficulties, particularly as applied to banks' multi-faceted trust and fiduciary services and multi-party trust and fiduciary relationships. Banks do not have systems to compute the complex calculations required for each account under the rules and would be required to expend enormous resources to restructure their operations to meet this requirement. A single account that fails to meet a techni-

[^3]cal requirement under the rule could cause banks to become an unregistered broker-dealer subject to considerable liabilities under the Exchange Act [Securities and Exchange Act of 1934]. Some banks would be forced to discontinue providing brokerage services to trust and fiduciary customers who have chosen to do business with the banks.

Our comments, therefore, recommend that the "chiefly compensated" limit be applied on an aggregate basis to the bank's trust and fiduciary activities, and not on an account-by-account basis.

Under the rules, a bank meets the "chiefly compensated" requirement if its "relationship compensation" exceeds its "sales compensation" from each account on an annual basis. Unfortunately the rules create a unique definition of "relationship compensation" that excludes legitimate, long-recognized forms of fiduciary compensation. Thus, even when a bank is predominately compensated for its services through traditional fiduciary fees, the bank may not meet the "chiefly compensated" test under the rules. In such cases, banks will be ineligible for the statutory exemption and therefore unable to continue providing customers certain trust and fiduciary services.

We believe the above provisions and the other requirements in the rule would seriously disrupt traditional trust and fiduciary activities, contrary to congressional intent.

## Trustee Capacity

As noted above, the GLB Act expressly provides an exemption when banks effect transactions in a "trustee" capacity. The Interim Final Rules suggest that there is "uncertainty" concerning whether banks acting as ERISA [Employee Retirement Income Security Act], IRA [individual retirement account], or indentured trustees are "trustees" under this exemption and therefore grant a special exemption to resolve this ambiguity. We believe the commission's narrow view of the term "trustee" is inconsistent with the plain language of the GLB Act and casts a cloud over a wide range of other trust relationships banks have with their customers. We recommend that the commission instead interpret the term "trustee" consistently with its plain and ordinary meaning, which would eliminate the need for the "special exemption" in the rules.

## Investment Advice for a Fee

As described above, the GLB Act provides an exemption for banks acting in a fiduciary capacity. Our comments express concern that the rules exclude from the fiduciary exemption activities that the GLB Act expressly includes within the term "fiduciary capacity." For example, the GLB Act specifically provides that a bank acts in a "fiduciary
capacity" when the bank offers investment advice for a fee. That statutory language tracks the banking agencies' definition of "fiduciary capacity" which also includes investment advice for a fee. ${ }^{3}$ The Interim Final Rules add new requirements, such as that the investment advice must be "continuous" and "regular," that are not included in the statute and that differ from the banking agencies' definition of "fiduciary capacity." Banks that offer investment advice for a fee, and do not meet those requirements, will be forced to discontinue offering transaction services to their customers. We believe the commission should develop a definition of "fiduciary capacity" that is consistent with the definition in banking regulations and that permits banks to continue conducting the fiduciary services covered by the plain language of the statutory exemption.

## Custody and S afekeeping Activities

Custody and safekeeping activities, like trust and fiduciary activities, are part of the core business of banking. Congress created a custody and safekeeping exemption to allow banks to provide the full range of custody and safekeeping activities they traditionally provided "as part of customary banking activities." ${ }^{4}$ Bank custodians have a long-standing history of accommodating customers by accepting and transferring orders for securities to a registered broker-dealer. Nonetheless, the Interim Final Rules do not include customary custodial order-taking services within the exemption.

The Interim Final Rules create special exemptions that are unnecessary if order-taking services to customers fall within the custody and safekeeping exemption. One of these special exemptions permits bank custodians to continue providing customary order-taking services if they do not charge any fees for the service. Our comments expressed concern that this restriction will cause banks either to stop offering this service or to move custodial activities outside the bank, contrary to the statutory language and congressional intent. ${ }^{5}$ This would deny customers the convenience and choice of placing orders through their chosen bank custodian.

We believe the commission should instead include order taking within the custody and safekeeping exemption.

[^4]
## Networking

National banks may establish arrangements with registered broker-dealers to offer brokerage services to bank customers on or off bank premises (networking arrangements). Under the GLB Act, a bank employee may receive a nominal one-time cash fee of a fixed dollar amount for referring customers to a broker-dealer under a networking arrangement. The Interim Final Rules define "nominal" in a manner that imposes new requirements on the amounts and manner banks may compensate their employees that create practical and operational difficulties for national banks, and effectively negate for many banks the availability of the specific statutory provision allowing for referral fees.

## Other Areas of Concern

Our letter also describes in detail serious concerns with other areas, including affiliate transactions, sweep accounts, and supervision of dual employees. We also express particular concern with provisions that unduly restrict the ability of banks to sell their loans through asset-securitization to qualified investors. ${ }^{6}$ We believe those exemptions should not be implemented in a manner that denies banks the ability to use the exemptions or that disrupts long-standing bank relations with customers who have chosen to do business with the banks.

## Concerns with Process

Our letter also expressed concern with the process that the commission employed in adopting the rules. The commission issued the rules without the benefit of the normal

[^5]notice and public comment process. Further, the commission's decision to use Interim Final Rules with an immediate effective date, coupled with exemptions that only temporarily suspend the rule's effectiveness, placed banks in an untenable position. Without knowing how the rules would be changed, banks were required to take immediate steps to comply with the rules by the effective date. Our comment letter urged the commission to review public comments before establishing final rules and then to grant banks a sufficient time period to bring their operations into compliance. We appreciate the commission's response in which it pledged to address these problems. ${ }^{7}$

## Conclusion

The banking agencies provided comments to the commission because of the significant issues raised by the rules. The commission has taken a positive step by extending the dates for compliance and acknowledging that the rules must be amended after careful consideration of the comments. We stand ready to provide assistance to the commission in this process.

We thank the subcommittees again for this opportunity to express our views, and for its attention to this issue.
[Attachment omitted. Full text of the attachment, "Interagency Comment Letter with Appendix" (48 pp.), is available as the attachment to OCC Bulletin 2001-30, "SEC Interim Final Rules: Title II of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act," dated June 29, 2001. It is also available on the OCC's Web site at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/200130a.pdf.]

[^6]
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## Interpretive Letters

## 911-J une 4, 2001

## 12 USC 24(7)

Re: [ ] (bank)<br>Managed Loan Fund<br>Dear [ ]:

This is in response to your letter requesting an opinion from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) that national banks may acquire for their own account beneficial interests in a privately offered investment fund that would invest in loans, cash and cash equivalents, and an offshore fund that invests solely in loans. We conclude that if certain standards are met, it would be legally permissible for national banks to acquire such interests as securities, subject to a 5 percent aggregate investment limit and safe and sound banking practices, or as loan participations, subject to the requirements of Banking Circular No. 181 (Rev.) (August 2, 1984) (BC-181).

## Background

The bank established the [ ] (fund) as a vehicle for investment in bank loans. The fund also may invest temporarily in cash and cash equivalents, and in an offshore fund managed by the bank that invests solely in bank loans. The bank is the investment manager of both the fund and the offshore fund. The fund holds approximately $\$ 30$ million in assets, all of which have been provided by investors that qualify as "accredited investors" and "qualified purchasers" under the federal securities laws. The minimum investment in the fund is $\$ 10$ million. Interests in the fund qualify for an exemption from registration as securities under section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 because they are sold through private placements. ${ }^{1}$ The fund is not subject to registration under the Investment Company Act of 1940 because its investors must be qualified purchasers. ${ }^{2}$

The fund is organized as a [State] limited liability company. The fund's governing instrument, the Limited Liability Company Agreement ("agreement"), provides that upon dissolution of the fund each beneficial owner will receive a dollar amount equal to its pro rata interest in the fund's net assets. The agreement limits the fund's activi-

[^7]ties to participation in the primary and secondary bank loan markets, and cash and cash equivalents. Investors in the fund are shielded from personal liability for the acts and obligations of the fund since their liability as owners of beneficial interests in the fund is limited to the value of their interests.

The fund will hold loans from a variety of industries. The fund will invest no more than 10 percent of its portfolio in loans to any one business sector. Other restrictions include limitations on loans to one borrower, limitations on loans to non-U.S. borrowers, and limitations on loans purchased from the bank or any of its affiliates. The fund values its loans monthly at market value using third-party pricing sources. In the event it is not possible to determine market value using third-party sources, the investment manager values the loans at fair value, which is intended to approximate market value. ${ }^{3}$

Investors in the fund receive information regarding the composition, credit quality, and performance of the loans in the fund's portfolio. This information includes a list of each loan held in the fund as of a specified date, the loan's credit rating, and information about the fund's credit underwriting standards. Investors also are able to consult with the bank concerning the fund's investment decision making. On a quarterly basis, investors receive information about the fund's performance and changes in its composition. The information about portfolio composition and underwriting standards is provided to investors whether the fund has invested directly in such loans or whether the investment is through the offshore fund.

After holding their initial purchase for six months, investors may liquidate their fund holdings on a quarterly basis and are required to provide at least 30 days prior notice of any redemption. Redemptions will be paid in an amount based on the market value of the fund's portfolio as of the redemption date.

[^8]
## Discussion

## National Bank Authority to Purchase Investment Securities

National banks may purchase investment securities subject to the limits of 12 USC 24(Seventh) and 12 CFR Part 1. The OCC defines "investment security" as a "marketable debt obligation that is not predominantly speculative in nature." ${ }^{4}$ A security is not "predominantly speculative in nature if it is rated investment grade." ${ }^{5}$ When a security is not rated, it must be the credit equivalent of one that is rated investment grade. ${ }^{6}$ The term "marketable" is defined to include a security that "[c]an be sold with reasonable promptness at a price that corresponds reasonably to its fair value." ${ }^{7}$ The OCC, however, also states in its regulations that notwithstanding the definitions of investment security and investment grade, "a national bank may treat a debt security as an investment security for purposes of [Part 1] if the bank concludes, on the basis of estimates that the bank reasonably believes are reliable, that the obligor will be able to satisfy its obligations under that security, and the bank believes that the security may be sold with reasonable promptness at a price that corresponds reasonably to its fair value." ${ }^{8}$ Such securities are subject to a 5 percent aggregate investment limit. ${ }^{9}$ Banks purchasing securities permitted under Part 1 must adhere to safe and sound banking practices and consider, as appropriate, interest rate, credit, liquidity, price, foreign exchange, transaction, compliance, strategic, and reputation risk. ${ }^{10}$

The OCC permits national banks to purchase for their own accounts investment company shares, provided that the investment company's portfolio consists exclusively of assets that a national bank could purchase directly. ${ }^{11}$ The OCC may permit a national bank to invest in an entity that is exempt from registration as an investment company, provided that the portfolio of the company consists exclusively of assets that a national bank may purchase and

[^9]sell for its own account. ${ }^{12}$ The OCC has permitted national banks to invest in limited partnerships and unregistered investment companies. ${ }^{13}$

A crucial factor in the OCC's regulations on investment in investment company shares and in its prior interpretations is whether the investment company's underlying assets consist of bank-eligible investments. Among the activities that make up the business of banking are the discounting and negotiating of promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt, loaning money on personal security, and obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes. ${ }^{14}$ These powers are merely illustrative, however, and the list of bank powers contained in Section 24(Seventh) does not constitute the full scope of the "business of banking." ${ }^{15}$

## National Bank Authority to Purchase Loan Participations

National banks may purchase participation interests in pooled loans under their general lending power. ${ }^{16}$ Purchases of interests as loan participations merely constitute another way for national banks to engage in activities that long have been permissible for them. Under this analysis, the purchase of the interests is viewed as a purchase of a share of the assets that they represent. The OCC has issued extensive guidance on national bank purchases of

[^10]loans and loan participations. ${ }^{17}$ National banks that purchase debt securities as loans must comply with the lending limit restrictions in 12 USC 84 and may not purchase them in an amount exceeding 15 percent of the bank's capital and surplus. ${ }^{18}$ Bank purchasers also must adhere to the prudential requirements of OCC Banking Circular No. 181 (Rev.), including the requirement that they perform an independent credit analysis of the loan pool to satisfy themselves that the underlying credits meet their own credit standards. ${ }^{19}$ The OCC requires banks to implement "satisfactory controls" over loan participations, including: (1) written lending policies and procedures governing those transactions; (2) an independent analysis of credit quality by the purchasing bank; (3) agreement by the obligor to make full credit information available to the selling bank; (4) agreement by the selling bank to provide available information on the obligor to the purchaser; and (5) written documentation of recourse arrangements outlining the rights and obligations of each party. ${ }^{20}$

## Purchases of Interests in the Fund

National banks may purchase interests in the fund as securities, subject to a 5 percent aggregate investment limit, or as loan participations. Part 1 provides for national bank investments in unregistered investment companies so long as the underlying instruments in the portfolio are permissible investments for national banks. Part 1 does not require that the underlying assets of investment companies be limited to instruments labeled "securities." ${ }^{21}$ Making loans is part of the business of banking, and national banks may hold shares of investment companies that invest in loans. ${ }^{22}$

Part 1 requires that an investment security be rated investment grade or the credit equivalent thereof. ${ }^{23}$ Interests in

[^11]the fund would not qualify under Part 1 as "investment securities" if the credit quality of the portfolio of loans in which the fund invests were below investment grade. Even if interests in the fund do not qualify as "investment securities," however, national banks may purchase limited quantities of interests in the fund if they are able to conclude: (1) that the obligor could satisfy its obligations under the security (based on reliable estimates); and (2) that the security could be sold with reasonable promptness at a price that corresponds reasonably to its fair value.

In the instant situation, national banks would need to demonstrate that, due to the fund's diversification and its investment standards, the fund would perform in a manner consistent with the reliable estimates standard. That determination would require an analysis of the performance of the fund's loans. The fund's diversification should help ensure its overall performance. Investors in the fund also should be able to sell their holdings with "reasonable promptness" at a "price that corresponds reasonably" to their fair value because redemptions can be made quarterly based on the interests' market value at the time of redemption. National banks would also need to consider risk factors enumerated in Part 1, such as liquidity risk, credit risk, compliance risk, and reputation risk, and satisfy themselves that they can manage such risks and that the investment is appropriate for them. ${ }^{24}$

In addition to purchasing interests in the fund as securities under Part 1, national banks also may purchase such interests as loans or loans participations in an amount not exceeding 15 percent of the bank's capital and surplus. In order to rely on this authority, national banks would need to have sufficient information available to them to make the independent credit analysis required by BC181. The nature and extent of the required independent credit analysis is a function of the particular transaction. Banks investing in the fund would receive data from the bank on the fund's underwriting standards, and the principal terms, credit quality, and performance of loans in the fund's portfolio. Investors would also be able to consult with the bank concerning the fund's investment decisionmaking, and obtain information on the fund's performance and composition.

## Conclusion

National banks as a legal matter may be able to purchase interests in the fund either as securities under the reliable estimates standard of Part 1, subject to a 5 percent aggregate investment limit for all securities purchased under this authority, or as loan participations, subject to a 15 percent limit. Investments made under Part 1 are subject

[^12]to the prudential considerations set forth in the rule. National banks contemplating investment in the fund through the purchase of interests as loan participations must undertake an independent credit analysis as discussed above and must establish that the fund's investment strategy and portfolio of loans are consistent with their credit underwriting standards prior to making the investment. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact Donald N. Lamson, assistant director, or Paul Vogel, senior attorney, Securities and Corporate Practices Division, at (202) 874-5210.

Julie L. Williams
First Senior Deputy Comptroller and Chief Counsel

## 912-J uly 3, 2001

## 12 CFR Part 1

Re: Bank Qualified Mutual Fund

Dear [ ]:
This letter responds to your request that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) determine that [ ] funds' proposed "Bank Qualified Mutual Fund" ("fund") is a permissible investment for national banks under 12 CFR Part 1. Assuming the permissibility of a national bank's investment in the fund, you ask what investment limit and risk-weight a purchasing bank should apply to the investment, and whether the investment should be accounted for as "held-to-maturity" or "available-for-sale." ${ }^{1}$ For the reasons discussed below, and subject to the limitations described herein, we conclude that: [1] the fund is a permissible investment for national banks under 12 CFR $1.3(\mathrm{~h})(2),{ }^{2}$ [2] the risk-weight assigned to the fund will depend on the composition of the fund's assets, but in no event will the minimum risk-weight be less than 20 percent, and [3] the investment can be accounted for as either a "trading" or "available-for-sale" asset.

## I. Background

The fund will hold primarily general obligation and municipal revenue bonds that are designated by the issuer as

[^13]bank qualified. ${ }^{3}$ The fund will purchase municipal revenue bonds that are rated investment grade (i.e., AAA/Aaa to BBB/Baa) at the time of purchase by independent rating agencies. The fund also may buy non-rated municipal revenue bonds if the investment adviser judges them to be the equivalent of investment grade.

The fund proposes to hold securities with five- to fifteenyear average maturities, with no more than 5 percent invested in any one issuer. The fund plans to diversify across states and territories. It will use short term Treasuries or a Treasury obligation mutual fund as the cash equivalent vehicle in the fund.

## II. Discussion

Under 12 CFR Part 1, a national bank may purchase for its own account shares in a mutual fund with a portfolio consisting of bank-eligible investment securities. ${ }^{4}$ National banks must conduct an independent review of a mutual fund's holdings to determine whether its portfolio consists of bank-eligible investment securities and to determine applicable legal investment limitations under 12 USC 24(Seventh) and 12 CFR Part 1 ("Part 1"). The minimum risk-weight that a national bank can apply to a mutual fund investment is 20 percent. A national bank's intent or purpose in acquiring mutual fund shares determines whether the investment can be accounted for as a "trading" or "available-for-sale" asset.

## A. National Bank Authority to Purchase Mutual Fund Shares

A national bank may purchase for its own account, shares of an investment company, e.g., a mutual fund with a portfolio consisting solely of obligations that are eligible for investment by a national bank. ${ }^{5}$ Similarly, a national bank may invest in a fund that is exempt from registration as an investment company. ${ }^{6}$

[^14]Section 24(Seventh) ${ }^{7}$ and Part 1 address national bank investments in bank-eligible investment securities. In general, Section 24 (Seventh) permits national banks to purchase "investment securities" for their own account provided the aggregate par value of investment securities held by the bank issued by any one obligor does not exceed 10 percent of the bank's capital and surplus. The Section 24(Seventh) definition of investment securities includes "marketable obligations, evidencing the indebtedness of any person, copartnership, association, or corporation in the form of bonds, notes and/or debentures, commonly known as 'investment securities.'" Part 1 defines an "investment security" as "a marketable debt obligation that is not predominantly speculative in nature." 8

Section 24(Seventh) and Part 1 exempt certain types of investment securities from the 10 percent investment limitation and permit a national bank to underwrite, deal in, purchase and sell those securities without quantitative limitation, e.g., obligations issued by, or backed by the full faith and credit of, the U.S. Part 1, which classifies permissible national bank investment securities into several categories or types, classifies these investments as Type I investments. ${ }^{9}$

Section 151 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) ${ }^{10}$ amended Section 24(Seventh) to exempt municipal revenue bonds from the 10 percent investment limitation. To qualify for the exemption, a national bank must be "well capitalized" under prompt corrective action standards. ${ }^{11}$ Specifically, Section 24(Seventh), as amended, permits national banks to deal in, underwrite, or purchase limited obligation bonds, revenue bonds, obligations that satisfy the requirements of section 142(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or other obligations issued by or on

[^15]behalf of any state or political subdivision of a state, including any municipal corporate instrumentality of 1 or more states, or of a state. ${ }^{12}$ Accordingly, municipal revenue bonds qualify under Part 1 as Type I investment securities for well-capitalized national banks. Indeed, the OCC has issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that, if adopted, would amend Part 1's list of Type I securities to include municipal bonds as defined in the GLBA amendment to Section 24(Seventh) for well capitalized national banks. ${ }^{13}$

If a national bank is not well capitalized, it may purchase and hold municipal revenue bonds as Type III investment securities. ${ }^{14}$ Part 1 permits a national bank to purchase and sell Type III investment securities, provided the aggregate par value of investment securities held by the bank issued by any one obligor does not exceed 10 percent of the bank's capital and surplus. ${ }^{15}$ To qualify as a Type III security, a municipal revenue bond must be rated investment grade or, if not rated, the credit equivalent of investment grade, and marketable. ${ }^{16}$ "Investment grade" means a security that is rated in one of the four highest rating categories by two or more nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSRO) or by one NRSRO if the security is rated only by one NRSRO. ${ }^{17}$ A security is the credit equivalent of a security rated investment grade if, after a sufficient analysis, the bank makes that determination. A debt security is "marketable," if it is: [1] registered under the Securities Act of 1933 ("'33 Act"); ${ }^{18}$ [2] exempt from registration as a municipal revenue bond under the '33 Act; ${ }^{19}$ [3] offered and sold under Rule $144 \mathrm{~A}^{20}$ and rated investment grade or is the credit

[^16]${ }^{13}$ OCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 66 Fed. Reg. 8178 (2001)("NPR"). The comment period for the NPR closes on April 2,
${ }^{14} 12$ CFR 1.2(k). The NPR, if adopted, will make clear that Type III securities include municipal bonds that do not satisfy the defini-
${ }^{15} 12$ CFR 1.3(c); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 777 (April 8, 1997), reprinted in [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) I 81-204; OCC Interpretive Letter No. 781 (April 9, 1997), reprinted in [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) If 81-208.
equivalent thereof; ${ }^{21}$ or [4] can be sold with reasonable promptness at a price that corresponds reasonably to its fair value. ${ }^{22}$

National banks that hold mutual fund shares, the portfolios of which do not qualify as Type I securities, ${ }^{23}$ must use reasonable efforts to calculate and combine its pro rata share of a particular security in the portfolio of each fund with the bank's direct holdings of that security. ${ }^{24}$ A bank's direct holdings of a particular security and the bank's pro rata interest in the same security in a mutual fund's portfolio may not, in the aggregate, exceed the investment limitation that would apply to that security. Alternatively, a national bank may elect not to combine its pro rata interest in a particular security in a mutual fund with the bank's direct holdings of that security if: [i] the fund's holdings of the securities of any one issuer do not exceed 5 percent of its total portfolio; and [ii] the bank's total holdings of the fund's shares do not exceed the most stringent investment limitation that would apply to any of the securities in the company's portfolio if those securities were purchased directly by the bank. ${ }^{25}$ National banks must conduct periodic reviews to ensure that fund holdings do not exceed the most stringent investment limitation, relative to the bank's capital, that would apply to any of the securities if purchased directly. ${ }^{26}$
${ }^{21}$ See 12 CFR 1.2(f).
${ }^{22}$ Id. OCC regulations also state that, notwithstanding the definitions of "investment grade" and "investment security" in Part 1, a national bank may treat a debt security as an investment security, based on the bank's reliable estimates that the obligor will be able to satisfy its obligations under that security. See 12 CFR 1.3(i)(1). The "reliable estimates" provision allows a bank to invest in a below investment grade security, i.e., in a category below one of a rating agency's four highest categories, provided that the bank satisfies itself that the securities may be sold with reasonable promptness at a price that corresponds reasonably to their fair value. Id. National banks may purchase securities under the "reliable estimates" standard in an aggregate amount no greater than 5 percent of their capital and surplus. See 12 CFR 1.3(i)(2). This limit applies against all securities in their portfolios acquired predominantly on the basis of reliable estimates, rather than on a per issuer basis. Id.
${ }^{23}$ The OCC has a long-standing policy of permitting a national bank to treat investments that are backed by Type I securities as Type I securities. See Security Pacific v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034 (2nd Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 514 (May 5, 1990), reprinted in [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) II 83,218; OCC Interpretive Letter No. 378 (April 24, 1987), reprinted in [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) II 85,602.

24 See 12 CFR 1.4(e)(1).
${ }^{25}$ See 12 CFR 1.4(e)(2).
${ }^{26}$ Banking Circular No. 220 (November 21, 1986): Investment in Investment Companies Composed Wholly of Bank Eligible Investments (BC-220).

National bank management also must ensure that a particular mutual fund is an appropriate investment for the bank's investment portfolio. ${ }^{27}$ A national bank's board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for deciding whether to invest in a mutual fund. Once that decision is made, the bank's board must review those holdings to determine whether a particular fund continues to be appropriate for the bank's investment portfolio. ${ }^{28}$ Banks purchasing securities permitted under Part 1 must adhere to safe and sound banking practices and consider, as appropriate, interest rate, credit, liquidity, price, foreign exchange, transaction, compliance, strategic, and reputation risk. ${ }^{29}$

To the extent that the municipal revenue bonds held by the fund are permissible investments for national banks under the criteria above, national banks may use their authority under Section 24(Seventh) and Part 1 to purchase fund shares. If the purchasing bank is well capitalized under prompt corrective action standards, the investment may be treated as a Type I investment because the municipal revenue bonds and the other investments of the fund are Type I investments. As a Type I investment, national bank purchases of the fund's shares would not be subject to an investment limitation.

Conversely, if the bank purchasing fund shares is not well capitalized, then the fund shares could qualify as Type III investment securities, provided that applicable rating and marketability requirements are met. Under these circumstances, the investing bank could combine any direct holdings it had of a particular municipal revenue bond issuer with its pro rata interest by the same bond issuer held in the fund's portfolio, subject to a 10 percent investment limitation. Alternatively, an investing bank could choose not to combine its Type III holdings in fund with its direct holdings, if the fund's holdings of any issuer do not exceed 5 percent of the fund's total portfolio, in which case the bank could not invest more than 10 percent of its capital in fund, i.e., the most stringent investment limitation applicable to the fund under this scenario. ${ }^{30}$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& { }^{27} \mathrm{ld} . \\
& { }^{28} \mathrm{ld} . \\
& { }^{29} 12 \text { CFR 1.5(a). }
\end{aligned}
$$

${ }^{30}$ If the fund's municipal bond issue is not rated, not the credit equivalent of investment grade or rated below investment grade, a national bank may treat the fund investment as an investment in investment securities if it concludes that: [1] the obligor could satisfy its obligations under the security (based on "reliable estimates") and [2] the security could be sold with reasonable promptness at a price that corresponds reasonably to its fair value. The purchasing bank's pro rata interest in the bonds would be combined with all of its other "reliable estimates" investments and subject to a 5 percent investment limitation. Conversely, provided that the fund does not hold more than 5 percent of the securities of any

## B. Risk-Weighting

For regulatory capital purposes, a national bank's asset portfolio is divided into four categories. Each category is assigned a risk-weight percentage that in theory reflects the risk level of the assets within that category. ${ }^{31}$ In the case of mutual fund investments, the assets represent an indirect holding of a pool of assets that encompass more than one risk-weight within the pool. ${ }^{32}$ Thus, the OCC generally allows a national bank to risk-weight its total investment in a mutual fund in the risk category appropriate to the highest risk-weighted asset the fund holds, consistent with the investment limits the fund incorporates into its prospectus. ${ }^{33}$ Alternatively, the OCC affords national banks the option of assigning fund investments to different risk categories on a pro rata basis according to the investment limits in the fund's prospectus. ${ }^{34}$ The OCC believes that it is more prudent to base risk-weight distributions on investment limits than on a fund's actual underlying assets because actual fund holdings can change significantly from day-to-day. ${ }^{35}$

Regardless of the risk-weighting method used, the minimum risk-weight that may be assigned to a fund is 20 percent-a mutual fund has certain credit, transaction, and compliance risks that necessitate a risk-weight greater then zero percent. ${ }^{36}$ Furthermore, if the bank assigns fund assets to risk categories on a pro rata basis, and the sum of the investment limits in the fund's prospectus exceeds 100 percent, the bank must assign the highest pro rata amounts of its total investment to the highest risk categories. ${ }^{37}$

Where a mutual fund is permitted to hold an immaterial amount of highly liquid, high quality securities ineligible for a preferential risk-weight, then those securities may be

[^17]disregarded in determining the fund's risk-weight. However, if a fund engages in any activities that are speculative in nature or has any other characteristics that are inconsistent with the preferential risk-weighting assigned to the fund's assets, then a national bank's investment in the fund will be assigned to the 100 percent risk-weight category. ${ }^{38}$

In summary, a purchasing bank may risk-weight its total investment in the fund in the risk category appropriate to the highest risk-weighted asset the fund holds, consistent with the fund's investment limits as set forth in its prospectus. Otherwise, a purchasing bank may assign the fund's investments to different risk categories on a pro rata basis according to the investment limits in the fund's prospectus. In any case, the minimum risk-weight that may be assigned to a fund is 20 percent.

## C. Mutual Fund Accounting Classification

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards Board No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities (FASB 115), identifies the categories among which national banks must divide their securities holdings as held-to-maturity, trading, and available-forsale, and provides a different accounting treatment for each category. FASB 115 permits a national bank to include a security in the held-to-maturity category only if the bank has "the positive intent and ability to hold the security to maturity." Trading securities are those debt and equity securities that a bank buys and holds principally for the purpose of selling in the near term. Securities in the available-for-sale category are securities a bank does not have the positive intent and ability to hold to maturity, yet does not intend to trade them actively as part of its trading account.

National banks that invest in mutual funds give up the ability to control whether the underlying securities are held-to-maturity. A national bank's intent or purpose in acquiring the fund's shares will determine whether the investment should be accounted for as a "trading" or "available-for-sale" asset. When a national bank acquires mutual fund shares and at each subsequent reporting date, it must evaluate whether the investment should be accounted for as a "trading" or "available-for-sale" asset. If the mutual fund was bought principally to sell the investment in the near term, it should be accounted for as trading and marked to market through earnings. Otherwise, the mutual fund investment should be accounted for as an available-for-sale asset and recorded at its fair value.

[^18]
## III. Conclusion

Under 12 CFR Part 1, a national bank may invest in the fund under its authority to invest in mutual funds with portfolios that consist exclusively of bank eligible assets. Individual banks must determine the appropriate investment limits, based on the limitations of Section 24(Seventh), Part 1, and BC-220. The minimum risk-weight that a national bank can assign to the fund is 20 percent. A national bank's intent or purpose in acquiring fund shares will determine whether the investment should be accounted for as a "trading" or "available-for-sale" asset.

Our position is based on the facts and representations made in your letter and phone conversations, and any material changes in the facts or conditions may result in a different conclusion. We take no position on whether the proposed fund is a permissible investment for state member banks. The OCC does not endorse specific investments and this letter should not be used in a manner that suggests otherwise. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at (202) 874-5210.

## Tena M. Alexander

Counsel
Securities and Corporate Practices Division

## 913-August 3, 2001

## 12 USC 21-23

Subject: Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.

## Dear [ ]:

I am responding to your inquiry of June 20, 2001, regarding the location of a national bank debtor under section 9-307 of the recently revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. As a general matter under revised Article 9, the location of the debtor determines which state's law governs perfection of a security interest. Section 9-307 determines the location of debtors for choice-of-law purposes.

For the purposes of section 9-307(f), a registered organization (which term includes a national bank) that is organized under the law of the United States is located (1) in the state that the law of the United States designates, if the law designates a state of location; (2) in the state that the registered organization designates, if the law of the United States authorizes the registered organization to designate its state of location; or (3) in the District of Columbia, if neither paragraph (1) nor paragraph (2) applies.

Under 12 USC 22(Second), organizers of a national bank are required to include in the organization certificate a designation of the bank's main office city and state. In addition, a national bank may relocate its main office. 12 USC 30 and 12 CFR 5.40. Accordingly, for the purpose of the location rule in section 9-307(f), federal law authorizes national banks to designate their state of location. Location for such purpose is the state in which the main office is located. ${ }^{1}$

I trust this letter is responsive to your inquiry.

## Jonathan Fink

Senior Attorney
Bank Activities and Structure

## 914-August 3, 2001

## 15 USC 1691 <br> 12 CFR 215 <br> 12 CFR 226

Subject: [3rd Party]
[Program]
Dear [ ]:
This letter responds to your correspondence with Brenda Curry, district counsel of our Southeastern District office, which was referred to our Washington headquarters office. You had formally requested a program evaluation/ comfort letter in connection with [an overdraft protection program] ("program") offered by [3rd party].

We have reviewed the materials that were submitted along with your letter, and we are unable to provide such a letter. In our view, the program presents a number of concerns, which we summarize below.

## Compliance Issues

## Truth in Lending/ Regulation $\mathbf{Z}$

An overdraft would be "credit," as defined by the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z. 15 USC 1602(e). The key issue under Regulation Z, however, is whether the fee

[^19]charged in connection with the overdraft is a "finance charge." The answer would depend on:

- Whether a nonsufficient funds (NSF) fee charged by the bank is the same whether the NSF check is paid or returned; and
- Whether there is an agreement between the bank and the accountholder pursuant to which the bank will pay the accountholder's NSF checks and impose a fee for doing so.
- See 12 CFR 226.4(b)(2) and (c)(3).

If the fee were determined to be a finance charge, the bank would have to make the disclosures required in Regulation Z for open-end credit. See, e.g., 12 CFR 226.5 and 226.6.

## Truth in Savings/Regulation DD

Certain fees must be disclosed in connection with a deposit account. At the time an account is opened, the disclosures must include the amount of any fee that may be imposed in connection with the account (or an explanation of how the fee will be determined) and the conditions under which the fee may be imposed. 12 CFR 230.4(b)(4).

If the program were added to an already existing deposit account, advance notice to the accountholder may be required. A bank must give advance notice (at least 30 days before the change) to affected customers of any change in a term that was required to be disclosed under 230.4(b) (which includes fees imposed in connection with the account) if the change may reduce the annual percentage yield or adversely affect the consumer. 12 CFR 230.5(a)(1).

## Electronic Fund Transfer Act/ Regulation E

In connection with the [ ] Repayment Agreement, the customer is urged to repay the amount of the unpaid overdraft over time through preauthorized transfers from his/ her checking account. A participating bank would need to comply with the Regulation E requirements for preauthorized transfers. 12 CFR 205.10(b).

## Equal Credit Opportunity Act/ Regulation B

An "overdraft" would be "credit" under Regulation B. See 12 CFR 202.2(e). A memorandum from [A] of [3rd party] to [B], dated June 10, 2000, provided criteria for selecting "ineligible (excluded) accounts," i.e., those accounts that are not eligible for the program. Among those accounts are: "Accounts which, in reviewing officer's judgment, should not receive the automated overdraft payment ser-
vice, such as (See sample memo): Not creditworthy or questionable financial condition." (Emphasis in original.) ${ }^{1}$

The materials do not appear to provide any indication of standards for the reviewing officer's determination. When a decision is left to bank personnel's discretion, there may be a potential for disparate treatment in violation of ECOA and Regulation B. See 12 CFR 202.4.

## Federal Trade Commission Act

The Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits deceptive acts or practices, including representations or omissions that are likely to mislead reasonable consumers and, thus, affect a consumer's choice or conduct regarding a product. See 15 USC 45(a)(1) and the FTC Policy Statement on Deception (October 14, 1983).

The marketing materials for the program send a mixed message as to whether the bank is committing to pay overdrafts as long as the account meets the stated qualifications for the program and also raise numerous ambiguities about or overstate the benefits of the program:

- In a number of places the materials make such statements as "we will pay your checks ... if you maintain your account in good standing." The back of the marketing materials, however, states that "we may refuse to pay an overdraft for you" and that this is being done as a "non-contractual courtesy."
- The materials give the wrong impression about the scope of the protection offered by the program and oversell its benefits. Claims of "no more charges from retailers for insufficient checks," "make a mistakeyou're covered," and "write a check or use an ATM for

[^20]more than you have in the bank-you're covered" are broad statements given the limitations placed on the program.

- The materials may leave the customer with the wrong impression about what the actual overdraft limits are. For instance, with respect to an account to which a $\$ 500$ limit is applicable, the bank would not, under the program, pay an overdraft that exceeded $\$ 480$ because the $\$ 20$ NSF fee, would cause the overdraft to exceed the $\$ 500$ limit. $^{3}$
- The requirement that the account need only be brought to a positive balance once every 30 days also may be illusory. We note that the materials provide that "The amount of any overdrafts plus our Non-Sufficient Funds and/or Overdraft (NSF/OD) Charge(s) that you owe us shall be due and payable upon demand." ${ }^{4}$


## Regulation 0

Overdrafts are considered extensions of credit for purposes of Regulation O. 12 CFR 215.3(a)(2). If, as some of
${ }^{3}$ The marketing materials address this but only in a rather oblique way:
[Program] adds a pre-approved $\$ 500$ overdraft limit to your personal checking account. If you overdraw your account, bank will cover each check up to $\$ 500$ limit. You still pay bank's standard overdraft fee for each item returned, but the benefits are worth it.

This representation nowhere alerts the customer that bank will not, under the program, pay a check in an amount between $\$ 480$ and $\$ 500$ or pay, for instance, five overdraft checks in an amount between $\$ 400$ and $\$ 500$. Where the disclosure about the relationship between fees and the overdraft limit is made, it is set forth in an unduly complicated manner: ". . . we will normally honor (pay) your overdrafts up to the limits mentioned above, including our normal Non-Sufficient Funds (NSF) Charge(s)." It is not readily apparent that this disclosure would alert a customer that the overdraft fees are deducted from the overdraft limit.
${ }^{4}$ This lack of forthrightness in dealing with customers also is demonstrated by a sample letter, advising a consumer that $\mathrm{s} / \mathrm{he}$ has just a few days to bring his/her checking account to a positive balance, which indicates that the customer may qualify for the [ ] Repayment Plan; but a follow-up letter sent when the customer fails to bring the account to a positive balance within the time period advises the customer that $s / h e$ has been "pre-approved" for the [ ] Repayment Plan. Moreover, the materials generally indicate that a person who fails to bring the account to a positive balance in the allotted period will be offered the opportunity to repay the overdraft in equal installments spread over a period of from six to 12 months.

Moreover, the integrity of the various representations are also called into question by the following typed notation on one aspect of the disclosures:
[NOTE REGARDING POSITION OF FREE CHECKING: Position the disclosure somewhere in the middle of the checking account disclosures to avoid calling unnecessary attention to the Free Checking account.]
the materials appear to indicate, a bank also makes this product available to certain bank insiders, issues would appear to arise under Regulation O governing extensions of credit to bank insiders.

## S upervisory Concerns

Your characterization of the product as something other than lending raises supervisory issues:

- It is posible that overdrafts would be paid for customers who would not qualify for loans under the prudent underwriting standards that the bank should use for all of its extensions of credit. This could increase a bank's credit risk profile (e.g., higher delinquency and loss rates) by extending credit to borrowers that may not have normally qualified for payment of overdrafts or overdraft protection;
- Given the loss history of bank overdraft programs, bank management must develop reasonable loss recognition guidelines and establish loan loss reserve methodologies to ensure timely loss recognition and estimated loss coverage.
- Although the submitted material indicates a measuring and monitoring process (infers MIS reporting), it is unclear what this entails, including the types and quality of information provided to a bank to assess credit risk performance on a periodic basis. Banks must have appropriate MIS reporting established.

Banks also need to take great care in entering into contracts with third party vendors. ${ }^{5}$ This raises a variety of supervisory concerns that banks should address before entering into an arrangement with a vendor in connection with the potential purchase of products including:

- Most banks have software already capable of overdraft protection without incurring the high up-front and ongoing costs of the program. Consequently, the benefits of the program are not readily evident, in that a bank could otherwise achieve the same results if it implemented and marketed its existing capabilities;
- It appears that the arrangement a bank enters with the vendor to participate in the program is devised in such a manner that only the bank is subject to the credit and reputation risk, while the vendor shares the benefits, i.e., the income;
- Banks are expected to conduct due diligence reviews of vendors. This includes initial and ongoing reviews of the financial information of any vendor. These reviews

[^21]are necessary to ensure that the company can fulfill the representations as outlined in the contract. Requirements for the timing and quality of financial information should be set forth in the contract;

- The sample contract indicates a termination clause that appears to prohibit or severely restrict the contracting bank's ability to terminate once the program is initiated. Only the vendor has control of termination, and the only termination consideration is if the 150 percent fee income profitability goal is not achieved. This one-sided termination clause is potentially detrimental for the bank from a reputation, financial, and strategic risk perspective. Under the contract, the bank has no recourse if it becomes dissatisfied for a variety of reasons such as customer satisfaction/bank reputation and credit risk issues (e.g., 50 percent of the customers complain or 15 percent delinquency rate).


## Policy Issues

The program is designed to increase fee income by encouraging customers to write NSF checks. Although the program may be valuable to customers who might inadvertently or infrequently write an NSF check, banks participating in the program will, in essence, attempt to entice their customers to write NSF checks more frequently and on purpose in order to generate fee income. This use of the program could promote poor fiscal responsibility on the part of some consumers. ${ }^{6}$

In this regard, we note the complete lack of consumer safeguards built into the program:

- In some circumstances the charges assessed on customers may be just as burdensome as those imposed

[^22]on borrowers utilizing other types of high interest rate credit; ${ }^{7}$

- An unlimited number of overdraft charges could be levied during a 30-day period as long as the consumer does not exceed the dollar amount limitation on overdrafts;
- No cooling off period following the repayment of overdraft amounts during which no overdrafts would be paid, thus increasing the likelihood that a customer would consciously resort to use of this product to pay for ordinary day-to-day expenses;
- No grace period (for instance, 24 hours) during which the customer can reimburse the bank without incurring the NSF charge after receiving notice that a check was paid;
- No effort by banks offering this program to identify customers who are writing overdraft checks regularly as a means of meeting regular obligations in order to attempt to serve their needs through more economical alternatives; and
- No effort by banks offering the program to inform customers generally of available alternatives for short-term consumer borrowing, explain to customers the costs and advantages of various alternatives to the program, or identify for customers the risks and problems in relying on this product and the consequences of abuse.

Thank you for the opportunity to evaluate the program. We hope that this information is useful to you.

Daniel P. Stipano
Deputy Chief Counsel

## 915-August 15, 2001

## 12 USC 24(7)

## Dear [ ]:

You inquired whether national banks may underwrite and deal in municipal revenue bonds issued by or on behalf of Puerto Rico. Section 151 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 ("section 151") amended Section 24(Seventh) to provide that well-capitalized national banks may underwrite and deal in revenue bonds "issued by on behalf of

[^23]any State." Under Section 24(Seventh), the term "state" includes Puerto Rico for purposes of these provisions. Thus, well-capitalized national banks may underwrite Puerto Rican municipal revenue bonds.

## I. Discussion

Section 24(Seventh), as amended by section 151, ${ }^{1}$ permits well-capitalized national banks to underwrite and deal in municipal revenue bonds of "states" and "political subdivisions" of states. The term "states" in Section 24(Seventh) includes Puerto Rico. Section 5 of Public Law 93-100, enacted in 1973, permits national banks to own

[^24]stock issued by any state housing corporation. ${ }^{2}$ Section 5 amended several statutes, including Section 24(Seventh). Section 5 provides that
[f]or purposes of this section and any Act amended by this section . . . the term 'State' means any State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands." ${ }^{3}$

Since Section 5 amends Section 24(Seventh), the term "state" in Section 24(Seventh) includes Puerto Rico. 4

## II. Conclusion

Under Section 24(Seventh), well-capitalized national banks may underwrite and deal in revenue bonds issued by Puerto Rico. ${ }^{4}$

Nancy Worth
Senior Attorney
Securities and Corporate Practices Division

[^25]
## Mergers-J uly 1 to September 30, 2001

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## Mergers-J uly 1 to September 30, 2001

Most transactions in this section do not have accompanying decisions. In those cases, the OCC reviewed the competitive effects of the proposals by using its standard procedures for determining whether the transaction has minimal or no adverse competitive effects. The OCC
found the proposals satisfied its criteria for transactions that clearly had no or minimal adverse competitive effects. In addition, the Attorney General either filed no report on the proposed transaction or found that the proposal would not have a significantly adverse effect on competition.

## Nonaffiliated mergers (mergers consummated involving two or more nonaffiliated operating banks), from J uly 1 to September 30, 2001

| Title and location (charter number) | Total assets |
| :---: | :---: |
| New York |  |
| Citibank, N.A., New York City (001461) . . . . . and European American Bank, Uniondale. | $\begin{array}{r} 382,106,000,000 \\ 15,427,000,000 \end{array}$ |
| merged on July 17, 2001 under the title of Citibank, National Association, New York City (001461)... | 398,363,000,000 |
| Intervest National Bank, New York (023712) | 117,384,000 |
| and Intervest Bank, Clearwater | 218,588,000 |
| merged on July 20, 2001 under the title of Intervest National Bank, New York (023712) | 335,788,000 |
| Oklahoma |  |
| The First National Bank and Trust Co., Chickasha (005547) | 152,791,000 |
| and The First American Bank, Minco | 15,107,000 |
| merged on July 1, 2001 under the title of The First National Bank and Trust Co., Chickasha (005547) | 166,069,000 |
| Tennessee |  |
| National Bank of Commerce, Memphis (013681) | 16,533,514,000 |
| and First Vantage Bank-Tennessee, Knoxville | 168,242,000 |
| merged on August 13, 2001 under the title of National Bank of Commerce, Memphis (013681). | 16,705,818,000 |
| Texas |  |
| First Mercantile Bank, National Association, Dallas (023466). | 207,010,000 |
| and TownBank, National Association, Mesquite (022975). | 78,410,000 |
| merged on September 10, 2001 under the title of First Mercantile Bank, National Association, Dallas (023466) | 291,487,000 |
| Wisconsin |  |
| State Financial Bank, National Association, Hales Corners (000945) | 1,071,079,000 |
| and Liberty Bank, Milwaukee . | 96,863,000 |
| merged on July 7, 2001 under the title of State Financial Bank, National Association, Hales Corners (000945). | 1,167,942,000 |

## Affiliated mergers (mergers consummated involving affiliated operating banks), from J uly 1 to September 30, 2001

| Title and location (charter number) | Total assets |
| :---: | :---: |
| Colorado |  |
| Colorado Business Bank, National Association, Denver (016723). | 663,386,000 |
| and First Capital Bank of Arizona, Phoenix . | 119,450,000 |
| merged on September 7, 2001 under the title of Colorado Business Bank, National Association, Denver (016723) | 782,836,000 |
| Illinois |  |
| Bank One, National Association, Chicago (000008) and Bank One, Florida, Venice | $\begin{array}{r} 141,439,135,000 \\ 213,009,000 \end{array}$ |
| merged on August 23, 2001 under the title of Bank One, National Association, Chicago (000008). | 141,650,041,000 |
| Indiana |  |
| American National Trust and Investment Management Company, Muncie (022148). and Old National Trust Company, Terre Haute (022729) | $\begin{aligned} & 6,853,000 \\ & 4,998,000 \end{aligned}$ |
| merged on July 31, 2001 under the title of American National Trust and Investment Management Company, |  |
| Muncie (022148). | 11,851,000 |
| Kansas |  |
| TeamBank, National Association, Paola (003350). and Fort Calhoun State Bank, Fort Calhoun .. | $\begin{array}{r} 374,940,000 \\ 27,332,000 \end{array}$ |
| merged on July 23, 2001 under the title of TeamBank, National Association, Paola (003350) | 402,272,000 |
| The Coldwater National Bank, Coldwater (006767) | 11,785,000 |
| The Wilmore State Bank, Wilmore | 4,427,000 |
| merged on August 1, 2001 under the title of The Coldwater National Bank, Coldwater (006767) | 16,212,000 |
| InTrust Bank, National Association, Wichita (002782) | 2,355,831,000 |
| and Will Rogers Bank, Oklahoma City | 136,119,000 |
| merged on August 10, 2001 under the title of InTrust Bank, National Association, Wichita (002782) | 2,473,047,000 |
| Kentucky |  |
| Whitaker Bank, National Association, Lexington (022246) | 443,416,000 |
| and The Bank of Whitesburg, Whitesburg . . | 148,833,000 |
| merged on July 16, 2001 under the title of Whitaker Bank, National Association, Lexington (022246) | 592,249,000 |
| Minnesota |  |
| U.S. Bank National Association, Minneapolis (013405) . | 79,691,000,000 |
| and U.S. Bank, National Association, Canby (023714) | 5,000,000 |
| merged on August 9, 2001 under the title of U.S. Bank National Association, Minneapolis (013405) . | 79,691,000,000 |
| American National Bank of Minnesota, Brainerd (024219) | 242,405,000 |
| and American National Bank of Alexandria, Alexandria (024218). | 1,129,000 |
| and American National Bank of Detroit Lakes, Detroit Lakes (024216) | 1,129,000 |
| and American National Bank of Grand Rapids, Grand Rapids (024215). | 1,129,000 |
| and American National Bank of Pequot Lakes, Pequot Lakes (024217) | 1,069,000 |
| and American National Bank of Walker, Walker (024213) . | 1,069,000 |
| merged on August 1, 2001 under the title of American National Bank of Minnesota, Brainerd (024219) | 247,450,000 |
| Nevada |  |
| Wells Fargo Bank Nevada, National Association, Las Vegas (023444) | 6,785,598,000 |
| and First Security Trust Company of Nevada, Las Vegas | 309,594,000 |
| merged on August 10, 2001 under the title of Wells Fargo Bank Nevada, National Association, Las Vegas (023444) | 7,095,054,000 |
| North Carolina |  |
| Wachovia Bank, National Association, Winston-Salem (001559). | 68,284,706,000 |
| and Republic Security Bank, West Palm Beach............. | 2,842,930,000 |
| merged on August 24, 2001 under the title of Wachovia Bank, National Association, Winston-Salem (001559)... | 70,999,967,000 |

## Affiliated mergers (continued)

Title and location (charter number)

| Ohio |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Firstar Bank, National Association, Cincinnati (000024) | 75,821,000,000 |
| and U.S. Bank National Association, Minneapolis (013405) | 79,691,000,000 |
| merged on August 9, 2001 under the title of U.S. Bank National Association, Cincinnati (000024). | 154,347,000,000 |
| Bank One, National Association, Columbus (007621) | 38,768,134,000 |
| and First Chicago NDB Mortgage Company, Troy | 2,540,420,000 |
| and Bank One Mortgage Corporation, Indianapolis. | 1,000 |
| merged on September 1, 2001 under the title of Bank One, National Association, Columbus (007621) | 41,205,320,000 |
| Texas |  |
| First National Bank of Borger, Borger (023511) | 53,484,000 |
| and Citizens National Bank of Childress, Childress (023512). | 20,880,000 |
| merged on June 25, 2001 under the title of First National Bank of Borger, Borger (023511) | 74,364,000 |

## Tables on the Financial Performance of National Banks

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## Assets, liabilities, and capital accounts of national banks September 30, 2000 and September 30, 2001

(Dollar figures in millions)

|  | $\begin{gathered} \text { September 30, } \\ 2000 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { September 30, } \\ 2001 \end{gathered}$ | Change <br> September 30, 2000September 30, 2001 fully consolidated |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Consolidated foreign and domestic | Consolidated foreign and domestic | Amount | Percent |
| Number of institutions. .............................. | 2,242 | 2,173 | (69) | (3.08) |
| Total assets | \$3,363,493 | \$3,544,511 | \$181,018 | 5.38 |
| Cash and balances due from depositories | 188,775 | 196,904 | 8,130 | 4.31 |
| Noninterest-bearing balances, currency and coin | 137,100 | 146,068 | 8,968 | 6.54 |
| Interest bearing balances . | 51,674 | 50,836 | (838) | (1.62) |
| Securities | 509,327 | 526,516 | 17,188 | 3.37 |
| Held-to-maturity securities, amortized cost | 39,679 | 25,784 | $(13,895)$ | (35.02) |
| Available-for-sale securities, fair value | 469,649 | 500,731 | 31,083 | 6.62 |
| Federal funds sold and securities purchased. | 88,754 | 153,679 | 64,925 | 73.15 |
| Net loans and leases... | 2,187,696 | 2,192,345 | 4,649 | 0.21 |
| Total loans and leases.. | 2,226,940 | 2,235,513 | 8,572 | 0.38 |
| Loans and leases, gross. | 2,228,456 | 2,236,954 | 8,498 | 0.38 |
| Less: Unearned income | 1,516 | 1,441 | (74) | (4.91) |
| Less: Reserve for losses | 39,244 | 43,168 | 3,924 | 10.00 |
| Assets held in trading account | 105,341 | 130,552 | 25,211 | 23.93 |
| Other real estate owned. . | 1,529 | 1,805 | 276 | 18.07 |
| Intangible assets . | 80,064 | 81,540 | 1,476 | 1.84 |
| All other assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 202,007 | 261,171 | 59,163 | 29.29 |
| Total liabilities and equity capital. | 3,363,493 | 3,544,511 | 181,018 | 5.38 |
| Deposits in domestic offices. | 1,768,496 | 1,908,823 | 140,327 | 7.93 |
| Deposits in foreign offices. | 426,457 | 387,767 | $(38,690)$ | (9.07) |
| Total deposits. . | 2,194,953 | 2,296,590 | 101,638 | 4.63 |
| Noninterest-bearing deposits | 412,190 | 450,897 | 38,707 | 9.39 |
| Interest-bearing deposits. | 1,782,762 | 1,845,693 | 62,931 | 3.53 |
| Federal funds purchased and securities sold. | 250,354 | 272,526 | 22,172 | 8.86 |
| Other borrowed money | 356,423 | 336,252 | $(20,171)$ | (5.66) |
| Trading liabilities less revaluation losses. | 20,637 | 26,940 | 6,303 | 30.54 |
| Subordinated notes and debentures | 60,957 | 64,900 | 3,942 | 6.47 |
| All other liabilities | 166,891 | 218,111 | 51,220 | 30.69 |
| Trading liabilities revaluation losses. | 56,781 | 60,647 | 3,866 | 6.81 |
| Other. | 110,110 | 157,463 | 47,354 | 43.01 |
| Total equity capital | 292,760 | 329,192 | 36,432 | 12.44 |
| Perpetual preferred stock | 892 | 805 | (87) | (9.77) |
| Common stock | 13,904 | 13,184 | (720) | (5.18) |
| Surplus . | 157,600 | 177,367 | 19,766 | 12.54 |
| Retained earnings and other comprehensive income .. | 120,364 | 137,870 | 17,506 | 14.54 |
| Other equity capital components. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | NA | (34) | (34) | NM |

[^26]
## Quarterly income and expenses of national banks Third quarter 2000 and third quarter 2001

(Dollar figures in millions)

|  | Third quarter 2000 | Third quarter 2001 | Change <br> Third quarter, 2000third quarter, 2001 fully consolidated |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Consolidated foreign and domestic | Consolidated foreign and domestic | Amount | Percent |
| Number of institutions................................. | 2,242 | 2,173 | (69) | (3.08), |
| Net income. | \$11,097 | \$9,803 | $(\$ 1,294)$ | (11.66) |
| Net interest income. | 29,132 | 31,415 | 2,283 | 7.84 |
| Total interest income | 61,850 | 55,762 | $(6,089)$ | (9.84) |
| On loans. | 48,491 | 42,950 | $(5,540)$ | (11.43) |
| From lease financing receivables | 1,910 | 1,874 | (37) | (1.91) |
| On balances due from depositories | 703 | 589 | (114) | (16.22) |
| On securities | 8,503 | 7,679 | (824) | (9.70) |
| From assets held in trading account. | 941 | 938 | (3) | (0.29) |
| On federal funds sold and securities repurchased | 1,302 | 1,465 | 163 | 12.52 |
| Less: Interest expense. | 32,718 | 24,347 | $(8,371)$ | (25.59) |
| On deposits. | 21,310 | 16,651 | $(4,660)$ | (21.87) |
| Of federal funds purchased and securities sold. | 3,698 | 2,377 | $(1,321)$ | (35.72) |
| On demand notes and other borrowed money* | 6,613 | 4,401 | $(2,213)$ | (33.46) |
| On subordinated notes and debentures. | 1,097 | 915 | (182) | (16.60) |
| Less: Provision for losses | 4,490 | 8,219 | 3,729 | 83.07 |
| Noninterest income. | 25,516 | 24,425 | $(1,091)$ | (4.28) |
| From fiduciary activities. | 2,287 | 1,963 | (325) | (14.20) |
| Service charges on deposits | 3,909 | 4,321 | 412 | 10.54 |
| Trading revenue | 1,300 | 1,803 | 503 | 38.66 |
| From interest rate exposures | 461 | 971 | 510 | 110.48 |
| From foreign exchange exposures | 641 | 767 | 126 | 19.69 |
| From equity security and index exposures | 194 | 62 | (133) | NM |
| From commodity and other exposures. | 4 | 36 | 32 | NM |
| Total other noninterest income | 18,020 | 16,337 | $(1,683)$ | (9.34) |
| Gains/losses on securities. | (399) | 585 | 984 | NM |
| Less: Noninterest expense | 32,358 | 33,004 | 645 | 1.99 |
| Salaries and employee benefits. | 11,959 | 12,782 | 822 | 6.88 |
| Of premises and fixed assets. | 3,815 | 3,868 | 53 | 1.39 |
| Other noninterest expense | 16,584 | 15,099 | $(1,485)$ | (8.95) |
| Less: Taxes on income before extraordinary items | 6,304 | 5,397 | (907) | (14.39) |
| Income/loss from extraordinary items, net of income taxes ... | (0) | (3) | (2) | 521.83 |
| Memoranda |  |  |  |  |
| Net operating income | 11,589 | 9,422 | $(2,168)$ | (18.70) |
| Income before taxes and extraordinary items. | 17,401 | 15,202 | $(2,199)$ | (12.64) |
| Income net of taxes before extraordinary items | 11,097 | 9,805 | $(1,292)$ | (11.64) |
| Cash dividends declared | 7,140 | 7,105 | (35) | (0.49) |
| Net charge-offs to loan and lease reserve. | 3,805 | 6,582 | 2,776 | 72.96 |
| Charge-offs to loan and lease reserve ... | 4,680 | 7,635 | 2,956 | 63.16 |
| Less: Recoveries credited to loan and lease reserve ....... | 874 | 1,053 | 179 | 20.50 |

[^27]Year-to-date income and expenses of national banks Through September 30, 2000 and through September 30, 2001
(Dollar figures in millions)

|  | $\begin{gathered} \text { September 30, } \\ 2000 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { September 30, } \\ 2001 \end{gathered}$ | Change <br> September 30, 2000- <br> September 30, 2001 fully consolidated |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Consolidated foreign and domestic | Consolidated foreign and domestic | Amount | Percent |
| Number of institutions...................... | 2,242 | 2,173 | (69) | (3.08) |
| Net income. | \$29,091 | \$31,671 | \$2,580 | 8.87 |
| Net interest income. | 87,015 | 90,296 | 3,281 | 3.77 |
| Total interest income | 178,607 | 172,223 | $(6,384)$ | (3.57) |
| On loans. | 138,286 | 132,946 | $(5,340)$ | (3.86) |
| From lease financing receivables | 5,507 | 5,780 | 273 | 4.95 |
| On balances due from depositories | 2,350 | 2,108 | (242) | (10.29) |
| On securities | 25,888 | 23,050 | $(2,838)$ | (10.96) |
| From assets held in trading account. | 2,403 | 2,887 | 484 | 20.12 |
| On federal funds sold and securities repurchased | 4,173 | 4,690 | 517 | 12.39 |
| Less: Interest expense. | 91,592 | 81,928 | $(9,664)$ | (10.55) |
| On deposits. | 59,284 | 55,117 | $(4,167)$ | (7.03) |
| Of federal funds purchased and securities sold | 10,925 | 8,237 | $(2,688)$ | (24.61) |
| On demand notes and other borrowed money* | 18,362 | 15,649 | $(2,714)$ | (14.78) |
| On subordinated notes and debentures. | 3,021 | 2,925 | (95) | (3.16) |
| Less: Provision for losses | 13,591 | 19,461 | 5,870 | 43.19 |
| Noninterest income. | 71,496 | 73,104 | 1,608 | 2.25 |
| From fiduciary activities. | 7,115 | 6,063 | $(1,051)$ | (14.78) |
| Service charges on deposits | 11,432 | 12,474 | 1,042 | 9.11 |
| Trading revenue | 4,417 | 5,480 | 1,062 | 24.04 |
| From interest rate exposures | 1,486 | 2,567 | 1,081 | 72.72 |
| From foreign exchange exposures | 2,127 | 2,466 | 340 | 15.97 |
| From equity security and index exposures | 765 | 306 | (459) | (59.97) |
| From commodity and other exposures. | 39 | 170 | 130 | 331.20 |
| Total other noninterest income | 48,532 | 49,088 | 556 | 1.15 |
| Gains/losses on securities. | $(2,086)$ | 1,437 | 3,523 | (168.90) |
| Less: Noninterest expense | 96,714 | 96,036 | (678) | (0.70) |
| Salaries and employee benefits. | 36,218 | 37,706 | 1,488 | 4.11 |
| Of premises and fixed assets. | 11,525 | 11,459 | (66) | (0.57) |
| Other noninterest expense | 48,972 | 42,978 | $(5,993)$ | (12.24) |
| Less: Taxes on income before extraordinary items | 17,045 | 17,300 | 255 | 1.49 |
| Income/loss from extraordinary items, net of income taxes .. . | 16 | (369) | (385) | NM |
| Memoranda: |  |  |  |  |
| Net operating income | 30,843 | 31,080 | 237 | 0.77 |
| Income before taxes and extraordinary items. | 46,121 | 49,340 | 3,220 | 6.98 |
| Income net of taxes before extraordinary items | 29,075 | 32,040 | 2,965 | 10.20 |
| Cash dividends declared | 20,623 | 20,895 | 272 | 1.32 |
| Net charge-offs to loan and lease reserve. | 11,025 | 16,645 | 5,621 | 50.98 |
| Charge-offs to loan and lease reserve | 13,770 | 19,715 | 5,945 | 43.17 |
| Less: Recoveries credited to loan and lease reserve | 2,746 | 3,070 | 324 | 11.80 |

[^28]
## Assets of national banks by asset size

 S eptember 30, 2001(Dollar figures in millions)

|  | All national banks | National banks |  |  |  | Memoranda All commercial banks |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { Less than } \\ \$ 100 \\ \text { million } \end{gathered}$ | $\$ 100$ million to $\$ 1$ billion | $\$ 1$ billion to \$10 billion | Greater than $\$ 10$ billion |  |
| Number of institutions reporting ...... | 2,173 | 1,027 | 974 | 131 | 41 | 8,149 |
| Total assets | \$3,544,511 | \$53,299 | \$256,641 | \$411,484 | \$2,823,087 | \$6,555,668 |
| Cash and balances due from | 196,904 | 2,913 | 11,923 | 20,461 | 161,608 | 393,666 |
| Securities | 526,516 | 12,727 | 60,801 | 84,949 | 368,038 | 1,106,816 |
| Federal funds sold and securities purchased | 153,679 | 3,596 | 10,851 | 18,073 | 121,159 | 345,726 |
| Net loans and leases | 2,192,345 | 31,498 | 158,759 | 255,729 | 1,746,358 | 3,792,608 |
| Total loans and leases | 2,235,513 | 31,929 | 161,030 | 261,168 | 1,781,386 | 3,860,819 |
| Loans and leases, gross | 2,236,954 | 31,986 | 161,235 | 261,263 | 1,782,470 | 3,863,483 |
| Less: Unearned income | 1,441 | 57 | 205 | 95 | 1,084 | 2,664 |
| Less: Reserve for losses | 43,168 | 431 | 2,270 | 5,439 | 35,027 | 68,211 |
| Assets held in trading account | 130,552 | 0 | 566 | 1,004 | 128,982 | 352,062 |
| Other real estate owned. | 1,805 | 70 | 254 | 175 | 1,307 | 3,457 |
| Intangible assets | 81,540 | 130 | 1,562 | 6,050 | 73,799 | 111,689 |
| All other assets | 261,171 | 2,366 | 11,925 | 25,043 | 221,836 | 449,643 |
| Gross loans and leases by type: |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Loans secured by real estate | 938,893 | 18,567 | 101,992 | 138,161 | 680,173 | 1,749,170 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages | 450,840 | 8,282 | 41,464 | 63,563 | 337,531 | 785,713 |
| Home equity loans | 95,639 | 475 | 4,374 | 9,280 | 81,511 | 145,749 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 30,263 | 404 | 3,693 | 4,933 | 21,233 | 63,499 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 231,741 | 5,436 | 37,406 | 41,873 | 147,026 | 493,667 |
| Construction RE loans | 89,998 | 1,830 | 10,730 | 16,566 | 60,871 | 190,495 |
| Farmland loans... | 12,670 | 2,141 | 4,322 | 1,799 | 4,408 | 35,468 |
| RE loans from foreign offices | 27,741 | 0 | 3 | 146 | 27,592 | 34,580 |
| Commercial and industrial loans. | 618,076 | 5,420 | 28,889 | 49,347 | 534,421 | 1,010,441 |
| Loans to individuals | 372,891 | 4,274 | 20,406 | 53,750 | 294,460 | 607,555 |
| Credit cards* | 156,182 | 127 | 3,107 | 22,754 | 130,193 | 218,406 |
| Other revolving credit plans | 21,049 | 69 | 450 | 1,779 | 18,752 | 25,777 |
| Installment loans. | 195,660 | 4,078 | 16,849 | 29,217 | 145,516 | 363,372 |
| All other loans and leases. | 307,094 | 3,725 | 9,948 | 20,005 | 273,416 | 496,316 |
| Securities by type: |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| U.S. Treasury securities. | 14,771 | 781 | 2,807 | 3,592 | 7,591 | 47,925 |
| Mortgage-backed securities. | 308,555 | 3,321 | 21,866 | 47,336 | 236,032 | 560,274 |
| Pass-through securities | 214,757 | 2,304 | 13,596 | 29,888 | 168,969 | 364,968 |
| Collateralized mortgage obligations | 93,797 | 1,018 | 8,270 | 17,447 | 67,062 | 195,306 |
| Other securities . | 166,576 | 8,599 | 35,711 | 30,867 | 91,399 | 404,257 |
| Other U.S. government securities | 57,228 | 5,800 | 19,922 | 13,573 | 17,933 | 184,799 |
| State and local government securities | 42,120 | 2,142 | 11,084 | 8,621 | 20,273 | 95,673 |
| Other debt securities | 60,428 | 474 | 3,434 | 7,725 | 48,795 | 105,414 |
| Equity securities | 6,799 | 183 | 1,270 | 949 | 4,398 | 18,371 |
| Memoranda: |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Agricultural production loans | 20,896 | 3,231 | 5,196 | 3,110 | 9,359 | 48,284 |
| Pledged securities | 248,664 | 4,911 | 27,813 | 40,258 | 175,682 | 536,926 |
| Book value of securities | 517,502 | 12,499 | 59,617 | 83,314 | 362,072 | 1,086,524 |
| Available-for-sale securities | 491,718 | 10,247 | 50,776 | 73,217 | 357,478 | 993,164 |
| Held-to-maturity securities | 25,784 | 2,252 | 8,841 | 10,097 | 4,594 | 93,360 |
| Market value of securities . | 527,052 | 12,783 | 61,031 | 85,113 | 368,125 | 1,108,961 |
| Available-for-sale securities | 500,731 | 10,475 | 51,960 | 74,852 | 363,444 | 1,013,456 |
| Held-to-maturity securities | 26,321 | 2,308 | 9,071 | 10,261 | 4,681 | 95,505 |

[^29]
## Past-due and nonaccrual loans and leases of national banks by asset size September 30, 2001

(Dollar figures in millions)

|  | All national banks | National banks |  |  |  | Memoranda All commercial banks |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { Less than } \\ \$ 100 \\ \text { million } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\$ 100$ million to $\$ 1$ billion | \$1 billion to $\$ 10$ billion | Greater than $\$ 10$ billion |  |
| Number of institutions reporting ................... | 2,173 | 1,027 | 974 | 131 | 41 | 8,149 |
| Loans and leases past due 30-89 days | \$30,684 | \$453 | \$2,070 | \$3,551 | \$24,610 | \$52,605 |
| Loans secured by real estate | 11,971 | 225 | 1,091 | 1,334 | 9,321 | 21,486 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages | 7,038 | 125 | 531 | 596 | 5,785 | 11,548 |
| Home equity loans. | 885 | 4 | 33 | 83 | 765 | 1,283 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 218 | 4 | 16 | 46 | 152 | 465 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 1,887 | 52 | 327 | 340 | 1,168 | 4,472 |
| Construction RE loans | 1,225 | 23 | 147 | 246 | 808 | 2,414 |
| Farmland loans. | 110 | 17 | 35 | 23 | 35 | 311 |
| RE loans from foreign offices | 609 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 609 | 993 |
| Commercial and industrial loans. | 5,895 | 99 | 402 | 761 | 4,633 | 11,106 |
| Loans to individuals | 8,671 | 100 | 502 | 1,242 | 6,826 | 14,410 |
| Credit cards. | 4,137 | 3 | 170 | 631 | 3,332 | 6,029 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 4,534 | 97 | 332 | 611 | 3,494 | 8,381 |
| All other loans and leases ...... | 4,147 | 28 | 76 | 214 | 3,830 | 5,603 |
| Loans and leases past due 90+ days | 8,197 | 105 | 460 | 1,149 | 6,483 | 13,150 |
| Loans secured by real estate | 2,654 | 56 | 223 | 300 | 2,075 | 4,415 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages... | 1,769 | 28 | 109 | 141 | 1,491 | 2,704 |
| Home equity loans. | 126 | 1 | 6 | 18 | 102 | 208 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 18 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 11 | 39 |
| Commercial RE loans. . | 337 | 14 | 68 | 57 | 198 | 791 |
| Construction RE loans | 281 | 3 | 21 | 74 | 182 | 455 |
| Farmland loans. | 54 | 10 | 15 | 6 | 23 | 142 |
| RE loans from foreign offices | 68 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 68 | 77 |
| Commercial and industrial loans. | 902 | 22 | 83 | 131 | 667 | 1,691 |
| Loans to individuals | 4,061 | 18 | 131 | 689 | 3,224 | 6,267 |
| Credit cards. | 2,854 | 2 | 83 | 524 | 2,244 | 3,989 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 1,208 | 16 | 47 | 165 | 980 | 2,279 |
| All other loans and leases. | 580 | 10 | 23 | 29 | 517 | 777 |
| Nonaccrual loans and leases | 24,313 | 240 | 1,134 | 1,671 | 21,268 | 38,472 |
| Loans secured by real estate | 6,836 | 117 | 607 | 824 | 5,289 | 11,882 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages. | 2,694 | 39 | 184 | 296 | 2,175 | 4,522 |
| Home equity loans .......... | 288 | 1 | 10 | 24 | 253 | 395 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 107 | 3 | 15 | 15 | 75 | 212 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 2,035 | 42 | 273 | 333 | 1,387 | 3,917 |
| Construction RE loans | 800 | 10 | 80 | 128 | 582 | 1,575 |
| Farmland loans. | 217 | 23 | 44 | 27 | 124 | 446 |
| RE loans from foreign offices | 693 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 692 | 814 |
| Commercial and industrial loans. | 12,893 | 77 | 346 | 694 | 11,776 | 20,257 |
| Loans to individuals | 1,442 | 16 | 101 | 80 | 1,246 | 2,368 |
| Credit cards. | 414 | 1 | 53 | 23 | 337 | 779 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 1,028 | 15 | 47 | 57 | 909 | 1,589 |
| All other loans and leases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 3,266 | 31 | 80 | 74 | 3,080 | 4,142 |

## Liabilities of national banks by asset size

 S eptember 30, 2001(Dollar figures in millions)

|  | All national banks | National banks |  |  |  | Memoranda: All commercial banks |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Less than \$100 million | $\begin{gathered} \$ 100 \\ \text { million to } \\ \$ 1 \text { billion } \end{gathered}$ | \$1 billion to $\$ 10$ billion | Greater than $\$ 10$ billion |  |
| Number of institutions reporting | 2,173 | 1,027 | 974 | 131 | 41 | 8,149 |
| Total liabilities and equity capital. | \$3,544,511 | \$53,299 | \$256,641 | \$411,484 | \$2,823,087 | \$6,555,668 |
| Deposits in domestic offices. | \$1,908,823 | \$44,747 | \$206,427 | \$261,757 | \$1,395,891 | \$3,613,777 |
| Deposits in foreign offices. | 387,767 | 0 | 362 | 2,721 | 384,684 | 680,900 |
| Total deposits. | 2,296,590 | 44,747 | 206,789 | 264,478 | 1,780,575 | 4,294,677 |
| Noninterest bearing | 450,897 | 6,934 | 31,457 | 46,861 | 365,644 | 777,457 |
| Interest bearing. | 1,845,693 | 37,813 | 175,332 | 217,617 | 1,414,931 | 3,517,220 |
| Other borrowed funds. | 336,252 | 1,280 | 11,640 | 50,284 | 273,048 | 550,905 |
| Subordinated notes and debentures | 64,900 | 5 | 155 | 3,370 | 61,369 | 92,442 |
| All other liabilities | 218,111 | 562 | 4,127 | 10,497 | 202,925 | 415,432 |
| Equity capital . | 329,192 | 6,175 | 26,276 | 40,300 | 256,440 | 586,004 |
| Total deposits by depositor: |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Individuals and corporations | 1,778,994 | 29,080 | 146,569 | 210,497 | 1,392,848 | 3,306,943 |
| U.S., state, and local governments | 85,218 | 3,592 | 14,802 | 14,817 | 52,007 | 172,101 |
| Depositories in the U.S.. | 42,921 | 490 | 1,563 | 702 | 40,167 | 96,836 |
| Foreign banks and governments. | 63,278 | 1 | 320 | 1,193 | 61,764 | 126,972 |
| Domestic deposits by depositor: |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Individuals and corporations | 1,488,216 | 29,080 | 146,526 | 208,714 | 1,103,896 | 2,825,337 |
| U.S., state, and local governments | 85,218 | 3,592 | 14,802 | 14,817 | 52,007 | 172,101 |
| Depositories in the U.S. | 5,352 | 490 | 1,500 | 346 | 3,016 | 15,432 |
| Foreign banks and governments. | 4,057 | 1 | 64 | 620 | 3,371 | 9,423 |
| Foreign deposits by depositor: |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Individuals and corporations | 290,778 | 0 | 43 | 1,783 | 288,952 | 481,606 |
| Depositories in the U.S.. | 37,570 | 0 | 63 | 356 | 37,151 | 81,404 |
| Foreign banks and governments. | 59,221 | 0 | 256 | 573 | 58,392 | 117,549 |
| Deposits in domestic offices by type: |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Transaction deposits. | 353,348 | 12,897 | 48,398 | 40,739 | 251,314 | 648,587 |
| Demand deposits. | 288,172 | 6,869 | 28,138 | 33,073 | 220,092 | 499,222 |
| Savings deposits. | 922,654 | 9,346 | 61,861 | 124,082 | 727,365 | 1,620,800 |
| Money market deposit accounts | 661,261 | 5,279 | 37,597 | 83,373 | 535,011 | 1,148,329 |
| Other savings deposits | 261,393 | 4,067 | 24,264 | 40,708 | 192,354 | 472,471 |
| Time deposits | 632,821 | 22,504 | 96,169 | 96,937 | 417,212 | 1,344,385 |
| Small time deposits | 370,173 | 15,320 | 61,901 | 57,740 | 235,213 | 766,377 |
| Large time deposits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 262,648 | 7,184 | 34,268 | 39,197 | 181,999 | 578,008 |

(Dollar figures in millions)

|  | All national banks | National banks |  |  |  | Memoranda All commercial banks |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Less than \$100 million | $\$ 100$ million to $\$ 1$ billion | $\$ 1$ billion to $\$ 10$ billion | Greater than $\$ 10$ billion |  |
| Number of institutions reporting ....................... | 2,173 | 1,027 | 974 | 131 | 41 | 8,149 |
| Unused commitments. | \$3,306,328 | \$81,476 | \$360,519 | \$275,692 | \$2,588,641 | \$4,766,597 |
| Home equity lines. | 146,737 | 357 | 4,162 | 10,506 | 131,713 | 199,263 |
| Credit card lines.. | 2,052,636 | 77,157 | 330,996 | 207,363 | 1,437,120 | 2,809,031 |
| Commercial RE, construction and land | 77,890 | 1,001 | 7,737 | 13,823 | 55,328 | 157,271 |
| All other unused commitments. | 1,029,064 | 2,961 | 17,624 | 43,999 | 964,480 | 1,601,031 |
| Letters of credit: |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Standby letters of credit. | 157,147 | 129 | 1,489 | 5,514 | 150,015 | 259,160 |
| Financial letters of credit. | 126,535 | 84 | 887 | 4,006 | 121,558 | 214,388 |
| Performance letters of credit | 30,612 | 45 | 602 | 1,508 | 28,457 | 44,772 |
| Commercial letters of credit. | 21,657 | 27 | 484 | 551 | 20,596 | 28,510 |
| Securities lent | 98,974 | 0 | 288 | 10,598 | 88,088 | 507,887 |
| Spot foreign exchange contracts | 201,047 | 0 | 9 | 103 | 200,935 | 395,585 |
| Credit derivatives (notional value) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reporting bank is the guarantor | 55,707 | 0 | 25 | 0 | 55,682 | 195,229 |
| Reporting bank is the beneficiary | 57,181 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 57,131 | 164,472 |
| Derivative contracts (notional value) | 19,609,485 | 56 | 2,920 | 38,718 | 19,567,791 | 51,275,576 |
| Futures and forward contracts. | 5,125,232 | 41 | 186 | 3,585 | 5,121,421 | 10,364,440 |
| Interest rate contracts | 2,776,928 | 41 | 171 | 3,120 | 2,773,596 | 5,908,417 |
| Foreign exchange contracts. | 2,280,324 | 0 | 14 | 465 | 2,279,844 | 4,315,488 |
| All other futures and forwards | 67,980 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 67,980 | 140,535 |
| Option contracts. | 4,267,677 | 10 | 2,061 | 10,571 | 4,255,036 | 11,951,742 |
| Interest rate contracts | 3,643,764 | 10 | 2,060 | 10,515 | 3,631,179 | 9,963,800 |
| Foreign exchange contracts. | 427,116 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 427,116 | 1,132,070 |
| All other options | 196,797 | 0 | 1 | 56 | 196,740 | 855,872 |
| Swaps. | 10,103,688 | 5 | 598 | 24,562 | 10,078,522 | 28,599,693 |
| Interest rate contracts | 9,634,708 | 5 | 545 | 19,788 | 9,614,370 | 27,273,033 |
| Foreign exchange contracts. | 418,056 | 0 | 2 | 4,397 | 413,656 | 1,187,390 |
| All other swaps. | 50,924 | 0 | 51 | 376 | 50,497 | 139,269 |
| Memoranda: Derivatives by purpose |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Contracts held for trading. | 18,527,846 | 40 | 71 | 10,037 | 18,517,699 | 49,547,957 |
| Contracts not held for trading | 968,751 | 16 | 2,774 | 28,681 | 937,280 | 1,367,917 |
| Memoranda: Derivatives by position |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Held for trading-positive fair value | 253,129 | 0 | 1 | 149 | 252,980 | 741,161 |
| Held for trading-negative fair value | 243,131 | 0 | 1 | 136 | 242,994 | 717,898 |
| Not for trading-positive fair value | 24,458 | 0 | 9 | 465 | 23,984 | 30,018 |
| Not for trading-negative fair value................... | 10,301 | 0 | 32 | 179 | 10,090 | 15,018 |

Third quarter, 2001
(Dollar figures in millions)

|  | All national banks | National banks |  |  |  | Memoranda All commercial banks |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { Less than } \\ \$ 100 \\ \text { million } \end{gathered}$ | $\$ 100$ million to $\$ 1$ billion | \$1 billion to $\$ 10$ billion | Greater than $\$ 10$ billion |  |
| Number of institutions reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2,173 | 1,027 | 974 | 131 | 41 | 8,149 |
| Net income. | \$9,803 | \$133 | \$795 | \$1,528 | \$7,347 | \$17,353 |
| Net interest income. | 31,415 | 519 | 2,544 | 4,199 | 24,153 | 54,261 |
| Total interest income | 55,762 | 930 | 4,488 | 7,155 | 43,188 | 100,141 |
| On loans. | 42,950 | 705 | 3,451 | 5,576 | 33,218 | 73,995 |
| From lease financing receivables | 1,874 | 3 | 30 | 76 | 1,765 | 2,733 |
| On balances due from depositories | 589 | 10 | 29 | 25 | 526 | 1,581 |
| On securities . | 7,679 | 175 | 853 | 1,238 | 5,412 | 15,736 |
| From assets held in trading account. | 938 | 0 | 1 | 15 | 923 | 2,346 |
| On fed. funds sold \& securities repurchased | 1,465 | 34 | 99 | 164 | 1,169 | 3,179 |
| Less: Interest expense. | 24,347 | 412 | 1,944 | 2,956 | 19,035 | 45,881 |
| On deposits. | 16,651 | 389 | 1,730 | 1,916 | 12,615 | 32,228 |
| Of federal funds purchased \& securities sold | 2,377 | 5 | 65 | 386 | 1,921 | 4,767 |
| On demand notes \& other borrowed money* | 4,401 | 17 | 146 | 605 | 3,633 | 7,534 |
| On subordinated notes and debentures. | 915 | 0 | 3 | 46 | 866 | 1,347 |
| Less: Provision for losses | 8,219 | 40 | 243 | 821 | 7,114 | 11,578 |
| Noninterest income. | 24,425 | 228 | 1,413 | 2,790 | 19,994 | 38,798 |
| From fiduciary activities. | 1,963 | 14 | 136 | 370 | 1,443 | 4,757 |
| Service charges on deposits | 4,321 | 62 | 286 | 425 | 3,548 | 6,714 |
| Trading revenue | 1,803 | (0) | (32) | 14 | 1,821 | 3,439 |
| From interest rate exposures | 971 | 0 |  | 9 | 960 | (253) |
| From foreign exchange exposures | 767 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 766 | 1,502 |
| From equity security and index exposures | 62 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 59 | 2,131 |
| From commodity and other exposures. | 36 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 36 | 80 |
| Total other noninterest income | 16,337 | 152 | 1,023 | 1,981 | 13,181 | 23,888 |
| Gains/losses on securities | 585 | 4 | 24 | 75 | 481 | 1,007 |
| Less: Noninterest expense | 33,004 | 529 | 2,569 | 3,916 | 25,990 | 56,168 |
| Salaries and employee benefits. | 12,782 | 258 | 1,054 | 1,407 | 10,063 | 23,260 |
| Of premises and fixed assets. | 3,868 | 65 | 304 | 409 | 3,089 | 6,971 |
| Other noninterest expense | 15,099 | 201 | 1,172 | 1,928 | 11,798 | 24,186 |
| Less: Taxes on income before extraord. items. | 5,397 | 46 | 374 | 800 | 4,177 | 8,973 |
| Income/loss from extraord. items, net of taxes. | (369) | (13) | 25 | (46) | (336) | (267) |
| Memoranda: |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Net operating income | 9,422 | 133 | 777 | 1,476 | 7,036 | 16,657 |
| Income before taxes and extraordinary items............ | 15,202 | 182 | 1,168 | 2,328 | 11,524 | 26,320 |
| Income net of taxes before extraordinary items | 9,805 | 136 | 794 | 1,528 | 7,347 | 17,347 |
| Cash dividends declared | 7,105 | 83 | 423 | 1,040 | 5,558 | 13,556 |
| Net loan and lease losses.. | 6,582 | 32 | 174 | 699 | 5,677 | 9,248 |
| Charge-offs to loan and lease reserve | 7,635 | 40 | 216 | 810 | 6,570 | 10,812 |
| Less: Recoveries credited to loan \& lease resv. ........ | 1,053 | 8 | 42 | 111 | 893 | 1,564 |

* Includes mortgage indebtedness
(Dollar figures in millions)

|  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |

[^30]
## Quarterly net loan and lease losses of national banks by asset size

 Third quarter 2001(Dollar figures in millions)

|  | All national banks | National banks |  |  |  | Memoranda: All commercial banks |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Less than $\$ 100$ million | $\begin{gathered} \$ 100 \\ \text { million to } \\ \$ 1 \text { billion } \end{gathered}$ | \$1 billion to $\$ 10$ billion | Greater than $\$ 10$ billion |  |
| Number of institutions reporting . ................... | 2,173 | 1,027 | 974 | 131 | 41 | 8,149 |
| Net charge-offs to loan and lease reserve | \$6,582 | \$32 | \$174 | \$699 | \$5,677 | \$9,248 |
| Loans secured by real estate | 1,100 | 2 | 18 | 56 | 1,024 | 1,276 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages... | 869 | 1 | 7 | 34 | 827 | 938 |
| Home equity loans | 81 | 0 | (1) | 5 | 77 | 93 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 92 | 0 | 9 | 11 | 73 | 142 |
| Construction RE loans | 30 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 23 | 66 |
| Farmland loans. | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 5 |
| RE loans from foreign offices | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Commercial and industrial loans. | 2,125 | 11 | 52 | 119 | 1,943 | 3,301 |
| Loans to individuals | 2,931 | 10 | 96 | 491 | 2,334 | 4,117 |
| Credit cards. | 2,053 | 1 | 56 | 397 | 1,599 | 2,889 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 878 | 9 | 39 | 94 | 735 | 1,228 |
| All other loans and leases. | 425 | 8 | 9 | 33 | 374 | 554 |
| Charge-offs to loan and lease reserve. . . | 7,635 | 40 | 216 | 810 | 6,570 | 10,812 |
| Loans secured by real estate | 1,190 | 4 | 23 | 66 | 1,098 | 1,410 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages... | 918 | 1 | 9 | 38 | 870 | 998 |
| Home equity loans | 91 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 85 | 106 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 5 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 7 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 113 | 1 | 11 | 14 | 87 | 180 |
| Construction RE loans | 35 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 26 | 76 |
| Farmland loans | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 9 |
| RE loans from foreign offices | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 35 |
| Commercial and industrial loans. | 2,438 | 13 | 61 | 137 | 2,226 | 3,745 |
| Loans to individuals | 3,523 | 14 | 120 | 570 | 2,818 | 4,994 |
| Credit cards. | 2,354 | 1 | 68 | 447 | 1,838 | 3,345 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 1,169 | 13 | 53 | 123 | 980 | 1,649 |
| All other loans and leases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 484 | 9 | 11 | 36 | 428 | 662 |
| Recoveries credited to loan and lease reserve | 1,053 | 8 | 42 | 111 | 893 | 1,564 |
| Loans secured by real estate | 90 | 2 | 6 | 10 | 73 | 134 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages... | 49 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 43 | 60 |
| Home equity loans. | 10 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 13 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 1 | 0 | 0 | (0) | 0 | 3 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 21 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 15 | 38 |
| Construction RE loans | 5 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 9 |
| Farmland loans. | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| RE loans from foreign offices | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 6 |
| Commercial and industrial loans. | 312 | 2 | 10 | 18 | 283 | 444 |
| Loans to individuals | 591 | 3 | 25 | 79 | 484 | 878 |
| Credit cards. | 300 | 0 | 11 | 50 | 239 | 456 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 291 | 3 | 13 | 29 | 245 | 421 |
| All other loans and leases, ............................ | 60 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 53 | 108 |

## Year-to-date net loan and lease losses of national banks by asset size <br> Through September 30, 2001

(Dollar figures in millions)

|  | All national banks | National banks |  |  |  | Memoranda All commercial banks |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Less than \$100 million | $\begin{gathered} \$ 100 \\ \text { million to } \\ \$ 1 \text { billion } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { \$1 billion } \\ \text { to } \$ 10 \\ \text { billion } \end{gathered}$ | Greater than $\$ 10$ billion |  |
| Number of institutions reporting .................... | 2,173 | 1,027 | 974 | 131 | 41 | 8,149 |
| Net charge-offs to loan and lease reserve | 16,645 | 73 | 440 | 1,972 | 14,160 | 23,829 |
| Loans secured by real estate | 1,815 | 8 | 42 | 161 | 1,604 | 2,276 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages | 1,269 | 3 | 19 | 106 | 1,141 | 1,454 |
| Home equity loans. | 191 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 176 | 228 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 11 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 211 | 3 | 17 | 25 | 166 | 357 |
| Construction RE loans | 63 | 1 | 4 | 14 | 44 | 128 |
| Farmland loans. | 17 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 14 | 25 |
| RE loans from foreign offices | 61 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 61 | 73 |
| Commercial and industrial loans. | 5,789 | 28 | 119 | 371 | 5,272 | 8,656 |
| Loans to individuals | 8,009 | 27 | 257 | 1,379 | 6,346 | 11,479 |
| Credit cards. | 5,686 | 3 | 157 | 1,103 | 4,423 | 8,170 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 2,323 | 24 | 100 | 276 | 1,923 | 3,309 |
| All other loans and leases. | 1,032 | 11 | 22 | 62 | 937 | 1,418 |
| Charge-offs to loan and lease reserve. . . | 19,715 | 97 | 573 | 2,304 | 16,741 | 28,450 |
| Loans secured by real estate | 2,111 | 11 | 61 | 191 | 1,849 | 2,700 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages | 1,424 | 4 | 25 | 119 | 1,276 | 1,653 |
| Home equity loans | 218 | 0 | 3 | 16 | 199 | 268 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 11 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 23 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 285 | 4 | 25 | 35 | 222 | 476 |
| Construction RE loans | 77 | 1 | 5 | 18 | 54 | 156 |
| Farmland loans | 20 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 15 | 34 |
| RE loans from foreign offices | 75 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 75 | 91 |
| Commercial and industrial loans. | 6,604 | 34 | 149 | 431 | 5,990 | 9,877 |
| Loans to individuals | 9,761 | 37 | 333 | 1,608 | 7,782 | 14,119 |
| Credit cards. | 6,549 | 3 | 192 | 1,238 | 5,116 | 9,526 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 3,211 | 34 | 141 | 370 | 2,666 | 4,593 |
| All other loans and leases ... | 1,239 | 14 | 30 | 75 | 1,121 | 1,754 |
| Recoveries credited to loan and lease reserve | 3,070 | 23 | 133 | 332 | 2,581 | 4,621 |
| Loans secured by real estate | 296 | 3 | 19 | 30 | 244 | 425 |
| 1-4 family residential mortgages | 155 | 1 | 6 | 13 | 134 | 199 |
| Home equity loans. | 28 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 22 | 39 |
| Multifamily residential mortgages. | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 13 |
| Commercial RE loans. | 75 | 1 | 9 | 10 | 55 | 118 |
| Construction RE loans | 14 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 10 | 28 |
| Farmland loans. | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 9 |
| RE loans from foreign offices,. | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 19 |
| Commercial and industrial loans. | 814 | 6 | 30 | 60 | 718 | 1,220 |
| Loans to individuals | 1,751 | 10 | 76 | 229 | 1,436 | 2,640 |
| Credit cards. | 863 | 0 | 35 | 135 | 693 | 1,356 |
| Installment loans and other plans | 888 | 10 | 41 | 94 | 743 | 1,284 |
| All other loans and leases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 208 | 3 | 8 | 13 | 184 | 336 |

Number of national banks by state and asset size September 30, 2001

|  |  |  | Nation | banks |  | Memoranda: |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | national banks | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { Less than } \\ \$ 100 \\ \text { million } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 100 \\ & \text { million to } \\ & \$ 1 \text { billion } \end{aligned}$ | \$1 billion to \$10 billion | Greater than $\$ 10$ billion | All commercial banks |
| All institutions. . | 2,173 | 1,027 | 974 | 131 | 41 | 8,149 |
| Alabama | 23 | 12 | 10 | 1 | 0 | 158 |
| Alaska. | 3 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 6 |
| Arizona. | 18 | 8 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 44 |
| Arkansas | 40 | 11 | 28 | 1 | 0 | 182 |
| California | 83 | 35 | 39 | 7 | 2 | 302 |
| Colorado | 54 | 29 | 22 | 2 | 1 | 178 |
| Connecticut. | 8 | 3 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 24 |
| Delaware | 16 | 2 | 9 | 2 | 3 | 33 |
| District of Columbia | 5 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| Florida. | 78 | 28 | 42 | 8 | 0 | 261 |
| Georgia | 65 | 31 | 31 | 2 | 1 | 330 |
| Hawaii. | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 8 |
| Idaho. | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 17 |
| Illinois | 186 | 76 | 100 | 6 | 4 | 702 |
| Indiana | 33 | 8 | 17 | 6 | 2 | 156 |
| lowa | 46 | 25 | 19 | 2 | 0 | 423 |
| Kansas | 105 | 77 | 25 | 3 | 0 | 372 |
| Kentucky | 52 | 24 | 25 | 3 | 0 | 229 |
| Louisiana | 16 | 7 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 143 |
| Maine | 6 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 15 |
| Maryland | 13 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 72 |
| Massachusetts | 12 | 3 | 7 | 2 | 0 | 42 |
| Michigan | 27 | 11 | 15 | 0 | 1 | 162 |
| Minnesota | 127 | 80 | 43 | 2 | 2 | 484 |
| Mississippi. | 20 | 9 | 9 | 2 | 0 | 100 |
| Missouri | 46 | 23 | 19 | 3 | 1 | 352 |
| Montana . | 17 | 13 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 82 |
| Nebraska | 78 | 56 | 20 | 2 | 0 | 275 |
| Nevada. | 9 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 33 |
| New Hampshire | 6 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 15 |
| New Jersey . | 24 | 1 | 16 | 7 | 0 | 81 |
| New Mexico. | 15 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 52 |
| New York | 60 | 12 | 39 | 8 | 1 | 143 |
| North Carolina. | 8 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 78 |
| North Dakota. | 15 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 107 |
| Ohio | 88 | 37 | 37 | 8 | 6 | 206 |
| Oklahoma. | 97 | 59 | 34 | 4 | 0 | 282 |
| Oregon. | 3 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 40 |
| Pennsylvania | 87 | 23 | 55 | 6 | 3 | 181 |
| Rhode Island. | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 7 |
| South Carolina. | 25 | 15 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 77 |
| South Dakota. | 18 | 9 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 93 |
| Tennessee | 28 | 6 | 19 | 1 | 2 | 191 |
| Texas. | 346 | 204 | 133 | 8 | 1 | 692 |
| Utah | 8 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 56 |
| Vermont | 11 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 18 |
| Virginia . | 36 | 10 | 24 | 2 | 0 | 144 |
| Washington | 15 | 11 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 77 |
| West Virginia | 23 | 9 | 11 | 3 | 0 | 72 |
| Wisconsin.... | 49 | 18 | 28 | 3 | 0 | 283 |
| Wyoming | 20 | 10 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 46 |
| U.S. territories . . . . | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 |

# Total assets of national banks by state and asset size 

 September 30, 2001(Dollar figures in millions)

|  | All national banks | National banks |  |  |  | Memoranda All commercial banks |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Less than \$100 million | $\begin{gathered} \$ 100 \\ \text { million to } \\ \$ 1 \text { billion } \end{gathered}$ | $\$ 1$ billion to $\$ 10$ billion | Greater than $\$ 10$ billion |  |
| All institutions. | \$3,544,511 | \$53,299 | \$256,641 | \$411,484 | \$2,823,087 | \$6,555,668 |
| Alabama. | 3,957 | 781 | 2,086 | 1,091 | 0 | 186,814 |
| Alaska. | 5,274 | 0 | 110 | 5,164 | 0 | 6,310 |
| Arizona. | 62,374 | 227 | 2,630 | 5,437 | 54,081 | 64,841 |
| Arkansas | 8,065 | 648 | 6,358 | 1,059 | 0 | 27,420 |
| California | 198,699 | 1,841 | 11,906 | 20,872 | 164,080 | 341,355 |
| Colorado | 29,116 | 1,554 | 5,431 | 5,065 | 17,067 | 49,134 |
| Connecticut | 1,294 | 258 | 1,036 | 0 | 0 | 3,497 |
| Delaware | 111,543 | 108 | 2,841 | 4,084 | 104,509 | 154,286 |
| District of Columbia | 816 | 82 | 734 | 0 | 0 | 816 |
| Florida. | 27,928 | 1,729 | 10,404 | 15,794 | 0 | 61,172 |
| Georgia | 33,722 | 1,769 | 7,443 | 7,648 | 16,862 | 176,932 |
| Hawaii. | 327 | 0 | 327 | 0 | 0 | 23,459 |
| Idaho. | 252 | 0 | 252 | 0 | 0 | 2,793 |
| Illinois | 270,943 | 3,967 | 25,690 | 15,933 | 225,353 | 406,560 |
| Indiana | 67,031 | 388 | 6,327 | 19,260 | 41,055 | 102,645 |
| lowa | 15,724 | 1,341 | 4,625 | 9,758 | 0 | 46,105 |
| Kansas | 14,968 | 3,785 | 6,654 | 4,528 | 0 | 34,760 |
| Kentucky | 23,301 | 1,490 | 4,873 | 16,937 | 0 | 53,484 |
| Louisiana | 25,187 | 409 | 1,335 | 6,874 | 16,568 | 41,893 |
| Maine | 6,179 | 18 | 1,598 | 4,563 | 0 | 8,137 |
| Maryland | 2,434 | 337 | 2,097 | 0 | 0 | 45,920 |
| Massachusetts | 8,957 | 174 | 1,566 | 7,217 | 0 | 117,365 |
| Michigan | 21,509 | 490 | 4,477 | 0 | 16,543 | 138,620 |
| Minnesota | 77,454 | 3,907 | 11,475 | 4,010 | 58,062 | 101,185 |
| Mississippi | 10,425 | 549 | 2,014 | 7,863 | 0 | 35,333 |
| Missouri | 26,707 | 1,179 | 5,181 | 9,983 | 10,364 | 67,557 |
| Montana | 3,731 | 537 | 483 | 2,711 | 0 | 12,564 |
| Nebraska | 16,302 | 2,623 | 4,736 | 8,943 | 0 | 30,314 |
| Nevada. | 21,023 | 42 | 720 | 20,262 | 0 | 33,479 |
| New Hampshire | 23,539 | 60 | 394 | 4,902 | 18,183 | 25,881 |
| New Jersey | 31,725 | 59 | 4,638 | 27,028 | 0 | 71,043 |
| New Mexico. | 10,230 | 354 | 1,922 | 7,955 | 0 | 14,660 |
| New York | 454,581 | 809 | 12,309 | 17,176 | 424,286 | 1,459,086 |
| North Carolina. | 881,914 | 187 | 1,248 | 0 | 880,479 | 989,605 |
| North Dakota. | 11,647 | 262 | 1,713 | 9,672 | 0 | 17,774 |
| Ohio | 390,786 | 1,906 | 10,755 | 18,153 | 359,973 | 468,883 |
| Oklahoma. | 25,590 | 2,998 | 6,650 | 15,942 | 0 | 45,291 |
| Oregon. | 8,785 | 0 | 458 | 8,327 | 0 | 16,618 |
| Pennsylvania . | 144,537 | 1,382 | 17,134 | 9,776 | 116,244 | 187,062 |
| Rhode Island. | 196,499 | 8 | 0 | 6,153 | 190,338 | 206,790 |
| South Carolina. | 5,511 | 803 | 2,516 | 2,192 | 0 | 25,794 |
| South Dakota. | 29,203 | 347 | 2,558 | 8,606 | 17,692 | 37,905 |
| Tennessee | 65,560 | 434 | 5,980 | 7,862 | 51,283 | 87,163 |
| Texas. | 83,963 | 10,133 | 31,810 | 21,012 | 21,008 | 140,657 |
| Utah | 30,603 | 63 | 839 | 10,644 | 19,057 | 126,663 |
| Vermont | 3,362 | 103 | 2,228 | 1,031 | 0 | 7,745 |
| Virginia . | 14,023 | 572 | 6,742 | 6,708 | 0 | 67,074 |
| Washington | 1,873 | 595 | 1,278 | 0 | 0 | 21,780 |
| West Virginia | 10,296 | 500 | 2,147 | 7,649 | 0 | 17,885 |
| Wisconsin. | 20,483 | 1,021 | 6,361 | 13,101 | 0 | 80,813 |
| Wyoming | 4,562 | 469 | 1,550 | 2,542 | 0 | 8,197 |
| U.S. territories | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 56,549 |

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[^0]:    *Previously banks reported "Credit card \& related plans." Starting with 2001 this item will be split into separate categories, "Credit cards" and "Other revolving credit plans."

[^1]:    *Previously banks reported "Credit card \& related plans." Starting with 2001 this item will be split into separate categories, "Credit cards" and

[^2]:    ${ }^{1}$ The FRS supervises state banks that have elected to become members of the Federal Reserve System. The FDIC supervises federally insured nonmember state banks.

[^3]:    ${ }^{1}$ This exemption is particularly important since state laws generally permit banks and trust companies, but not broker-dealers, to act as trustees.
    ${ }^{2}$ Although the rules provide an exemption from the account-byaccount calculation requirement, provisions in the exemption effectively require an account-by-account calculation of compensation.

[^4]:    ${ }^{3} 12$ CFR 9.2(e).
    ${ }^{4}$ GLB Act, 201(4)(B)(viii)(1), 15 USC 78c(a)(4)(B)(viii)(I).
    ${ }^{5}$ The other exemption applies only to small banks and includes numerous burdensome restrictions.

[^5]:    ${ }^{6}$ By selling loans, banks are able to enhance their liquidity and expand the amount of credit they can offer to meet community, business, and individual needs.

[^6]:    ${ }^{7}$ Once the commission adopts final rules, the banking agencies will proceed in adopting record-keeping requirements under the GLB Act.

[^7]:    ${ }^{1}$ See 15 USC 77d(2).
    ${ }^{2}$ See 15 USC 80a-3(c)(7).

[^8]:    ${ }^{3}$ The bank states that in valuing loans at "fair value," it will consider relevant factors such as: (1) the existence of bona fide, nondistressed transactions on the bank loans, if available; (2) data such as costs, size, current interest rate, period until next interest rate reset, maturity and base lending rate of the loans, the terms and conditions of the loans and any related agreements, and the position of the loans in the borrower's debt structure; (3) the nature, adequacy, and value of the collateral, including the investment manager's rights, remedies, and interests with respect to the collateral; (4) the creditworthiness of the borrower's business, cash flows, capital structure, and future prospects; (5) reliable price quotations for and trading in bank loans and interests in similar loans and the market environment and investor attitudes towards the bank loan investments and interests in similar loans; (6) the reputation and financial condition of the borrower, shareholders of the borrower, and/or the agent and any intermediary in the bank loans; and (7) general economic market conditions affecting the fair value of the bank loans.

[^9]:    ${ }^{4} 12$ CFR $1.2(e)$.
    ${ }^{5} \mathrm{ld}$.
    ${ }^{6}$ See id.
    ${ }^{7}$ ld. at $1.2(f)(4)$.
    ${ }^{8} / d$. at $1.3(\mathrm{i})(1)$.
    ${ }^{9}$ See id. at $1.3(\mathrm{i})(2)$. This limit is 5 percent for all securities, in the aggregate, acquired pursuant to reliable estimates authority.
    ${ }^{10}$ See id. at 1.5(a).
    ${ }^{11}$ See id. at 1.3(h)(1).

[^10]:    ${ }^{12}$ See id. at 1.3(h). Banking Circular No. 220 (November 21, 1986) (BC-220) states that the investment company must be registered with the SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and Securities Act of 1933 or be a privately offered fund sponsored by an affiliated commercial bank. The proposed fund is privately offered, but not from an affiliated bank. The OCC, however, has permitted exceptions to the BC-220 requirements. See, e.g., 12 CFR 1.3(h)(2). The fund at issue here is exempt from registration under the Investment Company Act of 1940 because its investors must be "qualified purchasers." See 12 USC 80a-3(c)(7). The proposed fund would also qualify as an exception to BC-220 because its portfolio consists exclusively of assets that a national bank may purchase and sell for its own account, and it is exempt from registration under the Investment Company Act of 1940. The fact that the exemption is provided under 12 USC 80a-3(c)(7), and not under 80a-3(c)(1), is immaterial. While section 3(c)(7) does not restrict participation to 100 or fewer investors, it does require a more sophisticated investor, i.e., a "qualified purchaser," than under section 3(c)(1).
    ${ }^{13}$ See Interpretive Letter No. 617 (March 4, 1993), reprinted in [1992-93 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) I 83,457; and Interpretive Letter No. 435 (June 30, 1988), reprinted in [198889 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ๆ 85,659.
    ${ }^{14}$ See 12 USC 24(Seventh).
    ${ }^{15}$ See Nations Bank v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company, 513 US 251 (1995).
    ${ }^{16}$ See Interpretive Letter No. 579 (March 24, 1992), reprinted in [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ๆ 83,349.

[^11]:    ${ }^{17}$ See Banking Circular No. 181 (Rev.) (August 2, 1984). The OCC currently is contemplating issuing a revision to Banking Circular No. 181 (Rev.). Banks must conform their activities to the guidance contained in Banking Circular No. 181 (Rev.) and all subsequent revisions, both when purchasing and when continuing to hold interests in loan funds.
    ${ }^{18}$ See Interpretive Letter No. 834 (July 8, 1998), reprinted in [1998-99 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ๆ 81-288; Interpretive Letter No. 833 (July 8, 1998), reprinted in [1998-99 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) Il 81-287; and Interpretive Letter No. 579, supra.
    ${ }^{19}$ See Interpretive Letter No. 663 (June 8, 1995), reprinted in [1994-95 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) If 83,611; and Interpretive Letter No. 579, supra.
    ${ }^{20}$ See Banking Circular No. 181, supra.
    ${ }^{21}$ See 12 CFR 1.3(h); Interpretive Letter No. 687, supra.
    ${ }^{22}$ See 12 USC 24(Seventh).
    ${ }^{23}$ See 12 CFR 1.2(e).

[^12]:    ${ }^{24}$ See generally 12 CFR 1.5(a).

[^13]:    ${ }^{1}$ You also question the capital gain or loss ramifications, and the tax-exempt status, of fund investments. We express no view on these issues.
    ${ }^{2}$ If the fund is an affiliate of the [ ] ("bank"), any investments by the bank and its affiliated depository institutions in the fund would be subject to 12 USC 371c and 371c-1.

[^14]:    ${ }^{3}$ The fund will purchase municipal bonds based upon an assessment of a bond's relative value in terms of current yield, price, credit quality, and future prospects. The fund also will monitor the continued creditworthiness of its municipal investments, and analyze economic, political, and demographic trends affecting the municipal markets.
    ${ }^{4}$ National banks may purchase investment company shares for their own account based on other authorities, subject to applicable limits. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 897 (October 23, 2000), reprinted in [2000-2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 『 81416.
    ${ }^{5}$ See 12 CFR $1.3(h)(1)(i)$.
    ${ }^{6}$ See 12 CFR 1.3(h)(2).

[^15]:    ${ }^{7}$ See 12 USC 24(Seventh).
    812 CFR 1.2(e). A security is not predominantly speculative in nature if it is rated investment grade. When a security is not rated, the security must be the credit equivalent of a security rated investment grade. Id.

    912 CFR 1.2(i) and 1.3(a). You represent that, in addition to municipal revenue bonds, the fund will hold only Type I investment securities.
    ${ }^{10}$ Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 151, 113 Stat. 1338, 1384 (1999) (codified at 12 USC 24(Seventh)); see also 12 CFR $1.2(\mathrm{i})(5)$.
    ${ }^{11}$ Section 38 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 USC 18310, states that "[a]n insured depository institution is 'well capitalized' if it significantly exceeds the required minimum level for each relevant capital measure." 12 USC $1831 o(b)(1)(A)$. Section 38 also states that "[e]ach appropriate Federal banking agency shall, by regulation, specify for each relevant capital measure the levels at which an insured depository institution is well capitalized." 12 USC 1831o(c)(2). The OCC defines "well capitalized" for national banks at 12 CFR 6.4(b)(1).

[^16]:    ${ }^{12}$ Footnote 10, supra. 2001. tion of a Type I security.
    ${ }^{16}$ See 12 CFR $1.2(\mathrm{e})$ and (f)(2).
    ${ }^{17}$ See 12 CFR 1.2(d) and (g).
    ${ }^{18}$ See 15 USC 77a, et seq.
    ${ }^{19}$ See 15 USC 77c(a)(2).
    ${ }^{20}$ See 17 CFR 230.144A.

[^17]:    one issuer, a national bank could include its entire investment in the fund in its 5 percent "reliable estimates" investment limitation if the investment in the fund satisfied the criteria described above.
    ${ }^{31} 12$ CFR Part 3, Appendix A. The risk-weights for national bank assets and off-balance-sheet items, range from zero to 100 percent. The higher the risk-weight percentage, the riskier the asset category. For example, the risk-weight percentage for private loans is 100 percent, while the risk-weight percentage for government securities is 0 percent. Thus, no capital is necessary to offset government securities, while 100 percent of the specified minimum capital levels must be held against a bank's loans.
    ${ }^{32} / d$. at Section 3.
    ${ }^{33} / d$.
    $34 / d$.
    3512 CFR Part 3, Appendix A, Section 3; Final Rule, "Risk-Based Capital Standards," 64 Fed. Reg. 10194 (March 2, 1999).

    $$
    { }^{36} \mathrm{ld} .
    $$

    $$
    { }^{37} \mathrm{ld}
    $$

[^18]:    ${ }^{38} / \mathrm{ld}$.

[^19]:    ${ }^{1}$ This result is consistent with the discussion of this issue in recent law review articles. See Charles Cheatham, "Changes in Filing Procedures under Revised Article 9," 25 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 235, 244 n. 42 (2000). See also Terry M. Anderson et al., "Attachment and Perfection of Security Interests under Revised Article 9: A 'Nuts and Bolts' Primer," 9 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 179, 210 n. 129 (2001).

[^20]:    ${ }^{1}$ Elsewhere the materials provide that the management component of the program "involves the Operations person making judgments on when to pay over the specified limit, when to restrict or otherwise curtail the privilege, when to charge off delinquent accounts."
    ${ }^{2}$ Other materials also introduce language that could be construed as providing a basis for the bank to not pay overdrafts despite representations otherwise. Marketing materials state that if an account is in good standing, the bank will "normally" pay overdrafts up to the stated limits. At another point in the materials, it states that if the account is in good standing we will approve your "reasonable" overdrafts. Elsewhere, the materials refer to the program as a "non-contractual customer courtesy that can be withdrawn at any time." In addition, the requirement of a positive balance at least once every 30 days is, at some places, stated as the "need to make regular deposits to bring the account to a positive balance at least once every 30 days." It is unclear if this is one test or two-in other words, even if the account is brought to a positive balance in 30 days, can the overdraft feature be terminated if the bank did not consider "regular deposits" to have been made and, if so, what constitutes the making of "regular deposits."

[^21]:    ${ }^{5}$ See OCC Advisory Letter No. 2000-9: Third-Party Risk (August 29, 2000).

[^22]:    ${ }^{6}$ The materials are contradictory with respect to a bank's expectations about the use that its customers will make of the program. On the one hand, a sample letter states that the program "is not an invitation to overdraw your account, it is an added layer of protection should you accidentally write checks for more than you have in the bank." On the other hand, marketing materials state: "Once you [the bank] and [3rd party] install and implement the process, a phenomenon occurs. Your customers will use it and use it and use it . . . and your NSF income will soar." At another point, the marketing materials advise the customer: "This [overdraft privilege] is extended to you to provide additional flexibility and convenience in managing your funds. ..." It belies logic to conclude that the customers will accidentally "use it and use it and use it" and that the program is designed to provide accidental "additional flexibility and convenience" to customers in managing their funds.

[^23]:    ${ }^{7}$ For instance, a customer with a $\$ 500$ overdraft limit who writes seven NSF checks in a month for a total overdraft of $\$ 360$ would be assessed $\$ 140$. We note, too, the observation in the materials with respect to the [repayment] program that "the customer will be encouraged to come in, acknowledge the OD amount (a large portion of which will now be fees), and set up a payment plan."

[^24]:    ${ }^{1}$ Section 151 provides:
    $\ldots$...[The limitations and restrictions contained in this paragraph as to dealing in, underwriting, and purchasing investment securities for the national bank's own account shall not apply to obligations ... issued by or on behalf of any State or political subdivision of a State, including any municipal corporate instrumentality of 1 or more States, or any public agency or authority of any State or political subdivision of a State, if the national bank is well capitalized (as defined in section 38 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act).

[^25]:    ${ }^{2}$ Pub. L. 93-100 5(c), 87 Stat. 344 (August 16, 1973).
    ${ }^{3}$ Emphasis added. This provision in Section 5 of Pub. L. 93-100 is codified as 12 USC 1470.
    ${ }^{4}$ Congress has authority to enact and amend statutes in ways that change the scope or effect of an existing statute. See 1A Sutherland Stat. Const. 22.01 (5th ed.) (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1995).

[^26]:    NM indicates calculated percent change is not meaningful.
    NA not available

[^27]:    * Includes mortgage indebtedness

    NM indicates calculated percent change is not meaningful.

[^28]:    * Includes mortgage indebtedness

    NM indicates calculated percent change is not meaningful.

[^29]:    *Prior to March 2001, also included "Other revolving credit plans."

[^30]:    * Includes mortgage indebtedness

